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ABSTRACT 
My thesis studies how people pay attention to other people and the environment. How 
does the brain figure out what is important and what are the neural mechanisms 
underlying attention? What is special about salient social cues compared to salient non-
social cues? In Chapter I, I review social cues that attract attention, with an emphasis on 
the neurobiology of these social cues. I also review neurological and psychiatric links: the 
relationship between saliency, the amygdala and autism. The first empirical chapter then 
begins by noting that people constantly move in the environment. In Chapter II, I study 
the spatial cues that attract attention during locomotion using a cued speeded 
discrimination task. I found that when the motion was expansive, attention was attracted 
towards the singular point of the optic flow (the focus of expansion, FOE) in a sustained 
fashion. The more ecologically valid the motion features became (e.g., temporal 
expansion of each object, spatial depth structure implied by distribution of the size of the 
objects), the stronger the attentional effects. However, compared to inanimate objects and 
cues, people preferentially attend to animals and faces, a process in which the amygdala 
is thought to play an important role. To directly compare social cues and non-social cues 
in the same experiment and investigate the neural structures processing social cues, in 
Chapter III, I employ a change detection task and test four rare patients with bilateral 
amygdala lesions. All four amygdala patients showed a normal pattern of reliably faster 
and more accurate detection of animate stimuli, suggesting that advantageous processing 
of social cues can be preserved even without the amygdala, a key structure of the “social 
brain”. People not only attend to faces, but also pay attention to others’ facial emotions 
and analyze faces in great detail. Humans have a dedicated system for processing faces 
and the amygdala has long been associated with a key role in recognizing facial 
emotions. In Chapter IV, I study the neural mechanisms of emotion perception and find 
that single neurons in the human amygdala are selective for subjective judgment of 
others’ emotions. Lastly, people typically pay special attention to faces and people, but 
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people with autism spectrum disorders (ASD) might not. To further study social attention 
and explore possible deficits of social attention in autism, in Chapter V, I employ a visual 
search task and show that people with ASD have reduced attention, especially social 
attention, to target-congruent objects in the search array. This deficit cannot be explained 
by low-level visual properties of the stimuli and is independent of the amygdala, but it is 
dependent on task demands. Overall, through visual psychophysics with concurrent eye-
tracking, my thesis found and analyzed socially salient cues and compared social vs. non-
social cues and healthy vs. clinical populations. Neural mechanisms underlying social 
saliency were elucidated through electrophysiology and lesion studies. I finally propose 
further research questions based on the findings in my thesis and introduce my follow-up 
studies and preliminary results beyond the scope of this thesis in the very last section, 
Future Directions.  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Chapter I: General Introduction  
!
1.1 Overview 
Saliency historically refers to the bottom-up visual properties of an object that 
automatically drive attention. It is an ordinal property that depends on the relative 
saliency of one object with respect to others in the scene. Simple examples are a red spot 
on a green background, a horizontal bar among vertical bars, or a sudden onset of motion. 
Researchers have introduced the idea of a saliency map, an abstract and featureless map 
of the ‘winners’ of attention competition, to model the dynamics of visual attention. The 
standard saliency map involves channels like color, orientation, size, shape, movement or 
unique onset. But how do complex stimuli, especially stimuli with social meaning such as 
faces, pop out and attract attention? Suppose you are attending a big party: your attention 
might be captured by someone in a fancy dress, someone looking at you, someone who is 
attractive, familiar, or distinctive in some way. This happens essentially automatically, 
and encompasses a huge number of different stimuli that are all competing for your 
attention. What determines which is the most salient, and how can we best measure this? 
Humans are social animals. We constantly interact with other people and the environment 
and we are unceasingly bombarded with various socially salient stimuli: faces, gestures, 
emoticons, and socially relevant pieces of text. These capture our attention, are encoded 
preferentially into memory, and influences our thoughts and actions. What is it about such 
stimuli that accomplishes these multiple effects? In particular, are there mechanisms 
analogous to those known to operate for low-level (non-social) saliency (such as visual 
motion and contrast)? Is there a finite vocabulary of social attention-grabbing cues, or a 
small set of dimensions that render social stimuli especially salient? Finally, how does the 
brain figure out what is important and what are the underlying neural mechanisms? 
To understand these questions, I conducted several studies in my thesis. First, I analyzed 
a strong non-social cue, optic flow, that is well known to attract attention. Second, I 
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compared animate social cues to inanimate non-social cues in an attentional change 
detection task and investigated their dependence on the amygdala, a neural structure that 
is recognized for processing socially relevant stimuli. Third, I analyzed in detail one 
particularly salient social stimuli—faces, and its neural representation in the amygdala. 
Lastly, I directly compared social stimuli of people and faces to non-social stimuli of, 
e.g., food, gadgets, and electronics, in an attentional visual search task. Deficiencies in 
processing social cues lead to complex disabilities such as autism. In the last study, I also 
included people with autism spectrum disorders (ASD) to explore the deficits in 
processing socially salient stimuli, and compared results from this clinical population 
directly with the results from patients with amygdala lesions. 
The General Introduction is organized as follows. First, I begin by discussing the socially 
salient cues, including eye gazes, faces, head directions, finger gestures, postures, actions, 
biological motion, personal distance, social touch, and social rewards. I underscore the 
neural substrates underlying processing of such social stimuli. Second, I discuss the role 
of the amygdala in encoding saliency. Third, I discuss the deficits in processing socially 
salient stimuli in autism and the possible involvement of the amygdala in these deficits. 
Lastly, I outline my thesis and propose future directions. 
!
1.2 Socially salient cues 
In everyday life, we are constantly bombarded by social cues. Rich information can be 
derived through social cues. But how does the brain figure out the message conveyed by 
the social cues? How are social cues represented and integrated in the brain? In particular, 
is social interaction mediated through a mechanism that relies on saliency? 
In this section, I discuss the socially salient cues, which include eye gazes, faces, head 
directions, finger gestures, postures, actions, biological motion, personal distance, social 
touch, and social rewards. I also discuss what is known about the functions and the neural 
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underpinnings of each social cue, as well as the developmental ontogeny and comparative 
neurobiology of the social cues. 
!
1.2.1 Eye gaze 
Eye gaze plays important roles in social communication. It functions for information 
seeking, signaling, controlling the synchronizing of speech, cueing for intimacy, avoiding 
undue intimacy, and avoiding excess input of information (Argyle et al., 1973). 
Especially, eye gaze directs attention and provides important sources of social 
information. Behavioral studies show that chimpanzees spontaneously follow human 
gaze direction and share joint visual attention (Povinelli and Eddy, 1996). Rhesus 
monkeys can also follow gazes and use the attentional cues of other monkeys to orient 
their own attention to objects (Emery et al., 1997). Human studies show that newborns 
prefer faces with eyes open vs. eyes closed (Batki et al., 2000), and that infants as early 
as 10 weeks of age follow the gaze of others (Hood et al., 1998), arguing for innate 
aspects to gaze cognition. Deficiencies in processing eye gaze is associated with complex 
disabilities such as autism spectrum disorder  (Pelphrey et al., 2002). 
Friesen and Kingstone reported that humans attend reflexively to locations and objects 
that are being looked at by other people (Friesen and Kingstone, 1998). Humans infer 
other people’s movement trajectories from their gaze direction and use this information to 
guide their own visual scanning of the environment (Nummenmaa et al., 2009). However, 
the specificity of eye gaze in orienting attention has been questioned and it has been 
reported that other non-social stimuli, such as arrows, trigger reflexive shifts in attention 
in a manner behaviorally identical to those triggered by eyes (Ristic et al., 2002). Further 
investigation has differentiated these two types of attentional cues neuronally, showing 
that the neural systems subserving eye gazes and arrows are not equivalent—with the 
superior temporal sulcus (STS) being engaged disproportionately when the fixation 
stimulus is perceived as eyes (Kingstone et al., 2004). This is further supported by a study 
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using a similar spatial cueing paradigm on a patient with circumscribed superior temporal 
gyrus damage, who showed a detection advantage only when cued by non-biological 
arrows but not gaze (Akiyama et al., 2006). The specificity of the STS in cueing by gaze 
is also illustrated through patients with parietal damage—perceived gaze in faces can still 
trigger automatic shifts of attention in the contra-lesional direction, even though parietal 
damage causes spatial neglect and impairs the representation of location on the contra-
lesional side (Vuilleumier, 2002). This suggests a specific and anatomically distinct 
attentional mechanism through the STS. Interestingly, attentional shift by gaze can be 
triggered without awareness (Sato et al., 2007). 
STS activation has consistently been demonstrated in the normal brain when viewing 
eyes and this brain region has been implicated in gaze processing. Recordings from single 
cells in awake, behaving monkeys have shown that this region of the temporal lobe is 
sensitive to faces and further modulated by head direction and gaze direction (Perrett et 
al., 1985). Similarly, STS lesions in the rhesus monkey impair gaze direction 
discrimination (Campbell et al., 1990). Human neuroimaging studies have demonstrated 
that a superior temporal region centered in the STS is activated when a subject views a 
face in which the eyes shift their gaze (Puce et al., 1998). In a spatial cueing paradigm, 
the STS has been demonstrated to be sensitive to the social context in which a gaze shift 
occurs (Pelphrey et al., 2003). Moreover, in a virtual reality environment, mutual gaze 
evokes greater activity in the STS than averted gaze, suggesting that the STS is involved 
in processing social information conveyed by gaze shifts within an overtly social context 
(Pelphrey et al., 2004). Multivariate pattern analysis of human functional imaging data 
has shown that anterior STS encodes the direction of another’s attention regardless of 
how this information is conveyed (Carlin et al., 2011). 
Perception of eye gaze also recruits the spatial cognition system in the intraparietal sulcus 
to encode and pay attention to the direction of another’s gaze (Hoffman and Haxby, 
2000). Research with split-brain patients suggests that lateralized cortical connections 
between temporal lobe subsystems specialized for processing gaze, and parietal lobe 
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subsystems specialized for orienting spatial attention, underlie the reflexive joint 
attention elicited by gaze (Kingstone et al., 2000). Besides the STS, contrasting between 
directed vs. averted gaze produces a tight cluster of activation corresponding to and 
restricted to the central nucleus and the bed nucleus of the stria terminalis (termed the 
lateral extended amygdala) in the monkey (Hoffman et al., 2007). 
!
1.2.2 Faces 
People often form judgments of others based purely on facial features. People are able to 
pick up subtle changes in facial structures from faces varying along one dimension to 
another (Oosterhof and Todorov, 2008). Trait evaluations from faces can predict 
important social outcomes. Inferences of competence based solely on facial appearance 
predict the outcomes of elections (Todorov et al., 2005). Facial features can also 
influence sentencing decisions – inmates with more Afrocentric features received harsher 
sentences than those with less Afrocentric features (Blair et al., 2004). Remarkably, 
impressions and judgments of unfamiliar people can be formed by a very brief exposure 
to faces as short as 100 ms (Willis and Todorov, 2006). 
Primates have a dedicated visual system to process faces (Tsao et al., 2006). 
Electrophysiological recordings in monkeys (Rolls, 1984, Leonard et al., 1985) and 
humans (Kreiman et al., 2000, Rutishauser et al., 2011) have found single neurons that 
respond not only to faces, but also to face identities, facial expressions and gaze 
directions (Gothard et al., 2007, Hoffman et al., 2007). Neuroimaging studies have 
revealed neural substrates for emotional attention, which might supplement but also 
compete with other sources of top-down control on perception (Vuilleumier, 2005). In 
particular, the amygdala plays a crucial role in emotional attention and is required for 
accurate social judgments of other individuals on the basis of their facial appearance. The 
amygdala also shares parallel roles in humans and other animals in emotional influences 
on attention and social behavior (see Phelps and LeDoux, 2005 for a review). Lesion 
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studies showed that patients with complete bilateral amygdala damage judge unfamiliar 
individuals to be more approachable and more trustworthy than do control subjects 
(Adolphs et al., 1998). The impairment is most striking for faces which normal subjects 
judge most unapproachable and untrustworthy. Besides the amygdala, recent findings 
show that orbitofrontal cortex lesions result in abnormal social judgments to emotional 
faces (Willis et al., 2010). The relationship between the amygdala and saliency is 
reviewed in more detail in the next section.  
As reviewed in more detail below, people with autism have altered saliency 
representations towards faces compared to non-face objects, as shown by reduced 
attention to faces compared to inanimate objects (Dawson et al., 2005, Sasson, 2006), as 
well as circumscribed interests to a narrow range of inanimate subjects (e.g., gadgets, 
devices, electronics and Japanese animation, etc.) (Kanner, 1943, Lewis and Bodfish, 
1998, South et al., 2005). It has even been shown in children and adolescents (Sasson et 
al., 2008), as well as in 2–5 year-olds (Sasson et al., 2011), that people with autism 
fixated faces or people less than controls when freely viewing arrays containing both 
faces and non-face objects. When looking within faces, the relative saliency of facial 
features is also altered in autism, as evidenced from both behavioral and neuronal 
findings: people with autism have an increased tendency to saccade away from (Spezio et 
al., 2007b) and actively avoid the eyes (Kliemann et al., 2010), but have an increased 
preference to fixate (Neumann et al., 2006) and rely on information from the mouth 
(Spezio et al., 2007a). The behavioral abnormality is supported by neuronal evidence of 
abnormal processing of information from the eye region of faces in single cells recorded 
from the amygdala in neurosurgical patients with ASD (Rutishauser et al., 2013). 
Interestingly, gaze cues interact with facial emotion cues. It has been shown that direct 
gaze facilitates the processing of facially communicated approach-oriented emotions 
(e.g., anger and joy), whereas averted gaze would facilitate the processing of facially 
communicated avoidance-oriented emotions (e.g., fear and sadness), suggesting that gaze 
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cues combine with facial emotion cues in the processing of emotionally relevant facial 
information (Adams and Kleck, 2003). 
!
1.2.3 Head direction 
Comparative research with non-human primates suggests that the orientation of the head 
might provide a stronger cue to another individual’s attentional direction than eye-gaze 
alone (Langton et al., 2000). In humans, manipulating the face directions of emotional 
expressions in the unilateral visual fields allows us to alter the emotional significance of 
the facial expression for the observer without affecting the physical features of the 
expression. It has been shown that the left amygdala increases activity for angry 
expressions looking towards the subjects than angry expressions looking away from 
them, suggesting that the amygdala is involved in emotional processing for facial 
expressions (Sato et al., 2004). In infants, the emergence of the tendency to look where 
another person looks is a fundamental landmark in the development of referential 
communication. It has been found that normal infants 10 to 12 months old reliably look 
in the direction towards which adults turn their heads and eyes (Scaife and Bruner, 1975). 
There is often interplay between gaze direction and head direction. Human neuroimaging 
studies suggest that right anterior STS is invariant to head view and physical image 
features (Carlin et al., 2011). Furthermore, head direction cues also interact with body 
direction cues—only when the head is rotated in the cuing person’s reference frame but 
not the observer’s frame, can head direction cues shift the observer’s attention to the 
same direction (Hietanen, 2002). 
!
1.2.4 Finger gestures 
Finger pointing provides social information and captures attention. Many animals can use 
experimenter-given cues in an experimental setup and are sensitive to human gestural 
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communication. In object-choice tasks, lowland gorillas complete the task better when 
the experimenter taps on or points at an object that contains a reward. Performance 
remains good when the experimenter gazes with eyes and head orients towards the 
correct object without manual gestures. In contrast, when only the experimenter's eye 
orientation serves as the cue, the gorillas do not appropriately complete the task (Peignot 
and Anderson, 1999) (but also see (Byrnit, 2009)). In a similar task, capuchin monkeys 
do not use the experimenter's gazing as a cue to find the correct baited object. In contrast, 
they do use gazing plus pointing, and it has been shown that pointing is necessary and 
sufficient under the conditions of the study (Anderson et al., 1995). Dogs are able to 
utilize pointing, bowing, nodding, head turning and glancing gestures of humans as cues 
for finding hidden food. Interestingly, this ability can be generalized from one person 
(owner) to another familiar person (experimenter) in using the same gestures as cues 
(Miklösi et al., 1998). Even fur seals were found to be able to follow human gestures—
they are able to use cues involving a fully exposed arm or a head direction, but fail to use 
glance only, suggesting that a domestication process is not necessary to develop receptive 
skills to cues given by humans (Scheumann and Call, 2004). In humans, finger pointing 
gestures can interfere with speech in a Stroop-type paradigm, suggesting that verbal and 
non-verbal dimensions are integrated prior to the response selection stage of processing 
(Langton et al., 1996). 
!
1.2.5 Postures, actions and biological motion 
People not only pay attention to their own motion in the environment (Wang et al., 
2012a), but also pay attention to and automatically infer other people’s mental states such 
as intention from their motion and actions. Psychophysical and functional neuroimaging 
evidence shows that biological motion is processed as a special category, and the 
mechanism underlying the attribution of intentions to actions might rely on simulating the 
observed action and mapping it onto representations of our own intentions (Blakemore 
and Decety, 2001). In a visual search paradigm with point-light animations, 
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differentiating between actions requires attention in general and there are search 
asymmetries between actions (van Boxtel and Lu, 2011). Particularly, animated 
threatening boxer targets pop out from emotionally neutral walker distractors in a crowd, 
whereas walkers do not, showing that body cues signal important social information 
related to threat and survival (van Boxtel and Lu, 2012). It has been suggested that body 
cues rather than facial expressions discriminate between intense positive and negative 
emotions (Aviezer et al., 2012). Even laboratory rodents, the rat, the mouse, the guinea 
pig, and the golden hamster, use postures and acts to signal social information (Grant and 
Mackintosh, 1963). 
!
1.2.6 Personal distance 
When interpersonal space is invaded, people feel uncomfortable and aroused. People 
automatically and reliably regulate the distance between one another during social 
interaction (Hall, 1966). The amygdala may be required to trigger strong emotional and 
arousal reactions when personal space is invaded, as evidenced by neuroimaging data 
showing amygdala activation in healthy individuals upon close personal proximity, and a 
lack of personal space in an individual with complete amygdala lesions (Kennedy et al., 
2009). This is consistent with monkey studies showing that amygdalectomized monkeys 
demonstrated increased social affiliation, decreased anxiety, and increased confidence 
compared with control monkeys (Emery et al., 2001). These effects might arise from lack 
of a saliency signal mediated by the amygdala to personal space violation. Furthermore, 
the monkey amygdala mediates the approach and avoidance to ambiguous or threatening 
novel situations and people (Mason et al., 2006). 
!
1.2.7 Social touch 
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Social touch is a salient cue in our everyday social interactions since it plays a 
particularly important role in social bonding which, in turn, has a major impact on an 
individual’s lifetime reproductive fitness (Dunbar, 2010). Interpersonal touch provides an 
effective means of influencing people’s various social behaviors (see Gallace and Spence, 
2010 for a review) and plays an important role in governing our emotional well-being 
(Field, 2003). Human orbitofrontal cortex represents affectively positive and negative 
touch in different areas (Rolls et al., 2003) (also see Rolls, 2010 for a review). 
In addition to the fast-conducting myelinated afferent fibers responsible for tactile 
sensation, a system of slow-conducting unmyelinated tactile (CT) afferents is responsible 
for affective sensation, as supported by neuroimaging studies in a unique patient lacking 
large myelinated afferents. Those studies showed that touch activates brain regions 
implicated in emotional and social processing such as the insula, but not primary 
somatosensory areas (Olausson et al., 2002). Further electrophysiological studies in 
healthy individuals have shown that soft brush stroking activates CT afferents but not 
myelinated afferents, suggesting that CT afferents constitute a privileged peripheral 
pathway for pleasant tactile stimulation that is likely to signal affiliative social body 
contact (Loken et al., 2009). However, recent neuroimaging studies in humans have 
shown that the response in primary somatosensory cortices to a sensual caress is modified 
by the perceived sex of the caresser, arguing for a more important role that 
somatosensory areas might play in affective processing than previously thought (Gazzola 
et al., 2012). Indeed, the different components of social touch, such as somatosensory 
experience, the proximity to the person, and an attribution of the somatosensory 
experience to the person, have been teased apart (Schirmer et al., 2011). All these 
findings illustrate that touch is a special and salient social cue that enhances visual 
attention and sensitizes ongoing cognitive and emotional processes. 
!
1.2.8 Social rewards 
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People not only pay attention to concrete, physical social cues delivered by direct body-
body interaction, but also pay attention to more abstract social cues such as rewards. 
Attentional control is at the center of the function of dopamine in reinforcement learning 
and animal approach behavior (Ikemoto and Panksepp, 1999, Wise, 2004). Dopamine 
systems mediate the incentive saliency of rewards by specifically changing the perceptual 
representation of reward-conditioned stimuli such that they become salient and draw 
attention (Berridge and Robinson, 1998). It has been shown that sensory and perceptual 
processing of reward-associated visual features is facilitated such that attention is 
deployed to objects characterized by these features, even when a strategic decision to 
attend to reward-associated features will be counterproductive and result in suboptimal 
performance (Hickey et al., 2010). Visual search for a salient target is slowed by the 
presence of an inconspicuous, task irrelevant distractor previously associated with 
monetary reward through learning, showing that the value of stimuli can modulate 
voluntary attention allocation (Anderson et al., 2011). Reward can even create 
oculomotor saliency and modulate saccade trajectories, suggesting low-level and non-
strategic mechanisms that operate automatically (Hickey and van Zoest, 2012). 
Complex social behavior and decision making may share the same neural basis as simple 
monetary evaluation and learning. The acquisition of one’s good reputation activated 
striatum as robustly as did monetary rewards, suggesting a ‘common neural currency’ for 
rewards (Izuma et al., 2008). In healthy individuals, social and monetary reward learning 
share overlapping neural substrates (Lin et al., 2012b). In monkeys, neurons from 
orbitofrontal cortex signal both social values and juice rewards, and far more neurons 
signal social category than fluid value, despite the stronger impact of fluid reward on 
monkeys’ choices (Watson and Platt, 2012). Interestingly, people can make optimal 
reward choices without being fully aware of the basis of their decision (Wang et al., 
2012b). Moreover, people with autism show various impairments in social decision 
making and reward learning (see below) (Izuma et al., 2011, Lin et al., 2012a, Lin et al., 
2012c). 
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1.3 Neural representation of saliency 
A distributed network of visuomotor areas is proposed to encode a representation of 
saliency that combines bottom-up and top-down influences to identify locations for 
further processing. Neurons in the primate frontal eye field (FEF) exhibit the 
characteristics of a visual saliency map—they are not sensitive to specific features of 
visual stimuli, but their activity evolves over time to select the target of the search array 
(Thompson et al., 1996, Thompson and Bichot, 2005). Visual activity in the FEF not only 
signals location of targets for orienting, but also signals movement-related saccade 
preparation (Murthy et al., 2009). However, in an adjacent area, the supplementary eye 
field (SEF), only very few neurons selected the location of the search target (Purcell et 
al., 2012), showing a very limited role of the SEF in encoding target saliency. Moreover, 
it has also been shown that neurons in the lateral intraparietal (LIP) area reflect selection 
to salient stimuli defined by a target when animals have to make a saccade towards the 
salient stimulus (Thomas and Paré, 2007). Activity in the LIP correlates with the 
monkey’s planning of memory-guided saccades to goal-directed salient locations in 
visual search tasks (Ipata et al., 2006) and these neurons only respond to stimuli that are 
behaviorally significant (Gottlieb et al., 1998). Studies have even found pure bottom-up 
saliency signals in LIP in a passive fixation task without any top-down instructions 
(Arcizet et al., 2011). Furthermore, individual neurons in monkey area 7a of the posterior 
parietal cortex encode the location of the salient stimulus and can thus provide spatial 
information required for orienting to a salient spot in a complex scene (Constantinidis 
and Steinmetz, 2001). 
Besides cortical areas, subcortical superior colliculus (SC) encodes both stimulus identity 
and saccade goals during visual conjunction search (Shen and Paré, 2007). Neuronal 
activity in the SC signals selection or increased saliency of subsequent saccade goals 
even before the initial saccade has ended (McPeek and Keller, 2002), and a recent report 
has shown that the process can encompass at least two future saccade targets (Shen and 
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Paré, 2014), suggesting parallel processing of visual saliency in the SC. The causal 
functional role of the SC in target selection has been revealed by focal reversible 
inactivation in monkeys (McPeek and Keller, 2004). Interestingly, even substantia nigra 
pars reticulata (SNr) has been shown to change activity with target selection and saccade 
initiation, which in turn may make substantial and direct contributions to the SC (Basso 
and Wurtz, 2002). 
On the other hand, neurons in the inferior temporal cortex have been suggested to play a 
critical role in representing and processing visual objects (Gross, 1994, Logothetis and 
Sheinberg, 1996, Tanaka, 1997), which holds for both isolated objects and objects in 
complex natural scenes (Sheinberg and Logothetis, 2001). Compared to visual areas in 
the temporal lobe, early visual areas such as V1 and V2 are generally accepted to 
represent low-level visual features, and V4 has been reported to show convergence of 
bottom-up and top-down processing streams that facilitate oculomotor planning for visual 
search (Mazer and Gallant, 2003). V4 neurons not only enhance responses to a preferred 
stimulus in their receptive field when the stimulus matched a feature of the target, but 
also enhance responses to candidate targets selected for saccades (Bichot et al., 2005). 
Comparing pop-out and conjunctive stimuli, V4 neurons encode pop-out saliency in a 
top-down attention-dependent manner (Burrows and Moore, 2009). In both single 
saccade tasks (Chelazzi et al., 1993, Tolias et al., 2001, Ogawa and Komatsu, 2004) and 
tasks with naturalistic free-viewing (Sheinberg and Logothetis, 2001, Mazer and Gallant, 
2003, Bichot et al., 2005), several studies have reported that temporal cortical neurons 
enhanced responses to visual stimuli presaccadically when the stimulus in the receptive 
field becomes the target, suggesting that task-relevant target saliency is encoded by these 
neurons. 
!
1.4 Saliency and the amygdala 
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The human amygdala is critical to process emotionally salient and socially relevant 
stimuli (Kling and Brothers, 1992, Adolphs, 2010). Earlier views of the amygdala in 
representing saliency emphasized a fear-related function, and the amygdala has generally 
been conceptualized as a fear-processing module. This view was supported by animal 
models of fear conditioning (LeDoux, 1993) and impairment of fear conditioning after 
amygdala damage in humans (Bechara et al., 1995, LaBar et al., 1995). Human studies 
demonstrated a selective impairment in recognizing fearful faces in subjects that lack a 
functional amygdala (Adolphs et al., 1994), mirrored by neuroimaging studies showing 
significant activation differences within the amygdala to fearful faces compared to happy 
faces (Morris et al., 1996). Interestingly, increased amygdala BOLD-fMRI to fearful 
stimuli was linked to serotonin transporter genes, which have been associated with 
anxiety-related behaviors (Hariri et al., 2002). 
Recently, however, (Adolphs, 2010) argued that the amygdala plays a broader role in 
social cognition and processes a stimulus dimension related to saliency or relevance in 
general. The amygdala has been proposed to respond to a broader spectrum of social 
attributes such as facial emotions in general and regulating a person’s personal space 
(Kennedy et al., 2009), rather than being specific for fearful faces (Fitzgerald et al., 
2006). Electrophysiological recordings in monkeys have found single neurons that 
respond not only to faces (Rolls, 1984, Leonard et al., 1985), but also to face identities, 
facial expressions and gaze directions (Gothard et al., 2007, Hoffman et al., 2007). In 
humans, it has been reported that amygdala neurons are selective for a variety of visual 
stimuli (Kreiman et al., 2000). Single neurons in the human amygdala have been found to 
encode whole faces selectively (Rutishauser et al., 2011) and account for the abnormal 
face processing in autism (Rutishauser et al., 2013). A recent study has shown that 
neurons in the human amygdala encode subjective judgment of facial emotions, rather 
than simply their stimulus features (Wang et al., 2014c). 
Salient social cues signal value, and the amygdala responds to values and rewards that are 
important to the organism (Baxter and Murray, 2002). The primate amygdala represents 
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the positive and negative value of visual stimuli during learning (Paton et al., 2006) and 
is sensitive to temporal reward structure (Bermudez et al., 2012). Monkeys with 
amygdala lesions showed impaired devaluation in selectively satiated food, indicating a 
failure to respond to the changing value of food rewards (Malkova et al., 1997, Baxter et 
al., 2000). These and other findings support a clear role for the amygdala in goal-directed 
instrumental learning, a function that is in addition to its even better established role in 
Pavlovian fear conditioning. Furthermore, amygdala neurons can predict the monkey’s 
save-spend choices while monkeys choose between saving liquid reward with interest 
and spending the accumulated reward (Grabenhorst et al., 2012). In rats, rapid 
strengthening of thalamo-amygdala synapses mediates cue–reward learning (Tye et al., 
2008). These various roles that the amygdala plays in aspects of reward learning no doubt 
support its function in social behavior. 
Lastly, the amygdala processes more abstract attributes such as stimulus unpredictability 
(Herry et al., 2007). Amygdala lesions result in an absence or reduction of fixations on 
novel objects observed in monkeys (Bagshaw et al., 1972). It has also been shown that 
the amygdala mediates emotion-enhanced vividness (Todd et al., 2012), responds more to 
animate entities compared to inanimate ones (Yang et al., 2012b), and is even selective to 
animals (Mormann et al., 2011). The amygdala has also been reported to modulate 
consolidation of aspects of declarative memory, especially for highly emotionally 
arousing tasks (McGaugh, 2000, 2004, Roozendaal et al., 2008). 
However, there are also many examples showing no obvious corresponding behavioral 
impairment when the amygdala is lesioned. Recent findings have shown that preferential 
attention to animals and people is independent of the amygdala (Wang et al., 2014b), and 
amygdala lesions do not lead to deficits in social attention as observed in people with 
autism (Wang et al., 2014d). These findings are consistent with preserved attentional 
capture by emotional stimuli and intact emotion-guided visual search in patients with 
acute amygdala lesions due to neurosurgical resection (Piech et al., 2010, Piech et al., 
2011). Besides compensatory circuits that might account for the intact social attention in 
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amygdala lesion patients (Becker et al., 2012), these findings leave open the question of 
what are the essential structures mediating social saliency and to what extent the 
amygdala contributes to social saliency. These questions remain important topics for 
future studies. 
Overall, the amygdala might act as a detector of perceptual saliency and biological 
relevance (Sander et al., 2005, Adolphs, 2008). The functional role of the amygdala is 
supported by its connection with the visual cortices specialized for face processing 
(Vuilleumier et al., 2004, Moeller et al., 2008, Hadj-Bouziane et al., 2012) as well as 
reciprocal connections with multiple visually responsive areas in the temporal (Desimone 
and Gross, 1979, Amaral et al., 2003, Freese and Amaral, 2006) and frontal lobes 
(Ghashghaei and Barbas, 2002). 
!
1.5 Saliency and autism 
Autism is a disorder characterized by impairments in social and communicative behavior 
and a restricted range of interests and behaviors (DSM-5, 2013). Individuals with autism 
show reduced attention to faces as well as to all other social stimuli such as the human 
voice and hand gestures, but pay more attention to inanimate objects (Dawson et al., 
2005, Sasson, 2006). Some characteristics, such as preference for inanimate objects and a 
lack of interest in social objects, are often evident very early in infancy (Kanner, 1943, 
Osterling and Dawson, 1994). Children with autism displayed significantly fewer social 
and joint attention behaviors, including pointing, showing objects, looking at others, and 
orienting to name (Osterling and Dawson, 1994). People with autism also show 
circumscribed interests to a narrow range of inanimate subjects, a type of repetitive 
behavior occurring commonly in autism, and are fascinated with gadgets, devices, 
vehicles, electronics, Japanese animation and dinosaurs, etc. (Kanner, 1943, Lewis and 
Bodfish, 1998, South et al., 2005). The circumscribed interests are evident in children and 
adolescents (Sasson et al., 2008), as well as in 2–5 year-olds (Sasson et al., 2011), as 
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shown by fewer fixations onto faces or people compared to controls when they freely 
view arrays containing both faces and non-face objects. Moreover, two-year-olds with 
autism orient to non-social contingencies rather than biological motion (Klin et al., 2009). 
Taken together, people with autism show a different saliency representation of social 
stimuli vs. non-social stimuli compared to normals. 
When the stimuli are restricted to faces, people with autism show impaired face 
discrimination and recognition and use atypical strategies for processing faces 
characterized by reduced attention to the eyes and piecemeal rather than configural 
strategies (Dawson et al., 2005). In particular, when viewing naturalistic social situations, 
people with autism demonstrate abnormal patterns of social visual pursuit (Klin et al., 
2002). They viewed core feature areas of the faces (i.e., eyes, nose, and mouth) 
significantly less compared to neurotypical controls (Pelphrey et al., 2002). They showed 
a greater tendency to saccade away from the eyes when information was present in those 
regions (Spezio et al., 2007b), but showed increased preference to the location of the 
mouth (Neumann et al., 2006) and relied primarily on information from the mouth 
(Spezio et al., 2007a). Eye-tracking data revealed a pronounced influence of active 
avoidance of direct eye contact on atypical gaze in people with autism (Kliemann et al., 
2010). These results again show a different saliency representation of faces in autism 
compared to normals. 
In tasks with top-down instructions such as visual search, attention is guided towards 
likely targets by a limited set of stimulus attributes such as color and size (Wolfe and 
Horowitz, 2004, Wolfe, 2012). Several studies have shown superior visual search skills 
by individuals with autism (Plaisted et al., 1998, O'Riordan and Plaisted, 2001, O'Riordan 
et al., 2001, O'Riordan, 2004, Kemner et al., 2008), particularly in relatively difficult 
tasks. This superiority has been attributed to enhanced memory for distractor locations 
already inspected, and enhanced ability to discriminate between target and distractor 
stimulus features (O'Riordan and Plaisted, 2001), while it is also arguable that the 
superiority is due to the anomalously enhanced perception of stimulus features (Joseph et 
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al., 2009). However, studies investigating the role of top-down excitation and inhibition 
of stimulus representations in children with autism showed that children with autism did 
not differ from controls in excitatory or inhibitory top-down control of stimulus 
representations (O'Riordan, 2000), leaving open the possibility that the autism advantage 
in visual search (O'Riordan et al., 2001) derived from enhanced bottom-up perception of 
stimulus attributes (Joseph et al., 2009). It is important to note that the stimuli in the 
above-mentioned studies are low-level features and inanimate stimuli (e.g., letters and 
shapes) but not complex images or social stimuli. Using both social stimuli of faces and 
people and non-social autism special-interest stimuli as search objects, we have 
demonstrated that people with autism have reduced attention to target-congruent objects 
in the search array, especially social attention (Wang et al., 2014d). Furthermore, some 
studies employed visual search to investigate recognition abilities of facial expressions in 
children with autism and found that faces with certain emotions are detected faster than 
others (Farran et al., 2011, Rosset et al., 2011). However, when compared with age-
matched controls, no significant differences were found anymore. 
Social rewards are salient cues (see above) and they share a common neural basis with 
monetary rewards (Izuma et al., 2008, Lin et al., 2012b). However, people with autism 
show a disproportionate impairment in learning to choose social rewards, compared to 
monetary rewards (Lin et al., 2012a). Furthermore, people with autism are not influenced 
by the presence of an observer in a charity donation task as compared with healthy 
controls who donate significantly more in the observer’s presence than absence, showing 
insensitivity in people with autism to social reputation (Izuma et al., 2011). People with 
autism also have reduced preference and sensitivity to donations to people charities 
compared with donations to the other charities (Lin et al., 2012c). In conclusion, people 
with autism also show altered saliency representation of more abstract social cues like 
social rewards. 
!
1.6 Amygdala theory of autism 
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The amygdala is proposed to be part of a neural network comprising the “social 
brain” (Brothers, 1990), while autism is a neuropsychiatric condition that disrupts the 
development of social intelligence. It is thus plausible that autism may be caused, in part, 
by an amygdala abnormality (Baron-Cohen et al., 2000). This hypothesis is supported by 
the following evidence. The abnormal facial scanning patterns in people with autism 
(Adolphs et al., 2001, Klin et al., 2002, Pelphrey et al., 2002, Neumann et al., 2006, 
Spezio et al., 2007a, Spezio et al., 2007b, Kliemann et al., 2010) are rather similar as seen 
in patients with amygdala damage, who fail to fixate on the eyes in faces (Adolphs et al., 
2005), while neuroimaging studies in healthy individuals have shown that amygdala 
activation is specifically enhanced for fearful faces when saccading from the mouth to the 
eye regions (Gamer and Büchel, 2009). Besides abnormal eye fixations onto faces, 
several studies have found reliable, but weak, deficits in the ability to recognize emotions 
from facial expressions in autism (Law Smith et al., 2010, Philip et al., 2010, Wallace et 
al., 2011, Kennedy and Adolphs, 2012) (for review, see (Harms et al., 2010)), while on 
the other hands, patients with amygdala lesions also show abnormal recognition of 
emotion from facial expressions (Adolphs et al., 1999), and abnormal recognition of 
mental states from the eye region of faces (Adolphs et al., 2002), providing further 
support for the amygdala’s involvement in autism. 
When directly testing the amygdala function in people with autism, the amygdala-
mediated orientation towards eyes seen in BOLD-fMRI is reported to be dysfunctional in 
autism (Kliemann et al., 2012). Activation in the amygdala is strongly correlated with the 
time spent fixating the eyes in the autistic group (Dalton et al., 2005), but compared to 
neurotypically developed controls, the amygdala activation was significantly weaker in 
the people with autism (Kleinhans et al., 2011), consistent with behavioral findings of 
reduced fixations onto the eyes. Recent studies with single neuron recordings in the 
human amygdala have even found weaker response to the eyes but stronger response to 
the mouth in patients with autism compared to control patients (Rutishauser et al., 2013). 
Despite considerable variability in reports of abnormal face processing in autism, this 
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evidence largely supports a link between abnormal processing of faces in autism and 
amygdala function. 
Although there is evidence for global dysfunction at the level of the whole brain in 
autism (Piven et al., 1995, Geschwind and Levitt, 2007, Amaral et al., 2008, Anderson et 
al., 2010), several studies emphasize abnormalities in the amygdala both 
morphometrically (Ecker et al., 2012) and in terms of functional connectivity (Gotts et 
al., 2012). The aberrant gaze patterns in individuals with autism has also been associated 
with an anatomical link supported by findings of similar gaze fixations, brain activation 
patterns and amygdala volume in their genetic but unaffected siblings, who demonstrate 
robust differences compared with typically developing control individuals (Dalton et al., 
2007). Amygdala volume can predict gaze patterns in humans (Nacewicz et al., 2006), 
and even in monkeys (Zhang et al., 2012), consistent with a substantial literature showing 
structural abnormalities (Bauman and Kemper, 1985, Schumann et al., 2004, Schumann 
and Amaral, 2006, Amaral et al., 2008, Ecker et al., 2012) and atypical activation (Gotts 
et al., 2012, Philip et al., 2012) in the amygdala in autism.  
Finally, it is important to note that autism is well known to be highly heterogeneous at the 
biological and behavioral levels and it is arguable that there will be no single genetic or 
cognitive cause for the diverse symptoms defining autism (Happe et al., 2006). No 
unanimously endorsed hypothesis for a primary deficit has emerged that can plausibly 
account for the full triad of social, communicative and rigid/repetitive difficulties (Happe, 
2003). It is also worth noting that a bona fide lesion of the amygdala shows no autistic 
symptoms by clinical examination and autism diagnosis (Paul et al., 2010).  
!
1.7 Thesis overview 
My thesis investigates how people pay attention when interacting with other people and 
the environment. I am particularly interested in how socially relevant cues attract and 
compete for attention and how these cues stand out from non-social stimuli. It is 
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important to create a vocabulary of social cues including eye gaze, face, head direction, 
finger gesture, and body posture, in order to investigate whether there is also a saliency 
map for these social cues. It is also useful to extend the investigation to lexical cues: what 
sequence of words captures people’s attention? Again, some examples are not hard to 
think of: your name, taboo words, exclamation marks all work fairly well. To break down 
the question, I am interested in quantifying the set of cues, or set of dimensions, that 
determine social saliency; in inquiring whether and how these are related to and interact 
with standard (non-social) “bottom-up” saliency; in exploring to what extent there are 
individual differences (e.g., in people from different cultures, in people with autism, or in 
males vs. females); and in understanding the neural mechanisms underlying these 
processes. 
To approach these questions, I used four primary experimental techniques. One was high-
resolution eye-tracking, which measures where people look, and in turn indicates where 
the attention goes. Using eye-tracking with high spatial and temporal resolution, we could 
understand the dynamic deployment of attention. A second was single-neuron recording 
in neurosurgical patients, which directly probes the neural correlates of perception and 
judgments. A third was a lesion approach, in particular in amygdala lesion patients, which 
tests the causal functional role of the amygdala, a key neural structure of the “social 
brain”. A fourth was testing neuropsychiatric populations such as people with autism, 
which is able to reveal possible behavioral deficits, especially social deficits, and trace 
these ultimately to their neural source. Importantly, combining these techniques can 
answer the same question from different angles and thus have a more holistic view of the 
question under investigation. For example, testing patients with amygdala lesions and 
people with autism on the identical task can inform whether amygdala dysfunction will 
lead to social deficits in autism. Testing a neurological population with concurrent eye-
tracking can explore possible deficits of visual attention, while recording single-neurons 
from neurosurgical patients co-morbid with autism can reveal neuronal mechanisms that 
lead to behavioral impairment. Therefore, combining different approaches can yield more 
insights and often leads to more exciting findings. Along with this idea, we have been 
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conducting single-neuron recordings with concurrent eye-tracking in neurosurgical 
patients, in order to elucidate the neural mechanisms of one of the most important 
questions—how do we direct our gaze rapidly to salient objects in our visual 
environment. 
On the other hand, I also employed a variety of experiments to investigate visual 
attention. In Chapter II, I employed a cued speeded task, in which different locations with 
respect to the center of optic flow were probed by reaction times in order to study the 
deployment of spatial attention in optic flow. In Chapter III, I employed a “change 
detection” protocol, in which subjects were exposed to alternations between two complex 
scenes that switched back and forth and were entirely identical except for a single 
change. It is well known that people are remarkably bad at detecting the single item that 
is changing between the alternating scenes (hence the name, “change blindness”), and 
this method has been widely used to study which stimuli automatically capture attention 
and become objects of our conscious awareness. In Chapter IV, we showed degraded 
emotional faces (a ‘bubbles task’) and asked subjects to judge emotions shown in the 
faces. With an adaptive learning algorithm implemented to keep a roughly constant 
performance, we were able to induce enough errors to investigate how neurons responded 
in the error trials. In Chapter V, I adopted a standard visual search task and directly 
compared fixations onto social vs. non-social objects in the cluttered search array. Taken 
together, I combined diverse experimental strategies of cognitive psychology with 
multiple neuroscience techniques, together with specific neurological and psychiatric 
populations, to elucidate the neural mechanisms that come into play. The neurobiological 
approaches provide information on the brain-end of my question: just like I am interested 
in determining what it is about social stimuli that captures attention, I am interested in 
whether there are specialized systems in the human brain for processing social stimuli. 
My thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter I, I reviewed the social cues and the neural 
structures, particularly the amygdala, involved in processing saliency. I argued that 
people with autism may have altered saliency representation of the visual environment 
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and that amygdala dysfunction may partially account for this deficit. Then I start to 
investigate saliency from non-social cues. People constantly move in the environment 
and pay attention to their locomotion. In Chapter II, I studied the spatial cues that attract 
attention during locomotion using a cued speeded discrimination task and found that 
motion cues indicating a forward motion are the strongest to attract attention. However, 
compared to inanimate objects and cues, people preferentially attend to animals and 
faces, processing in which the amygdala is thought to play an important role. In Chapter 
III, I employed a change detection protocol and tested four rare patients with bilateral 
amygdala lesions. All four amygdala patients showed a normal pattern of reliably faster 
and more accurate detection of animate stimuli. People not only attend to faces, but also 
pay attention to others’ facial emotions. Humans have a dedicated system to process 
faces and the amygdala has long been associated with a key role in recognizing facial 
emotions. In Chapter IV, I studied the neural mechanism of emotion perception and found 
that single neurons in the human amygdala are selective for subjective judgment of 
others’ emotions. Lastly, normal people pay more attention to faces and conspecifics than 
to inanimate objects, but people with autism spectrum disorders (ASD) might not. To 
further study social attention, in Chapter V, I employed a visual search task and revealed 
a deficit of social attention in people with ASD. This deficit is independent of the 
amygdala but dependent on task demands. Overall, through visual psychophysics with 
concurrent eye-tracking, my thesis found and analyzed socially salient cues and 
compared social vs. non-social cues and healthy vs. clinical populations. Neural 
mechanisms underlying social saliency were elucidated through electrophysiology and 
lesion studies. 
!
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Chapter II: Spatial Attention is Attracted in a Sustained Fashion 
towards Singular Points in the Optic Flow 
!
2.1 Overview 
Understanding how the attentional system selects goal-directed information and allocates 
limited resources is an important question in cognitive neuroscience. Since the invention 
of Posner’s cueing paradigm in 1970’s, a large amount of knowledge has accumulated. 
However, the majority of these experiments have been carried out on static images or 
scenes. 	

People constantly move in the environment. In this chapter, we focused on the problem of 
how optic flow influences visual attention. Optic flow, one of the most fundamental 
properties of any natural visual scene, is associated with self-motion of an organism. It 
has been studied extensively for more than half a century using psychophysics, 
electrophysiology, functional neuroimaging, and computational modeling. The 
quantitative relationship between optic flow and visual attention, however, remains little 
explored. 	

With a series of experiments, we showed that expanding optic flow fields, consistent with 
forward self-motion, attract visual attention strongly in a sustained fashion. We concluded 
that motion itself, rather than depth structure or temporal evolution of the size of objects, 
is critical for this effect. We also provided evidence that this attentional effect has a 
sizable influence even in real life using a change detection paradigm (natural photo 
stimuli with free eye movements). Continued research on the potency of the FOE and 
other qualitative aspects of the optical flow to attract attention and gaze will further 
educate cognitive neuroscientists, engineers and film directors on the forces that shape 
and control where we attend and look	

To understand what is special about salient social cues compared to salient non-social 
cues, I start to investigate saliency from non-social cues. This first empirical chapter find 
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a salient motion cue that can be further compared to salient social cues. Importantly, we 
discuss the neural computations underlying this salient non-social cue—the optic flow, 
which can be compared to neural computations underlying social saliency. We will 
directly compare social and non-social cues in Chapter III, where we also test the 
dependency of social saliency on the amygdala—a key neural structure of the “social 
brain”. 
This work has been published as (Wang et al., 2012a). 
!
2.2 Summary 
While a single approaching object is known to attract spatial attention, it is unknown how 
attention is directed when the background looms towards the observer as s/he moves 
forward in a quasi-stationary environment. In Experiment 1, we used a cued speeded 
discrimination task to quantify where and how spatial attention is directed towards the 
target superimposed onto a cloud of moving dots. We found that when the motion was 
expansive, attention was attracted towards the singular point of the optic flow (the focus 
of expansion, FOE) in a sustained fashion. The effects were less pronounced when the 
motion was contractive. The more ecologically valid the motion features became (e.g., 
temporal expansion of each dot, spatial depth structure implied by distribution of the size 
of the dots), the stronger the attentional effects. Further, the attentional effects were 
sustained over 1000 ms. Experiment 2 quantified these attentional effects using a change 
detection paradigm by zooming into or out of photographs of natural scenes. Spatial 
attention was attracted in a sustained manner such that change detection was facilitated or 
delayed depending on the location of the FOE only when the motion was expansive. Our 
results suggest that focal attention is strongly attracted towards singular points that signal 
the direction of forward ego-motion.  
!
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2.3 Introduction 
The psychophysics of overt and covert attention is a well explored subject with deep 
roots (Yarbus, 1967). The physiological correlates of visual attention are beginning to be 
understood at both the single neuron (Colby and Goldberg, 1999, Maunsell and Cook, 
2002) and at the brain regional level (Corbetta and Shulman, 2002). This has given rise to 
detailed computational models of the factors that control the allocation of bottom-up, 
saliency-driven attention in both artificial and natural static scenes (Itti et al., 1998, Itti 
and Koch, 2001, Foulsham and Underwood, 2008).  
In our daily life, however, the visual inputs to the retina are rarely stationary due to eye, 
head, and body movements. Furthermore, any object in the scene is embedded in a 3D 
environment. Looming stimuli on a 2D display are often utilized in laboratory 
experiments to mimic approaching objects in 3D. Looming stimuli signify biological 
urgencies or dangers, especially when they approach closer to the body, implying a 
potential interaction between motion, the projected size of an object on the retina, and 
attention. Therefore, to fully understand how attention works in a realistic situation, it is 
necessary to study how the retinal optic flow that accompanies looming stimuli, ego 
motion and 3D scene structures affect and guide attentional mechanisms. 
Looming stimuli typically attract attention and elicit avoidance responses. Many species, 
including Drosophila, locusts, fiddler crabs, fishes, frogs, turtles, chicks, monkeys and 
humans, persistently dodge looming stimuli (Schiff et al., 1962, Schiff, 1965, Hayes and 
Saiff, 1967, Tronick, 1967, Bower et al., 1970, Ball and Tronick, 1971, Dill, 1974, Ingle 
and Shook, 1985, Yamamoto et al., 2003, Nakagawa and Hongjian, 2010, Fotowat and 
Gabbiani, 2011, de Vries and Clandinin, 2012, Hemmi and Tomsic, 2012). Infant and 
adult rhesus monkeys manifest persistent avoidance responses to a rapidly expanding but 
not to rapidly contracting circular shadows (Schiff et al., 1962). This response appears in 
human infants as well (Ball and Tronick, 1971).  
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Indeed, the time-to-contact of an approaching object can be precisely estimated (Wang 
and Frost, 1992, Gray and Regan, 1998, Regan and Gray, 2000), using specialized visual 
mechanisms (Regan and Beverley, 1978, 1979). Lin et al showed that a looming stimulus 
captures visual attention of an observer only when it would collide with him or her (Lin 
et al., 2008). This effect was observed even when observers could not consciously 
discriminate whether or not the object was on a collision path with them (Lin et al., 
2009). 
While it is well known that a single looming stimulus attracts visual attention among 
static ones (Franconeri and Simons, 2003), little is known about whether and how visual 
attention is guided in the presence of an expanding optic flow where many objects loom 
together. Psychophysical (Schrater et al., 2001), imaging (Field and Wann, 2005) and 
physiological studies (Laurent and Gabbiani, 1998, Sun and Frost, 1998) provided 
evidences that expanding optic flow can be decomposed into separate optic features and 
each optical feature may be individually computed and represented in the brain. Although 
many conventional psychophysical and electrophysiological studies of ego-motion 
utilized random dots for expanding optic flow (Saito et al., 1986, Komatsu and Wurtz, 
1988, Newsome et al., 1988, Tanaka and Saito, 1989, Duffy and Wurtz, 1991, Graziano et 
al., 1994, Duffy and Wurtz, 1995, Britten and van Wezel, 1998, Duffy, 1998, Lappe et al., 
1999, Morrone et al., 1999, von Muhlenen and Lleras, 2007), such a visual stimulus is 
less ecological, in the sense that each individual dot does not expand in size and the 
distribution of the dot size is not consistent with the depth structure in the real world.  
Here, we studied how attention is affected by the background visual stimuli that are 
composed of multiple elements. In a first experiment, we independently manipulated 
three features of the background dot stimuli: (1) movement of the dots away from or 
towards a singular point in the visual field (FOE or FOC); (2) expansion or contraction of 
the dots over time; (3) distribution of the size of the dots in each frame, to make it 
consistent or inconsistent with the depth structure of the scene in a 3D environment. We 
created stimuli that lacked or possessed each of the above features (see Figure 2.1). We 
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found the largest attentional effects when all three features were conjoint, emulating a 
situation where an observer moves towards a fronto-parallel surface in a 3D environment 
with depth structure. 
!
!  
Figure 2.1. Cube representation of expanding optic flow features.  
Motion, the change in object size over time (or temporal size gradient, TSG), and the 
spatial depth structure implied by object size distribution (or spatial size gradient, SSG) 
correspond to one of the three axes of the cube. They can be either on or off. Each corner 
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of the cube represents a certain combination of features. The specifications of the six 
conditions that went for testing are illustrated. Red arrows represent the motion. Black 
horizontal and vertical arrows represent the TSG. Different dot sizes represent the SSG. 
Note that the sizes of the dots are not to scale. 
!
In a second experiment, we utilized a change detection paradigm using natural scenes 
(Rensink et al., 1997, Simons and Rensink, 2005, New et al., 2007). We zoomed into or 
out from a part of a natural scene and manipulated the location of the change in order to 
test if zooming motion affects spontaneous monitoring of object change. We found strong 
attentional effects only when the optic flow of the scene expanded (i.e., zooming towards 
a singular point in the scene) but not when it contracted (i.e., zooming away from the 
point).  
!
2.4 Methods 
2.4.1 Experiment 1: Speeded discrimination under background dot motion  
2.4.1.1 Subjects and apparatus 
Subjects from the Caltech Community gave written informed consent. The experiments 
were approved by the Caltech Institutional Review Board. Fifteen subjects (6 females) 
and one of the authors (SW) participated in the experiments (7 subjects and SW took part 
in Exp 1a and the other 8 took part in Exp 1b). All subjects had good natural or corrected 
visual acuity. 
Subjects sat 70 cm from a CRT display. The refresh rate of the display was 120Hz and the 
stimuli occupied the entire display (32° × 24°, visual angle). The stimuli were presented 
using MATLAB with the Psychtoolbox 3 (Brainard, 1997, Pelli, 1997, Cornelissen et al., 
2002) (http://psychtoolbox.org).  
!30
We monitored the subjects' eye movements with a non-invasive infra-red eye-tracker 
(Eyelink-II system, SR Research, Canada) tracking both eyes at 250 Hz. We calibrated 
the eye tracker with the built-in 13-point grid method. During the main experiment, we 
repeated the calibration procedure when subjects had several fixation failures in a row. 
!
2.4.1.2 Task 
We employed a cued speeded discrimination task to quantify how attention is guided by 
the singular point defined by the flow field of dot motion (i.e., the focus of expansion 
(FOE) or contraction (FOC)) or by depth structures due to the size distribution of the 
dots. These features emulate some aspects of the ego-motion related optic flow and the 
depth structure of the 3D scene. In each trial, a singular point is randomly selected in one 
of the four quadrants (i.e., top-left (TL), top-right (TR), bottom-left (BL) and bottom-
right (BR) corner of the screen). We define congruent, resp. incongruent, trials as those 
where the target was located in the same, resp. diagonally opposite, quadrant as the 
singular point. We define the attentional effect as the increase of the mean reaction time 
(RT) in the incongruent trials compared to the congruent trials.  
Attentional Effect = Mean RTincongruent - Mean RTcongruent 
Overt eye movements are known to be attracted towards the singular point corresponding 
to the focus of expansion (Lappe et al., 1998, Niemann et al., 1999). To exclude a 
possibility that such an effect contaminates our measure of attentional effects, we 
monitored the gaze location and removed trials with poor fixation. We asked subjects to 
fixate within 1.6° from the central fixation cross and discarded trials when central fixation 
was broken. 
!
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!  
Figure 2.2. Paradigm for Experiment 1.  
(A) Structure and time course of a trial. The dashed line surrounding the tilted target 
rectangle demonstrates the protection zone. (B) A central fixation cross, together with six 
possible locations of the target, was shown for 1 sec. To initiate a trial, subjects had to 
fixate 0.3 sec stably within a 1.6 deg radius from the center of the cross. Moving dots 
appeared subsequently. After various SOAs, a target rectangle appeared. Subjects were 
asked to discriminate the tilt orientation of the target rectangle by pressing the left or right 
arrow key as quickly as possible. Subjects had a maximum of 1 sec to respond. If 
responded correctly, the next trial started. Otherwise, a big cross, indicating the error, 
appeared, followed by a black screen.  
!
+
Up	
    to	
    1	
    s
SOA
+
+
Fixation
+
Targ	
    Pos	
    Cues
Fixating	
    
to	
    Start	
    
1	
    s 0.3	
    s
Stimulus
SOA
Target
Max	
    RT	
    1	
    s
Next	
    Trial
Correct
Incorrect
Next	
    Trial
Big
Cross
Black	
    Screen
0.2	
    s 0.8	
    s
A
B
!32
Figure 2.2 illustrates the task structure. Before each trial, a white central fixation and six 
thin white peripheral cueing circles (radius 2.6º) were presented for 1 sec. To test if 
attention is attracted exactly “to” the singular point or “towards” the side of the singular 
point, we measured the attentional effects at three eccentricities. The circles were 
positioned along the diagonal of the screen to remind the subjects of the potential 
locations of a target rectangle. In alternating trials, the potential locations were swapped 
between top-left vs. bottom-right and top-right vs. bottom-left. There were three potential 
locations in the top half of the screen and three in the bottom. According to their 
eccentricity, we refer them as ‘far’, ‘middle’ and ‘near’ cues. The singular point was 
always located at the ‘middle‘ eccentricity, either in the same or diagonally opposite 
quadrant (e.g., at the location of the top left middle or bottom right middle circle in 
Figure 2.2). The attentional effect refers to the increase in RT between the inconsistent 
trials where the singular point was located in the opposite quadrant (e.g., in the top left) 
with respect to the target (e.g., in the bottom right, possibly near, middle or far locations) 
compared to the consistent trials where the singular point was located in the same 
quadrant as the target. 
1 sec after the onset of fixation and cues, the subjects’ eye positions were monitored. 
After 0.3 sec of stable fixation, a trial was initiated. The start of the trial was defined as a 
sudden replacement of the cues with white background dots. After a variable (0, 0.25, 0.5, 
0.75, or 1 sec) and randomized stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) with respect to the 
onset of the background dots, a target rectangle was presented. The target was a thick 
white rectangle (0.96º × 3.2º), tilted either 22º left or right. The surrounding area of the 
target was protected from background dots by a black rectangular zone (3.2º × 5.7º) tilted 
in the same orientation as the target to ensure its visibility. To facilitate stable fixation, the 
central fixation cross was also protected from the background dots with a black circular 
exclusion zone (radius 1.6º). Subjects had to discriminate the orientation of tilt of the 
target (by pressing the left or right arrow key) within 1 sec from the target onset as fast as 
possible. When they made a mistake, the data was discarded and the trial was repeated 
(see below). They were told that any attribute of the background dots was task-irrelevant 
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and independent of the location or the tilt of the target. They were asked to reduce blinks 
as much as possible and to keep fixation throughout the trial. Figure 2.3A illustrates the 
distribution of raw RTs and Figure 2.3B shows how the attentional effect is defined. 
!
!  
Figure 2.3. Reaction times (RTs) and the attentional effect.  
(A) RT distribution of a single subject. Blue and green colors represent congruent and 
incongruent trials, respectively. The dashed vertical bars represent the mean RT. (B) The 
mean RT of congruent (blue) and incongruent (green) trials of the single subject shown in 
(A). The attentional effect for each subject is defined as the increase of the mean RT in 
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the incongruent trials compared to that in the congruent trials. Error bars denote one 
s.e.m. across trials. (C) Individual results for the attentional effect in Condition 8 (motion 
= on, TSG = on, SSG = on). The black bars represent the mean attentional effect and the 
red error bars denote the 5 to 95 percentile intervals. The means and the errors were 
estimated by the bootstrap method (1000 repetition per subject) (Efron and Tibshirani, 
1994). (D) Individual results of the 25th and 75th percentile of RT, shown in blue and red, 
respectively. 
!
2.4.1.3 Stimuli 
The background visual stimuli, which were irrelevant and non-informative for the 
discrimination task, consisted of a collection of dots. Across different conditions, we 
systematically manipulated three features of these dots. (1) The motion feature controlled 
the optic flow of the dots. In the ‘motion on’ condition, dots moved away from or towards 
the singular point in the display, which was located in one of the four quadrants. In the 
‘motion off’ condition, the position of each dot remained the same, and did not define the 
location of a singular point. 2) The temporal size gradient (TSG) mimicked looming or 
receding of each dot. In the ‘TSG on’ condition, the radius of each dot increased or 
decreased over time. In the ‘TSG off’ condition, the radius of each dot remained the 
same. The TSG did not signify the location of the singular point. 3) The spatial size 
gradient (SSG) implied depth structure in the 3D environment. In the ‘SSG on’ condition, 
the size of the dots gradually increased proportionally to the distance from the singular 
point in the first frame of the stimulus movie. In the ‘SSG off’ condition, the size of the 
dots was uniform across the display, thus it did not signify the location of the singular 
point. 
The SSG decides whether a scene structure is present in subsequent frames. To elucidate 
the relationships between the TSG and SSG, we want readers to note that the SSG 
decides the expanding rate of the TSG (see Eqs. 2.2 and 2.3 and their conditions) and 
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hence ensures whether a scene structure is present or absent across frames: If the SSG is 
on, the TSG makes the dots grow proportionally according to the distance from the 
singular point (the perspective of the 3D space), preserving the presence of a scene 
structure; otherwise, the TSG makes the dots grow uniformly, preserving the absence of a 
scene structure. 
For all possible 8 combinations of the features, we made sample demo movies. Table 2.1 
and its legend summarize each stimulus. To define the attentional effects, we need a 
singular point that is defined by the background dots. Therefore, either the ‘motion’ or the 
‘SSG’ feature has to be on. Accordingly, we used 6 of the 8 conditions in our experiment. 
When the ‘TSG’ is turned on, it can enhance the ecological validity of the background 
dots. However, the TSG did not signify the location of the singular point.  
!
Table 2.1. The stimulus parameters for each condition.  
TSG and SSG stand for temporal and spatial size gradient, respectively. In Condition 1, 
uniformly distributed stationary dots are presented. As they do not cue the location of the 
singular point, this condition was not used in our experiment. In Condition 2, stationary 
dots with the size gradient imply a 3D scene structure, signifying the location of the 
singular point. In Condition 3, all the stationary dots expand their diameter at the same 
rate. As they do not cue the location of the singular point, this condition was not used in 
our experiment. In Condition 4, static dots are initially arranged with the size gradient, 
implying a 3D depth structure. Each dot changes its size as if it looms or recedes without 
changing its position. Condition 5 corresponds to a conventional random dot movie with 
uniform dot size, which does not change over time. In Condition 6, the initial frame has 
the size gradient to imply the 3D depth structure. However, each dot does not change its 
size as it moves, which is unlikely to happen in the real situation. In Condition 7, all the 
dots have the same size in the initial frame. As they start to move, they change the size 
together at the same rate, regardless of the distance to the singular point, which is 
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unlikely to happen in the real situation. In Condition 8, the dots are arranged to have the 
size gradient to imply the 3D depth structure. Each dot changes its size as it moves so that 
its diameter is proportional to the distance from the singular point. This is closest to the 
real situation where an observer moves in a 3D environment, which has the 3D depth 
structure. 
!
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Note that at any given time, the speed of motion of a dot was proportional to the distance 
to the singular point of the flow field 
!           (Eq. 2.1) 
in which x (in the unit of pixels) is the distance from the center of the dot to the singular 
point and t is in units of seconds. In the case of the contractive motion, the negative sign 
was added in Eq. 2.1. When the SSG was on (a scene structure was present), the dot size 
was proportional to the distance to the focus of the flow field 
!           (Eq. 2.2) 
Condition 
(Movie)
Motion TSG SSG Motion 
Speed
Rate of 
Expansion
Dot Diameter # Trials
1 (S1)
Off Off Off 0 0
0.32º not 
tested
2 (S2) Off Off On 0 0 0.032º – 0.64º 60
3 (S3)
Off On Off 0 0.32 º/s
0.032º – 0.64º not 
tested
4 (S4) Off On On 0 0 – 1.68 º/s 0.032º – 1.60º 120
5 (S5) On Off Off 0 – 29 º/s 0 0.32º 120
6 (S6) On Off On 0 – 29 º/s 0 0.032º – 0.64º 120
7 (S7) On On Off 0 – 29 º/s 0.32 º/s 0.032º – 0.64º 120
8 (S8) On On On 0 – 29 º/s 0 – 0.64 º/s 0.032º – 0.64º 120
dx
dt = 1.05 ⋅ x
θ = 0.02 ⋅ x
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in which θ is the diameter of the dot (in the unit of pixels). Thus, the rate of expansion (or 
contraction) of a dot was proportional to the distance to the singular point 
!           (Eq. 2.3) 
When the SSG was off (no scene structure), all dots were of the same size across all 
frames and the rate of expansion (or contraction) of a dot was uniform regardless the 
distance to the focus of the flow field. The homogenous expansion (or contraction) 
ensures no size gradient at any frame. 
In Condition 4, dots were stationary but kept on expanding in size, as if they were 
moving. The instantaneous rate of expansion and the dot size were proportional to the 
virtual distance to the singular point. This was the distance as if the dots kept on moving 
from their starting position. The virtual moving speed was proportional to the virtual 
distance to the singular point. Though no dots left the display frame, their rate of 
expansion increased exponentially over time. Thus, we had to terminate expansion in the 
middle of the trial at the frame when the largest dot reached 1.6º, in order to keep 
individual dots distinguishable. The maximum speed (here 1.6 º/s) refers to the rate of 
expansion of the dot that is farthest from the singular point in the last expanding frame, 
which had the largest expanding rate among all dots. 
Conditions with the contracting motion were the reverse play of the corresponding 
expanding conditions. Note that, in Condition 4, since expansion stopped in the middle, 
its corresponding contraction started from the last expanding frame of the expansion, 
reverse-played all the expanding frames, and stopped and remained stationary with the 
first expanding frame for the rest of the time in the trial. 
Five of the six tested conditions consisted of 120 trials (2 motion directions [expansion 
vs. contraction] × 6 target locations × 5 SOAs × 2 sides for the singular point [top left (or 
top right) vs. bottom right (or bottom left)]). Condition 2 (motion off, TSG off and SSG 
on) was tested only for 60 trials as it did not differ between the expansion and contraction 
dθ
dt =
dθ
dx ⋅
dx
dt = 0.02 ⋅1.05x = 0.021x
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conditions (Table 2.1). The order of trials was fully randomized. Subjects continued until 
a correct trial was registered for each condition and took a break every 60 trials. In total, 
there were 480 or 660 correct trials (see below). 
We performed two sub-experiments separately. Experiment 1a (480 trials) grouped all 
four conditions with motion on. We did not replace any moving dots when they moved 
off the screen. Over time, the background dot density decreased for expansion but 
increased for contraction. Experiment 1b (660 trials) grouped all six conditions, also 
without replacing any dots. Note that the density of dots was constant for the two 
conditions without motion, thus always higher than for those four conditions with motion. 
Everything else was the same as in Exp 1a. 
!
2.4.1.4 Data analysis 
We labeled trials with poor fixation (more than 1.6° deviation from the fixation cross or a 
blink) or incorrect responses (incorrect target discrimination, missing response, response 
before 0.1 sec or after 1 sec from the target onset) as error trials, and we removed these 
trials from the RT analysis. 
We used MATLAB for t-tests and R (R Foundation for Statistical Computing, Vienna, 
Austria) for repeated ANOVAs. 
!
2.4.2 Experiment 2: Change detection with zooming in and out 
In Experiment 1, we tightly controlled stimuli and eye movements. Experiment 2 seeks to 
relax these constraints by using movies of natural scenes as stimuli and allowed eye 
movements in a change detection task. 
!
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2.4.2.1 Subjects and apparatus 
Fifteen naive male subjects, none of whom took part in Experiment 1, participated. 
Subjects sat 80 cm from the display with a chin rest to minimize head movements. The 
refresh rate of the display was 50Hz and the images occupied the entire display (29° × 
22°). Eye movements were not recorded. 
!
2.4.2.2 Zooming algorithm 
In Experiment 2, we chose to study the effects of attention based on natural scene images. 
As a consequence, we focused on Condition 8 in Experiment 1, where motion, TSG and 
SSG were all on. As a control, we also used Condition 1, where all three features were 
off. For Condition 8, singular points coincide with the FOE or FOC.  
We used a zooming algorithm, based on the OpenGL function in the Psychtoolbox-3. 
During expansion, the camera speed of zooming was kept constant over time. The speed 
of expansion at each pixel was proportional to its distance (in the unit of visual angles) to 
the FOE and ranged from 0 to 5.4 °/s. Denoting the location of a pixel p at time t during 
the expanding period as p(t), our zooming algorithm computes !
where !  denotes the location of the FOE and !  denotes the zoom speed, thus the p 
increases exponentially as t increases. The zoom speed, , was fixed at 2 [°/s]. The same 
algorithm was used for the contraction but with negative t. 
!
2.4.2.3 Procedure 
Subjects pressed a button to initiate a trial. Each trial started with a 0.6 sec movie 
sequence consisting of 15 frames, which was replaced by a uniform gray field for 0.28 
sec. The last frame of the sequence that contained a single noticeable change was then 
presented for 0.6 sec. After this static image, another 0.28 sec blank period followed. A 
p(t) = f + zt (p(0) − f )
f z
z
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complete cycle of this movie-blank-image-blank sequence was repeated until subjects 
pressed a space bar, indicating that they were sure that they have seen the change 
explicitly. When the space bar was pressed during the movie presentation or during the 
blank period immediately after the movie, the last frame of the movie was presented 
again on the screen and subjects had to indicate the change location via the mouse. When 
it was pressed during the stationary image or the blank period immediately following it, 
the stationary image was presented, on which subjects localized the change. This 
procedure prevented any visual transients that could be used to localize the change. If 
subjects could not detect the change after 52.8 sec, the trial was stopped.  
!
2.4.2.4 Stimuli 
For a given change detection image pair, we created 4 movie sequences for 4 different 
conditions corresponding to the FOE and FOC being close or far away from the location 
of the change. For example, when an image pair contained a change within a top-left 
quadrant, we created 4 movies as follows: 1. FOE-on by zooming into the top-left corner, 
2. FOE-off by zooming into the bottom-right corner, 3. FOC-on by zooming out from the 
top-left corner, and 4. FOC-off by zooming out from the bottom-right corner. These 
sequences were carefully constructed such that the last frames of the 4 movies were 
identical. The stationary image that contained the change was also identical across all 
conditions. Thus, the size of the objects in the last frame of the movie and the critical 
change frame was identical across conditions, rendering the difficulty of the search 
comparable. The 5th condition, a stationary control, was created by presenting the last 
frame of the movie for 0.6 sec. 
We prepared 55 image pairs (5 of them were used for practice). We presented each image 
pair to a particular subject in one of five conditions. In other words, each subject was 
tested ten times in each condition, but each subject only saw a given image pair once in 
one condition. To achieve balance across subjects, we created 3 groups of 5 subjects and 
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assigned image pairs to each group such that each image pair was seen under one 
experimental condition by only one member of the group. For the data analysis, the 
results from one group were considered as a single data point. To reflect this grouping 
process, the error bars are the standard deviation divided by the square root of the number 
of groups, which is 3. 
!
2.4.2.5 Data analysis 
Prior to data collection, we defined a region of acceptable click location for each image 
pair by delineating a rectangular area that encompassed the change. Out of 750 trials, 701 
clicks (93.5%) were within the pre-defined areas and only 10 clicks (1.3%) were outside 
of the rectangle. In 39 trials (5.2%), subjects did not click any location within 52.8 sec. 
A one-way ANOVA was performed on log-transformed RTs because RTs were heavily 
long-tailed as can be seen from the cumulative histogram, whose x-axis is the logarithm 
of RT. For display purpose, the means of log-transformed RT as well as the error bars 
were transformed back into a linear scale by exponentiation. We used non-parametric 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for post-hoc comparisons. 
!
2.5 Results 
2.5.1 Experiment 1: Speeded discrimination under background dots 
2.5.1.1 Motion is a strong cue while TSG and SSG act as auxiliary cues 
Our main interest in this paper is how visual attention is attracted and guided by motion, 
looming stimuli, and depth structure. These cues represent some aspects of the visual 
input during navigation within the 3D environment. Our expansive or contractive motion 
as well as the size distribution of dots (the spatial size gradient, SSG) defined a singular 
point in the display, which may or may not attract attention. When the size of the dots 
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changed over time (the temporal size gradient, TSG), they did not signal the location of 
the singular point but they assisted the ecological interpretation of the motion and depth 
structure of the dots. We measured whether the singular point defined by the motion and/
or SSG attracted covert attention by measuring RTs in the discrimination task and by 
defining the attentional effect as the RT increase in the trials where the target was located 
in the opposite (or incongruent) side of the display from the singular point compared to 
where they were located in the same (or congruent) side (Figure 2.3B). Significant 
attentional effects were highly robust and measurable in almost all subjects as shown in 
Figure 2.3C (in Condition 8), with a confidence interval estimated by the bootstrap 
method (Efron and Tibshirani, 1994). We demonstrated raw RT range for each subject in 
Figure 2.3D. 
Comparing the overlapping conditions between Exp 1a and 1b (four conditions with 
motion on), we did not find any difference in the attentional effect (four-way ANOVA; 
Experiment [1a vs. 1b] (between-subjects factor) X motion direction [expansive vs. 
contractive] X TSG X SSG: the p-value for the main effect of the Experiment was > 
0.32). Post-hoc two-tailed t-tests confirmed no difference between each pair of 
overlapping conditions (all p-values were above 0.05). This analysis confirmed that our 
experiment was replicated by two independent samples. 
!
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Figure 2.4. The attentional effects of the expanding and contracting optic flow.  
(A) Cube representation of the attentional effect. Red and blue colors represent the 
positive attentional effect for the expanding and contracting conditions, respectively. 
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Black color represents the negative attentional effect. The area of the balls corresponds to 
the absolute magnitude of the attentional effect (the scale indicates 5 ms). p-values from 
two-tailed t-test against zero are represented by *, ** and *** indicating p < 0.05, p < 
0.01, and p < 0.001, respectively. (B) Bar representation of the attentional effects. Red 
and blue bars are for the expanding and contracting conditions, respectively. The stars 
indicating the level of the p-values (*, ** and ***) from two-tailed t-test against zero are 
shown within the bars. Significant differences between the expanding and contracting 
conditions are denoted by stars above the bars. Error bars denote one s.e.m. across 
subjects. 
!
In Figure 2.4A, we represent the attentional effects as the area of balls in a cube 
configuration, using the motion, TSG and SSG as the three axes. Note that the condition 
with motion off, TSG off and SSG on (a static perspective image) was identical for 
expanding and contracting motion. 
As the first analysis, we tested if each condition produced reliable attentional effects 
(two-tailed t-tests against 0). For all the conditions with the expanding motion, we 
observed significant attentional effects (above 0, all ps < 0.01, the 4 red bars on the right 
in Figure 2.4B). Their magnitudes ranged from 18 to 35 ms for motion on, but less than 5 
ms for motion off. With the contracting motion, we found significant attentional effect 
only when combined with the TSG and SSG [motion = on, TSG = on, SSG = on] (p < 
0.01, 18 ms, the rightmost blue bar in Figure 2.4B). Separately for expanding and 
contracting motion, we compared the attentional effects between motion on and off, 
collapsing TSG and SSG, and found a highly significant difference for the expanding 
(paired t-test; p < 0.0005) but not for the contracting conditions (p = 0.78). We conclude 
that focal attention is critically captured by the focus of expansion signaled by the 
expanding motion, but not by the contracting motion. 
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Second, we investigated the effects of the TSG with repeated ANOVAs. We used a subset 
of balanced data from Exp 1b, with [motion = on/off, TSG = on/off] (i.e., the data points 
in the upper plane of the cube in Figure 2.4A). For the expanding condition, we found 
the main effect of motion to be significant (two-way ANOVA, p = 0.016), but neither for 
the main effect of TSG (p = 0.86) nor the interaction between motion and TSG (p = 0.80). 
For the contracting condition, we observed the main effect of TSG (p = 0.0047), but 
neither the main effect of motion (p = 0.95), nor the interaction between motion and TSG 
(p = 0.55). We conclude that the TSG was a critical feature to capture attention for the 
contracting but not for the expanding optic flow.  
Third, we investigated the effects of the SSG on attention by confining the analysis to 
motion on, i.e., the right side of the cube in Figure 2.4A. Three-way, within-subjects 
repeated ANOVA (motion direction [expansion vs. contraction] X TSG X SSG) revealed 
significant main effects of motion direction (p < 0.01) and TSG (p = 0.038) but not SSG 
(p = 0.09). There was a significant interaction between TSG and SSG (p = 0.044), but 
neither between motion direction and TSG (p > 0.65), motion direction and SSG (p > 
0.19), nor a 3-way interaction (p > 0.18). To understand the nature of the interaction 
between TSG and SSG, we performed post-hoc two-way ANOVAs (TSG X SSG) 
separately for the expanding and contracting conditions. For the expanding condition, we 
found a significant main effect of SSG (p = 0.021) but not TSG (p = 0.27) or interaction 
(p > 0.41). For the contracting condition, we found a significant main effect of TSG (p = 
0.043) and interaction (p = 0.026) but not the main effect of SSG (p = 0.76). Although 
significant, these effects tend to be small in magnitude (~10 ms) compared to the effects 
caused by the presence of motion itself (~28 ms; Figure 2.4A). To conclude, the SSG 
played a significant role only in the expanding motion condition.  
Fourth, to further characterize the importance of the TSG and SSG, we compared the 
attentional effects in Condition 8 (motion = on, TSG = on, SSG = on) with the conditions 
that lacked only the TSG and/or SSG. The effect increased with both features [motion = 
on, TSG = off, SSG = off] (~18 ms, pairwise two-tailed t-test, p = 0.026) and [motion = 
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on, TSG = on, SSG = off] (~14 ms, p = 0.01), but not with [motion = on, TSG = off, SSG 
= on] (~10 ms, p = 0.23). This pattern seems consistent with an additive attentional effect 
of the TSG and SSG. To summarize, we found that the effects of the TSG and SSG were 
about 1/3 of the attentional effect due to the motion cue alone.  
Fifth, we compared the magnitude of the attentional effects between the expanding and 
contracting conditions (Figure 2.4B, the red and blue bars are for the expanding and 
contracting motion, respectively). We found that the expanding motion attracted more 
attention only when the TSG and/or SSG were on (paired t-test, p < 0.05) but not when 
both the TSG and SSG were off (p = 0.12). This indicates an interdependence of motion 
direction, TSG and SSG. The TSG and SSG helped the expanding motion to attract 
attention. This further buttressed our claim that the motion plays the dominant role in the 
attentional effect while the TSG and SSG played an auxiliary role for the attentional 
attraction due to the expanding motion. 
!
2.5.1.2 Target eccentricity and SOA on the attentional effects 
So far, we showed that Condition 8 (motion = on, TSG = on, SSG = on), which is closest 
to the ecological condition, strongly attracts attention towards the singular point. In this 
section, we characterize the spatiotemporal characteristics of the attentional cueing 
(Figure 2.5). We analyzed the influence of the target eccentricity and SOA on the 
attentional effects separately for the expanding (Figure 2.5 A,C,E and G) and contracting 
(Figure 2.5 B,D,F and H) motion, by averaging across all conditions (Figure 2.5 A–D) 
or by focusing on Condition 8 (Figure 2.5 E–H). 
!
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Figure 2.5. Dependency of the attentional effects on target eccentricity and SOA. 
Dependency of the attentional effects on target eccentricity (A,B,E,F) and SOA 
(C,D,G,H) for all conditions averaged (A–D) and for Condition 8 (motion = on, SSG = 
on, TSG = on) (E–H). Red bars are for the expanding conditions (A,C,E,G) and blue bars 
are for the contracting conditions (B,D,F,H). The level of p-values from two-tailed t-test 
against zero are shown above the bars by *, ** and *** for p < 0.05, p < 0.01 and p < 
0.001, respectively. 
!
With the data averaged across all conditions (Figure 2.5 A–D), the results of the three-
way, within-subjects ANOVA (motion direction [expansion vs. contraction] X 
eccentricity [near, mid and far] X SOA [0, 250, 500, 750 and 1000 ms]) revealed 
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significant main effects of motion direction (p = 0.013) and SOA (p = 0.0022), but not 
eccentricity (p = 0.16). A significant interaction was observed between motion directions 
and SOA (p = 0.012), but no other significant interactions were observed. The lack of the 
main effect of the eccentricity implies that attention was attracted towards the side of the 
singular point and that attention was not attracted to the exact location of the singular 
point.  
To characterize the nature of the interaction between motion direction and SOA, we 
performed post-hoc, one-way, within-subjects ANOVA on SOA separately for the 
expanding and contracting conditions (collapsing across the eccentricities): SOA 
dependence came from the expanding (p = 7.4×10-5, Figure 2.5C) but not contracting 
conditions (p = 0.19, Figure 2.5D).  
The expansive motion captured attention as soon as 250 ms after stimulus onset (p < 
0.001 for t-tests testing that the attentional effects were above 0 at SOA = 0.25, 0.5, 0.75 
and 1s, p = 0.84 at SOA = 0s; Figure 2.5C). Unlike other exogenous attentional cues, 
such as a flash of a bright square, the expansive motion attracted attention rapidly and in 
a sustained manner (see Discussion). In contrast, the contracting motion field took a long 
time to capture attention (p < 0.05 at SOA = 0.75 and 1s, p > 0.36 at SOA = 0, 0.25 and 
0.5s; Figure 2.5D). This slow orienting process is unlikely to be caused by bottom-up 
stimulus factor, suggesting a possible difference in the neuronal mechanisms of 
attentional capture for the expansive and contractive motions. 
We repeated the above analysis, focusing on Condition 8 (motion = on, TSG = on, SSG = 
on), which is closest to the ecological condition, as these experiments produced the 
largest attentional effects (Figure 2.5E–H). The results were similar to those collapsing 
over all conditions: a marginally significant main effect of motion direction (p = 0.061) 
but not eccentricity (p = 0.11). Here we did not observe a significant dependency on SOA 
(p = 0.16). We found that the expanding motion started to attract attention for an SOA as 
short as 250 ms and lasting until 1s (all ps < 0.05 except p = 0.071 for SOA = 0.75s; 
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Figure 2.5G) while the contracting motion started to attract attention with the long SOA 
(p < 0.01 at SOA = 1s; Figure 2.5H). 
!
2.5.1.3 Laterality of the attentional effects 
We found an unexpected and sizable effect of laterality of the singular point. Averaging 
across all conditions, the attentional effects were stronger when the singular point 
appeared in the right visual field than the left, but they were similar between the upper 
and lower visual field: with a three-way within-subjects ANOVA (motion direction 
[expansion vs. contraction] X the horizontal [left vs. right] X the vertical [upper vs. 
lower] position of the singular point), we found significant main effects of motion 
direction (p = 0.013) and the horizontal (p = 0.021) but not the vertical position of the 
singular point (p = 0.41; Figure 2.6A,B).  
!
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Figure 2.6. The size of the attentional effects depends on the side of the singular 
point.  
(A,B) The attentional effects averaged for all conditions and (C,D) for Condition 8 
(motion on, TSG on, and SSG on). (E,F) The effects are not explained by the difference 
in raw RTs (all conditions averaged). Red bars are for the expanding conditions (A,C,E) 
and blue bars are for the contracting conditions (B,D,F). p-values from two-tailed t-test 
against zero are shown above the bars by *, ** and *** for p < 0.05, p < 0.01 and p < 
0.001, respectively. TL: top-left. TR: top-right. BL: bottom-left. BR: bottom-right. 
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!
The most ecological motion (Condition 8, motion, TSG and SSG all on) also revealed 
this left-right asymmetry of the attentional effect: with a three-way within-subjects 
ANOVA, we found a significant main effect of the horizontal position of the singular 
point (p = 0.030) but not of the other factors (motion directions, p = 0.080 and the 
vertical position p = 0.63; Figure 2.6C,D).  
This effect is not an artifact of using the right hand for response; the reaction time for 
target detection was comparable when the singular point appeared in any of the quadrants 
(three-way within-subjects ANOVA (motion direction [expansion vs. contraction] X the 
horizontal X the vertical position of the singular point, the main effect of motion 
directions: p = 0.35; horizontal: p = 0.85; vertical p = 0.62, no significant interactions (all 
ps > 0.12; Figure 2.6E,F)). 
When we grouped the trials according to the horizontal position of the target and repeated 
the same analysis, we did not find any significant effects.  
!
2.5.1.4 Analysis of error trials  
There were five types of errors (1. fixation-break, 2. wrong discrimination, 3. missing 
response, 4. too early response, and 5. too late response). Table 2.2 summarizes the error 
rates for each condition. All errors except fixation-break were well controlled below 5%, 
showing that subjects well understood and concentrated on the task. The mean rate of 
fixation-break was 19%. In this task, constant fixation was not easy and subjects were 
frequently reminded to keep a good fixation and reduce blinks. Condition 4 (motion = 
off, TSG = on, SSG = on) had a slightly higher error rate than the rest of conditions (two-
way ANOVA (error types X conditions), the main effect of error types: p < 2×10-16, the 
main effect of conditions: p = 0.017), indicating that this condition was slightly more 
difficult to maintain constant fixation than others. No interaction was found between the 
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error types and conditions (p = 0.36). Separate analysis within Exp 1a and Exp 1b (two-
way within-subjects ANOVA) revealed the same effect. 
!
Table 2.2. The error rates (in percentage) for each condition. 
!
2.5.2 Experiment 2: Change detection with zooming in and out 
In Experiment 2, we investigated if the attentional effects revealed in Experiment 1 can 
be replicated in a more naturalistic setting. For this purpose, we used natural scene 
images and allowed subjects to move their eyes in a change detection paradigm (Figure 
2.7A). 
!
Conditio
n
Motio
n
TS
G
SSG Fixation 
Break
Wrong 
Discriminatio
n
Missing 
Response
Too Early 
Response
Too Late 
Response
1 Off Off Off - - - - -
2 Off Off On 20.6 2.17 0.116 0 0.614
3 Off On Off - - - - -
4 Off On On 26.3 2.4 0.236 2.49 2.87
5 On Off Off 18.1 1.9 0.211 0.0324 0.541
6 On Off On 17.3 1.86 0.0403 0 0.792
7 On On Off 15.7 2.11 0.125 0 0.722
8 On On On 19.2 1.95 0.171 0 0.743
Average - - - 19 2.02 0.134 0.265 0.898
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Figure 2.7. Expansion but not contraction influences the speed of change detection.  
(A) For Experiment 2, a 0.6 sec movie expanded or contracted with the associated FOE 
or FOC located either at the corner of the same quadrant as the change or at the opposite 
corner (in this example, the car on the bottom right disappeared). After a 0.28 sec blank 
period, a stationary image with a single noticeable change from the last frame of the 
movie was presented for 0.6 sec, followed by another 0.28 sec blank. This loop was 
repeated until subjects responded. (B) The cumulative detection probability as a function 
of RT (log scale). When the FOE was close to the location of the change, detection was 
facilitated, while when the FOE was far away, it interfered with change detection. 
Contraction did not affect change detection, compared to the control stationary condition. 
(Inset)  Mean RT (error bars are for s.e.m.). 
!
As was expected from Experiment 1, subjects detected the change more quickly when it 
was close to the FOE (Figure 2.7B). Mean RTs across conditions (FOE-on: 3.34 ± 1.13 
sec; FOE-off: 6.48 ± 1.16 sec; FOC-on: 4.62 ± 1.08 sec; FOC-off: 4.56 ± 1.14 sec; 
stationary: 4.39 ± 1.06 sec; mean ± standard error) differed significantly (one-way 
ANOVA, p < 10-5). A post-hoc Kolmogorov-Smirnov test confirmed (i) that the RT was 
strongly influenced by the location of the FOE (p < 10-9) but not by the FOC (p > 0.9), 
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(ii) that the RT in the FOE-on condition was faster than any other conditions (p < 0.01 for 
all comparisons) and (iii) that the RT in the FOE-off condition was slower than any other 
conditions (p < 0.02 for all comparisons). FOC-on, FOC-off, and stationary conditions 
did not differ among each other (p >0.27 for all). We conclude that zooming into the 
change (FOE), but not zooming away from the change (FOC), guides covert and overt 
attention.  
!
2.6 Discussion 
In two separate experiments, visual attention was rapidly attracted in a sustained manner 
towards the focus of the expanding motion. The effect was largely specific to the 
expanding motion and was weak or absent for the contracting motion. The motion cue 
played a key role in capturing attention while the temporal evolution of object size (TSG) 
and depth structure (SSG) played an auxiliary role (Experiment 1). Change detection was 
substantially slowed or facilitated depending on the location of the FOE (focus of 
expansion), but not FOC (focus of contraction), relative to the changed object 
(Experiment 2). 
!
2.6.1 Attention is attracted towards the singular point defined by the expansive, but not 
contractive, motion 
Throughout our experiments, we found a profound asymmetry between the strong 
attentional effects of expansive motion and the weak or inconsistent effects for 
contractive motion. This ruled out a possibility that the slower speed vector fields around 
the singular point attracted attention since both the contractive and expansive motion had 
slower motion field near the singular point, yet much larger attentional effects were found 
in the expanding motion. Our result is consistent with the asymmetric ease in visual 
search (e.g., it is easy to find an expanding object among receding ones and it is difficult 
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to find a receding object among expanding ones (Takeuchi, 1997)). Likewise, cortical 
neurons that prefer expanding radial motion outnumber neurons that prefer contracting 
motion (Saito et al., 1986, Graziano et al., 1994). The attentional and neuronal bias 
towards expansive motion might have been shaped through evolution reflecting 
ecological conditions, as contractive motion occurs only when moving backward, which 
happens much less often in the natural environment. This conjecture is supported by 
developmental studies of babies that prefer to look at expansive rather than contractive 
motion; even more, the developmental onset of expansive motion preference starts even 
before babies start moving by themselves and experiencing expansive optic flow 
(Brosseau-Lachaine et al., 2008), suggesting an innate bias towards expansive motion. 
Furthermore, in the real world, animals manifested a fine-tuned neural system to perceive 
expanding optic flow and control motion, for example during pigeon perching (Lee et al., 
1993), fly landing (Wagner, 1982), gannet plunge-diving (Lee and Reddish, 1981) and 
during human landing from a fall (Sidaway et al., 1989), steering (Land and Lee, 1994) 
and braking a car (Lee, 1976, Yilmaz and Warren, 1995). Abundant psychophysical 
(Morrone et al., 1999) and physiological (Duffy and Wurtz, 1991, Orban, 1992) studies 
have shown that these expansionary motions are processed by specialized mechanisms in 
mammalian visual systems.  
!
2.6.2 Sustained attentional effects 
Consistent with von Muhlenen & Lleras (von Muhlenen and Lleras, 2007) who used 
random dot motion, we found that the expanding optic flow field rapidly attracted 
attention towards the FOE in a sustained manner. While many exogenous cues attract 
attention, these cues tend to attract attention only during the initial several hundred 
milliseconds, usually acting in a repelling fashion after ~500 ms, a phenomenon called 
‘inhibition-of-return (IOR)’ (Klein, 2000), which is believed to facilitate orientation 
towards novel locations, facilitating foraging and other search behaviors.  
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In Experiment 1, the attentional effects were sustained up to 1 sec, which suggests that 
IOR is not operating for the attentional mechanisms with the expansive motion. In 
Experiment 2, the attentional effects even amounted to 3 sec, implying that IOR was not 
operating over long period of time in this paradigm. On this point, we invite readers to 
look at our demo movies. We expect them to feel like they tend to look at the location 
around the FOE repeatedly although they know that there is no change to be detected 
around that location. The lack of IOR in our expansive motion implies that attention 
towards the FOE may be important in coordinating behavior by aligning the direction of 
gaze, head and body.  
!
2.6.3 Mechanisms of computation of the FOE 
Optic flow is processed in a network of visual motion areas, V1, V3, MT, medial superior 
temporal area (MST) (Saito et al., 1986, Duffy and Wurtz, 1991, Graziano et al., 1994, 
Britten and van Wezel, 1998), the ventral intraparietal sulcus (VIP) (Schaafsma and 
Duysens, 1996, Bremmer et al., 2002, Zhang et al., 2004), area 7a and STP (for a review, 
see (Britten, 2008)). Recordings from neurons in the ventral intraparietal sulcus (VIP), 
which receives strong input from MSTd, also revealed strong tuning to the optic flow 
(Schaafsma and Duysens, 1996, Bremmer et al., 2002, Zhang et al., 2004). A recent fMRI 
study compared the response characteristics of these two regions and found that VIP is 
more consistent with the computation of FOEs than MSTd (Wall and Smith, 2008).  
Given the known strong effects of attention in VIP (Colby and Goldberg, 1999, Maunsell 
and Cook, 2002) and other parietal areas, it is possible that the attentional effects of the 
FOE are mediated by neurons in this region. These overlapping regions for computing the 
FOE and attention raise the question of to which extent the FOE attracts focal attention 
and, if so, whether this depends on the task at hand. 
!
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2.6.4 Advantage of our stimulus design 
Conventional studies often used homogeneous random-dot patterns without any size 
change over time (TSG off) and/or uniform size distribution over space (SSG off). We 
found that the size change over time (TSG on) and the size distribution over space (SSG 
on) maximize the attentional effect of the expansive motion. Future studies might be 
better able to simulate ego-motion in the real world by including temporal evolvement 
(TSG) and depth information (SSG). 
Our decomposition paradigm begs a question: how is each optical feature represented in 
the brain? Human psychophysical studies showed perception of visual expansion without 
optic flow (Schrater et al., 2001), indicating that judgment of size (or scale) change is 
independent of local translational motion. Human fMRI studies have also tried to 
separate and control optical variables, such as time-to-contact, image expansion, motion 
in depth and rate of gap closure, in the case of looming (Field and Wann, 2005). In future 
research, it will be important to examine the neural mechanisms of each feature.  
!
2.6.5 Laterality effects of attention 
Unexpectedly, we found the attentional effects strongly depend on the laterality of the 
singular point (Figure 2.6A-D): when the singular point appears in the right visual field, 
the attentional effects became roughly twice as large (30ms vs. 15ms, for the expansion). 
Behaviorally, lateralized effects have been reported for the sensory and cognitive 
processing of language, face, and emotion (MacNeilage et al., 2009). Recent studies also 
report laterality effects in frogs, chickens, birds and monkeys, implying the evolutionary 
origin of the laterality (Vallortigara and Rogers, 2005). Laterality has been also well 
documented for the attentional mechanisms (Fox et al., 2006). In normal subjects, a 
strong asymmetry in the attentional resolution has been reported between the upper and 
lower visual field (He et al., 1996). While it is unclear why spatial attention is more 
strongly captured when the singular point locates in the right visual field, our findings 
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might be related to the ancestral origin of hemispheric lateralization for detecting 
unexpected predators vs. performing routine jobs (MacNeilage et al., 2009). 
!
2.7 Conclusion  
In this paper, we explored the attentional effects of the singular point defined by motion, 
object expansion and 3D depth structure. We found the strongest attentional effects in the 
condition that incorporates expansive motion with the 3D depth structure, which is most 
compatible with the visual input during forward ego motion in the 3D environment. 
While extensive studies have been performed on the mechanisms of attention, relatively 
less is explored on how attention is guided in the real 3D natural environment with the 
observer motion. Accordingly typical computational models of attention do not 
incorporate the factors we investigated here (Itti et al., 1998, Itti and Koch, 2001, 
Foulsham and Underwood, 2008). Our experiments revealed that expanding motion that 
accompanies forward ego motion is likely to guide attention strongly in everyday life. 
Further studies will be necessary to uncover how attention is guided and how we perceive 
the world in the natural environment. 
!
2.8 Acknowledgements 
We thank Claudia Wilimzig for offering us the stimuli for Experiment 2, Shima 
Hajimirza for collecting the data for Experiment 2 and Elnaz Nouri for performing the 
preliminary version of Experiment 1.  
!59
Chapter III: Preferential attention to animals and people is independent 
of the amygdala 
!
3.1 Overview 
In Chapter II, we studied non-social spatial cues that attract attention during locomotion 
using a cued speeded discrimination task and found that motion cues indicating a forward 
motion are the strongest to attract attention. However, compared to inanimate objects and 
cues, people preferentially attend to animals and faces, a process in which the amygdala 
is thought to play an important role. In this chapter, we tested four rare patients with 
selective bilateral amygdala lesions, in order to address an important open question: is the 
amygdala critical for the preferential processing of animate stimuli? There is substantial 
evidence to suggest the amygdala’s involvement in attention to, and detection of, animate 
stimuli (pictures of animals and people), but nobody has yet tested whether this 
involvement is necessary. 
We used a well-validated experimental protocol (New et al., 2007), and supplemented 
this with additional control tasks as well as detailed eye-tracking measures. Compared to 
matched controls, our four patients all performed completely normally, showing a robust 
advantage for detecting animals and people. These results are particularly surprising 
because both fMRI studies as well as single-unit recordings have found strong evidence 
for amygdala responses that are tuned to these stimulus categories. This result is 
important, because it redirects the search for the neural substrates of animacy detection 
elsewhere, and we suggest some plausible candidate structures in this chapter. 
Linking between Chapter II and Chapter IV, this chapter directly compares social (faces, 
people and head directions) vs. non-social cues (plants and artifacts). We show attentional 
advantage of social over non-social cues, but this attentional advantage is independent of 
the amygdala—a key structure of the “social brain”. Then what is role of the amygdala in 
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processing animate stimuli, in particular faces? We will investigate this question in the 
next chapter. 
This work has been published as (Wang et al., 2014b). 
!
3.2 Summary 
The amygdala is thought to play a critical role in detecting salient stimuli. Several studies 
have taken ecological approaches to investigating such saliency, and argue for domain-
specific effects for processing certain natural stimulus categories, in particular faces and 
animals. Linking this to the amygdala, neurons in the human amygdala have been found 
to respond strongly to faces, and also to animals. Yet the amygdala’s necessary role for 
such category-specific effects at the behavioral level remains untested. 
Here we tested four rare patients with bilateral amygdala lesions on an established 
change-detection protocol. Consistent with prior published studies, healthy controls 
showed reliably faster and more accurate detection of people and animals, as compared to 
artifacts and plants. But so did all four amygdala patients: there were no differences in 
phenomenal change blindness, in behavioral reaction time to detect changes, or in eye-
tracking measures. The findings provide decisive evidence against a critical participation 
of the amygdala in rapid, initial processing of attention to animate stimuli, suggesting that 
the necessary neural substrates for this phenomenon arise either in other subcortical 
structures (such as the pulvinar) or within cortex itself.  
!
3.3 Introduction 
The human amygdala clearly contributes to processing emotionally salient and socially 
relevant stimuli (Kling and Brothers, 1992, LeDoux, 1996, Adolphs, 2010). While most 
studies have investigated stimuli that are salient because they are emotionally arousing 
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(McGaugh, 2004), or involve reward-related valuation (Baxter and Murray, 2002, Paton 
et al., 2006), recent findings show that the amygdala processes salient stimuli even when 
there is no emotional component involved at all (Herry et al., 2007). Earlier notions that 
the amygdala specifically mediates fear processing have been replaced by recent accounts 
that it is involved in processing a broader spectrum of salient stimuli, such as biological 
values and rewards (Baxter and Murray, 2002), novel objects (Bagshaw et al., 1972), 
emotion-enhanced vividness (Todd et al., 2012), animate entities (Yang et al., 2012b), 
temporal unpredictability (Herry et al., 2007) and personal space (Kennedy et al., 2009). 
While some of these may involve fear processing, it has been argued that a more 
parsimonious explanation is that the amygdala instead acts as a detector of perceptual 
saliency and biological relevance (Sander et al., 2005, Adolphs, 2008).  
One category of salient stimuli that have been recently investigated is animate (living) 
stimuli (New et al., 2007, Mormann et al., 2011). Subjects can rapidly detect animals in 
briefly presented novel natural scenes even when attentional resources are extremely 
limited (Li et al., 2002), suggesting that such detection may in fact be pre-attentive. 
Furthermore, images of animals and people are detected preferentially during change 
blindness tasks (New et al., 2007), an approach on which we capitalized here. The 
amygdala’s role in such preferential detection is also related to a large literature of 
neuroimaging studies suggesting that amygdala activation to faces might be seen even 
under conditions of reduced attention or subliminal presentation (Morris et al., 1998, 
Whalen et al., 1998, Morris et al., 2001, Vuilleumier et al., 2001, Anderson et al., 2003, 
Jiang and He, 2006) (but see (Pessoa et al., 2006)). Importantly, direct recordings of 
single neurons in the human amygdala were recently shown to respond preferentially to 
images of animals (Mormann et al., 2011), and robust responses to images of faces have 
been shown as well (Rutishauser et al., 2011). This begs the question whether the strong 
neuronal responses tuned to animals in the amygdala (Mormann et al., 2011) have a 
behavioral consequence such as enhanced attention to animals (New et al., 2007). If so, 
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we would expect a reduced preferential detection of animals in patients with amygdala 
lesions. 
Here we tested four rare patients with bilateral amygdala lesions on a flicker change-
detection protocol (Grimes, 1996, Rensink et al., 1997) with concurrent eye-tracking to 
test the amygdala’s role in rapid detection of animate stimuli. We found both healthy 
controls and all four amygdala patients showed reliably faster and more accurate 
detection of animals and people. Detailed eye-tracking analyses further corroborated the 
superior attentional processing of animals, people and faces, and again were equivalent in 
controls and amygdala patients.  
!
3.4 Methods 
3.4.1 Subjects 
We tested four rare patients, SM, AP, AM and BG, who all have bilateral amygdala 
lesions due to Urbach-Wiethe disease (Hofer, 1973), a condition that caused complete 
bilateral destruction of the basolateral amygdala and variable lesions of the remaining 
amygdala while sparing hippocampus and all neocortical structures (see Figure 3.1 for 
MRI anatomical scans and Table 3.1 for neuropsychological data). AM and BG are 
monozygotic twins whose lesions and neuropsychology have been described in detail 
previously (Becker et al., 2012): both AM and BG have symmetrical complete damage of 
the basolateral amygdala with some sparing of the centromedial amygdala. SM and AP 
are two women who have also been described previously (Hampton et al., 2007, 
Buchanan et al., 2009): SM has complete bilateral amygdala lesions, whereas AP has 
symmetrical bilateral lesions encompassing about 75% of the amygdala. Ten 
neurologically and psychiatrically healthy subjects were recruited as controls, matched in 
gender, age, IQ and education (see Table 3.1). Subjects gave written informed consent 
and the experiments were approved by the Caltech Institutional Review Board. All 
subjects had normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity. 
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!  
Figure 3.1. MRI anatomical scans of the amygdala lesions.  
Displayed are high-resolution (0.5–1 mm isotropic) horizontal T1-weighted magnetic 
resonance imaging sections of the anterior medial temporal lobes. Red arrows index the 
focal bilateral amygdala calcification damage. R: right.  
!
Table 3.1. List of subject demographics and psychological evaluation.  
Intelligence was measured by the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI). 
SM’s IQ was measured by the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS-III). AM and 
BG’s IQ was measured by the HAWIE-R ('Hamburg-Wechsler Intelligenztest für 
Erwachsene in revidierter Fassung'), a German-language adaptation of the WAIS-R 
(Wechsler Intelligence Test for Adults-Revised), which provides a measure of verbal, 
performance, and full-scale IQ. 
R R RR
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Abbreviations: Age: age at testing. Hand: Dominant handedness (A: ambidextrous, L: 
left, R: right); Benton: Benton Facial Recognition Test, long form score. Benton scores 
41–54 are in the normal range. WASI: IQ scores from the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of 
Intelligence: full scale IQ (FSIQ), performance IQ (PIQ), verbal IQ (VIQ). n.a.: not 
available. 
Subjects were tested individually. The four amygdala patients do not differ in age from 
the controls (amygdala patient mean age = 36.5 years, range 27–43; control mean age = 
35.7 years, range 23–57; t-test p = 0.89). SM’s IQ was measured by WAIS-III. The rest of 
the subjects were measured by WASI. The mean IQ of the other three amygdala patients 
was 98.3 (range 96–101), not different from that of their controls (mean IQ = 104.7, 
range 100–116; p = 0.13). 
ID Age Sex Hand Race Education Benton
WASI
FSIQ PIQ VIQ
SM 43 F R Caucasian High School 45 88 95 86
AP 27 F R Asian/Pacific Islander Bachelor's Degree 50 98 106 92
AM 38 F A Caucasian
13 years of 
education in 
Germany
36 101 103 99
BG 38 F R Caucasian
13 years of 
education in 
Germany
41 96 97 94
RA0067 57 F R African 
American
Some College 54 104 n.a
.
n.a
.
RA0071 45 F R Caucasian Some College 49 111 103 117
RA0629 32 F A Caucasian Some College n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
RA0633 27 F R Asian/Pacific Islander Bachelor's Degree n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
RA0762 23 F A Hispanic/Latino Some College 50 100 105 95
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3.4.2 Stimuli and apparatus 
We used a flicker change-detection task using natural scenes (Figure 3.2). Change targets 
were drawn from the following five categories: animals (32 images), artifacts (32 
images), people (31 images), plants (29 images) and head directions (26 images). A 
subset of the images had been used in previous studies that showed reliably faster 
detection of animals and people (New et al., 2007, New et al., 2010). Targets were 
embedded in complex and natural scenes that contained items from non-target categories 
as well. The changes to the targets between alternating presentations of an image 
included both flips and disappearances. Construction and validity of the stimuli, stimulus 
properties and further control experiments using inverted stimuli have been discussed in 
previous studies (New et al., 2007, New et al., 2010).  
!
RA0764 31 F R Caucasian Master's Degree n.a. 102 103 101
RA0829 29 F R Caucasian Bachelor's Degree n.a. 116 111 116
RA0835 38 F R Hispanic/Latino Bachelor's Degree 49 102 99 104
RA0848 40 F R Caucasian High School n.a. 101 104 98
RA0851 35 F R Caucasian Bachelor's Degree n.a. 107 103 108
ID Age Sex Hand Race Education Benton
WASI
FSIQ PIQ VIQ
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!  
Figure 3.2. Task and sample stimuli.  
(A) Task structure and timecourse. One target object either disappeared or changed its 
orientation between two alternating frames. These frames were separated by a blank 
frame. Note that the sizes of the stimuli are not to scale. Sample stimuli showing changes 
of (B) an animal, (C) artifact, (D) person, (E) plant and (F) head direction. The changes 
are labeled by a red box. Low-level saliency and eccentricity of the changes did not differ 
between categories, while plants were significantly larger in area, favoring easier 
detection. 
!
We quantified low-level properties of all stimuli. Target categories did not differ in terms 
of bottom-up local saliency around the target region as quantified by the Itti-Koch 
bottom-up model of attention (Itti et al., 1998, Itti and Koch, 2001) (one-way ANOVA, p 
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= 0.44; mean saliency was normalized to 1 within each image), nor by mean distance 
from the center of the image (p = 0.28). Plants subtended a larger area on the screen than 
the other categories (p < 0.05). SM and SM controls were tested on a subset of the stimuli 
that had larger area for inanimate stimuli (artifacts and plants vs. animals and people; p < 
0.005), but did not differ in Itti-Koch saliency (artifacts and plants vs. animals and 
people; p = 0.77) or distance to the center (p = 0.13). Overall, any low-level differences 
in area favored a faster detection of inanimate stimuli instead of the faster detection of 
animate stimuli we observed. We also note that our key comparison is between amygdala 
patients and their matched controls, and these two groups always saw identical stimuli in 
any case. 
Subjects sat 65 cm from an LCD display (refresh rate 60 Hz, centrally presented stimuli 
subtending 14.9° × 11.2°). Stimuli were presented using MATLAB with Psychtoolbox 3 
(Brainard, 1997) (http://psychtoolbox.org). 
!
3.4.3 Task 
In each trial, we presented a sequence of the original scene image (500 ms), a blank 
screen (250 ms), the altered scene with a changed target (500 ms), and a blank (250 ms). 
This sequence was repeated until subjects detected the changed target (Figure 3.2). 
Subjects were asked to press the space bar as quickly as possible upon detecting the 
change. Subsequent to detection, subjects were asked to use a mouse to click on the 
location of the change on the original scene image, which was followed by a feedback 
screen for 1 second (the words, ‘accurate’, or ‘inaccurate’). If subjects did not respond 
within 15 seconds (20 seconds for SM and SM controls), a message ‘Time Out’ was 
displayed. An inter-trial-interval (ITI) was jittered between 1 and 2 seconds. Scene and 
category order were completely randomized for each subject. Subjects practiced 5 trials 
(one trial per stimulus category) for initial familiarization. 
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Patients AP, AM and BG and 8 matched controls performed the task as described above. 
Patient SM and two matched controls performed the task with a subset of the stimuli 
(identical setup and stimuli to (New et al., 2010), which did not contain the head direction 
change category).  
!
3.4.4 Eye-tracking 
We tracked binocular eye positions using a Tobii TX300 system operating at 300 Hz with 
a 23-inch screen (screen resolution: 1920 × 1080). Fixations were detected using the 
Tobii Fixation Filter implemented in Tobii Studio (Olsson, 2007) which detects quick 
changes in the gaze point using a sliding window averaging method (velocity threshold 
was set to 35 pixels/sample and distance threshold was set to 35 pixels in our study). 
!
3.4.5 Data analysis 
ROIs were defined for each image pair by delineating a rectangular area that 
encompassed the target change region. Out of 1818 trials, 1571 mouse clicks (86.4%) fell 
within these pre-defined ROIs (correct trials) and 111 clicks (6.11%) fell outside 
(incorrect trials); 136 trials (7.48%), were time-out trials. For all subsequent analyses, we 
only analyzed correct trials with RTs that fell within ± 2.5 SD; 61 correct trials (3.36% of 
all trials) were excluded due to this RT criterion. There was no difference between 
amygdala patients and matched control subjects in the proportion of any of the above trial 
types (all t-tests ps > 0.05). We used MATLAB for t-tests and one-way ANOVAs, and R 
(R Foundation for Statistical Computing, Vienna, Austria) for repeated-measures 
ANOVAs. 
!
3.5 Results 
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3.5.1 Phenomenological change blindness and conscious detectability 
To obtain a systematic characterization of awareness of, and attention to, the change 
target, we first quantified phenomenological change blindness—the most severe case of 
change blindness in which the target change is missed entirely. The full time course of 
change detection for each stimulus category is depicted in Figure 3.3A,F, which plots the 
cumulative proportion of changes detected as a function of time elapsed. Steeper slopes 
indicate faster change detection and higher asymptotes mean more changes eventually 
detected. For both amygdala patients and control subjects, the curves for animate targets 
rose more rapidly and reached higher asymptotes, compared to inanimate targets. At any 
given time, a greater proportion of changes was detected for animate targets than 
inanimate ones. Both amygdala patients and control subjects were entirely change-blind 
more often for inanimate targets than for animate ones (time-out rates, Figure 3.3B,G; 
amygdala: 5.4 ± 4.8% for animate vs. 11.0 ± 7.8% for inanimate; see Table 3.2 for 
statistics) and there was no significant difference between amygdala patients and 
controls.  
!
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!  
Figure 3.3. Change detection is category-specific.  
Both amygdala lesion patients (A–E) (N = 4) and control subjects (F–J) (N = 10) showed 
advantageous change detection of animals, people and head directions over changes to 
plants and artifacts. (A,F) Graphs show proportion of changes detected as a function of 
time and semantic category. (B,G) Percentage of time-out for each category. (C,H) RT 
histogram across all trials. (D,I) Mean RT for each category. (E,J) Percentage of correct 
detection for each category. Error bars denote one s.e.m. across subjects. 
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Table 3.2. ANOVA table.  
p-values in bold indicate a statistical significance at p < 0.05. d.f.: degree of freedom. 
Measure Statistical Test Effect F-statistic (d.f.) p-value
Change 
blindness
5x2 mixed-model ANOVA of target category X 
group (amygdala lesion vs. control)
Main effect of 
target category F(4,45) = 13.1 p = 3.76×10
Main effect of 
subject group F(1,12) = 0.053 p = 0.82
Interaction F(4,45) = 0.46 p = 0.76
One-way repeated-measures ANOVA in 
amygdala lesion group
Main effect of 
category F(4,11) = 2.68 p = 0.088
One-way repeated-measures ANOVA in 
control group
Main effect of 
category F(4,34) = 11.4 p = 5.82×10
Conscious 
detection
Mixed-model two-way ANOVA of target 
category X subject group
Main effect of 
category F(4,36) = 21.1 p = 5.11×10
Main effect of 
group F(1,9) = 0.045 p = 0.84
Interaction F(4,36) = 0.079 p = 0.99
One-way repeated-measures ANOVA in 
amygdala lesion group
Main effect of 
category F(4,8) = 6.73 p = 0.011
One-way repeated-measures ANOVA in 
control group
Main effect of 
category F(4,28) = 14.8 p = 1.29×10
RT
Mixed-model two-way ANOVA of target 
category X subject group
Main effect of 
category F(4,45) = 44.4 p = 4.44×10
Main effect of 
group F(1,12) = 0.22 p = 0.65
Interaction F(4,45) = 0.12 p = 0.97
One-way repeated-measures ANOVA in 
amygdala lesion group
Main effect of 
category F(4,11) = 7.57 p = 0.0035
One-way repeated-measures ANOVA in 
control group
Main effect of 
category F(4,34) = 39.7 p = 2.26×10
Number of 
Mixed-model two-way ANOVA of target 
category X subject group
Main effect of 
category F(4,36) = 32.2 p = 1.95×10
Main effect of 
group F(1,9) = 0.15 p = 0.71
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Number of 
fixations Interaction F(4,36) = 1.45 p = 0.24
One-way repeated-measures ANOVA in 
amygdala lesion group
Main effect of 
category F(4,8) = 4.19 p = 0.040
One-way repeated-measures ANOVA in 
control group
Main effect of 
category F(4,28) = 31.6 p = 5.22×10
Hit rates
Mixed-model two-way ANOVA (subject group 
X category)
Main effect of 
target category F(4,45) = 17.2 p = 1.22×10
Main effect of 
subject group F(1,12) = 1.37 p = 0.26
Interaction F(4,45) = 0.88 p = 0.48
One-way repeated-measures ANOVA in 
amygdala lesion group
Main effect of 
category F(4,11) = 5.64 p = 0.010
One-way repeated-measures ANOVA in 
control group
Main effect of 
category F(4,34) = 12.5 p = 2.35×10
Fixation 
order
Mixed-model two-way ANOVA of target 
category X subject group
Main effect of 
category F(4,36) = 24.6 p = 7.14×10
Main effect of 
group F(1,9) = 0.049 p = 0.83
Interaction F(4,36) = 2.65 p = 0.049
One-way repeated-measures ANOVA in 
amygdala lesion group
Main effect of 
category F(4,8) = 2.27 p = 0.15
One-way repeated-measures ANOVA in 
control group
Main effect of 
category F(4,28) = 26.7 p = 3.32×10
Latency Mixed-model two-way ANOVA of target category X subject group
Main effect of 
category F(4,36) = 11.2 p = 5.43×10
Main effect of 
group F(1,9) = 0.45 p = 0.52
Interaction F(4,36) = 0.70 p = 0.59
Mixed-model three-way ANOVA of category 
X subject group X horizontal position [left vs. 
right]; main effect of category
Main effect of 
category F(4,102) = 38.4 p < 10
Main effect of 
horizontal 
position
F(1,102) = 0.52 p = 0.47
Main effect of 
subject group F(1,12) = 0.38 p = 0.55
Measure Statistical Test Effect F-statistic (d.f.) p-value
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Horizontal 
position 
effect
Interactions all ps > 0.05
Two-way ANOVA of category X horizontal 
position in amygdala lesion group
Main effect of 
category F(4,25) = 6.98 p = 0.0006
Main effect of 
horizontal 
position
F(1,25) = 0.071 p = 0.79
Interaction F(4,25) = 1.06 p = 0.40
Two-way ANOVA of category X horizontal 
position in control group
Main effect of 
category F(4,77) = 36.6 p < 10
Main effect of 
horizontal 
position
F(1,77) = 1.70 p = 0.20
Interaction F(4,77) = 2.07 p = 0.093
Vertical 
position 
effect
Mixed-model three-way ANOVA of category 
X subject group X vertical position [upper vs. 
lower]
Main effect of 
category F(4,100) = 22.3 p = 3.48×10
Main effect of 
vertical 
position
F(1,100) = 11.9 p = 0.00084
Main effect of 
subject group F(1,12) = 0.22 p = 0.64
Interaction 
between 
category and 
vertical 
position
F(4,100) = 3.90 p = 0.0055
Other 
interactions all ps > 0.05
Two-way ANOVA of category X vertical 
position in amygdala lesion group
Main effect of 
category F(4,25) = 7.92 p = 2.89×10
Main effect of 
vertical 
position
F(1,25) = 1.48 p = 0.23
Interaction F(4,25) = 1.13 p = 0.37
Two-way ANOVA of category X vertical 
position in control group
Main effect of 
category F(4,75) = 14.5 p = 8.56×10
Main effect of 
vertical 
position
F(1,75) = 10.8 p = 0.0015
Measure Statistical Test Effect F-statistic (d.f.) p-value
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We further analyzed gaze patterns to elucidate a possible mechanism for faster conscious 
detectability of animate stimuli: having fixated a target, its change should be detected 
more efficiently for animate than inanimate stimuli. We quantified this by computing the 
percentage of trials having ‘misses’, which were defined as fixations onto the target area 
ROI (a rectangular ROI tightly surrounding the target) yet without the change detected. 
We excluded the last 3 fixations entering the ROI for misses since they may have been 
associated with subsequent detection of changes (subjects tended to fixate on the target 
for 1 to 3 fixations in order to confirm their selection. Thus, the last 1–3 fixations 
corresponded to the detection instead of misses of targets). For homogeneity of the data, 
we here only analyzed the data from AP, AM, BG and their matched controls, who all had 
identical stimuli and experimental setup. 
Figure 3.4A–B shows that animate stimuli had a lower percentage of trials with misses 
and thus preferentially emerged into consciousness (see Table 3.2 conscious detection 
analysis; animate vs. inanimate: 8.1 ± 9.2% vs. 28.8 ± 9.3%, t(2) = -4.26, p = 0.051 for 
amygdala patients, and 9.8 ± 6.5% vs. 29.3 ± 12.9%, t(7) = -6.63, p = 2.96×10-4 for 
controls) and there was no difference between amygdala patients and control subjects. No 
target category showed any significant differences in the percentage of misses between 
amygdala patients and their matched controls (two-tailed t-tests, all ps > 0.67; bootstrap 
(Efron and Tibshirani, 1994) with 1000 runs, all ps > 0.30). The same pattern of results 
held when we repeated the analysis by computing the average number of misses instead 
of percentage of trials with misses as used above. Similarly, the same pattern held when 
we inflated the size of the ROI to a more lenient region of the image (a 50-pixel circular 
ROI (1.2 deg. visual angle) centered on the target). These results confirm that the 
Interaction F(4,75) = 3.16 p = 0.019
Measure Statistical Test Effect F-statistic (d.f.) p-value
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amygdala is not required for preferential conscious detection of biologically relevant 
stimuli. 
!
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Figure 3.4. Quantification of fixation properties.  
(A–B) Percentage of trials with change blindness despite direct fixation on the change 
target. (C–D) Number of fixations before detecting changes. (E–F) The serial order of 
fixation that first entered the target ROI. (G–H) Latency from first fixation onto target to 
detection of target. (A,C,E,G) Amygdala lesion patients (N = 3). (B,D,F,H) Control 
subjects (N = 8). Error bars denote one s.e.m. across subjects. 
!
3.5.2 Rapid detection of animate stimuli by explicit behavioral reports of change 
detection 
We next quantified reaction times for the explicit behavioral reports of change detection. 
We found category-specific effects in reaction times (RT) in both subject groups (see 
Table 3.2 RT analysis for statistics). There was a main effect of category but none of 
group nor any interaction. Category effects were significant when tested separately in the 
amygdala lesion group (Figure 3.3D) as well as in the control group (Figure 3.3I), with 
animate targets (animals, people and head directions) reliably showing faster detection 
than inanimate targets (artifacts and plants). Both amygdala-lesioned subjects and 
controls detected animate targets faster (amygdala: 3.13 ± 0.66 sec for animate and 4.50 ± 
1.63 sec for inanimate; controls: 2.91 ± 0.52 sec for animate and 4.36 ± 0.70 sec for 
inanimate, mean ± SD). We confirmed this animacy effect for both groups using a 
summary statistic approach: the difference of the mean RT for animate and inanimate 
targets was significant both for the amygdala patients (t(3) = -2.57, p = 0.041, paired t-
test) and control subjects (t(9) = -12.94, p = 2.02×10-7). All individual control subjects 
and amygdala patients except AM showed detection advantages of animate stimuli (two-
tailed t-tests comparing animate vs. inanimate stimuli within each subject, all ps < 0.05). 
No target category showed any significant differences between amygdala patients and 
their matched controls (two-tailed t-tests, all ps > 0.47; bootstrap with 1000 runs, all ps > 
!78
0.24). All above effects also held when we used log-transformed RT as our dependent 
measure. 
We quantified the number of fixations made before the explicit report of change detection 
(Figure 3.4C,D), and found a pattern which mirrored the RT results. There was a 
category effect as expected (see Table 3.2, number of fixations analysis) but no 
difference between amygdala patients and controls. No target category showed any 
significant differences between amygdala patients and their matched controls (two-tailed 
t-tests, all ps > 0.14; bootstrap with 1000 runs, all ps > 0.32). Category effects were 
prominent separately within amygdala patients (see Figure 3.4C) and within control 
subjects (see Figure 3.4D), with changes in animate stimuli requiring fewer numbers of 
fixation to be detected than those in inanimate stimuli. Direct comparisons collapsing all 
animate stimuli vs. inanimate stimuli revealed a significantly faster detection of animate 
stimuli for both amygdala patients (7.0 ± 2.0 vs. 9.9 ± 2.5 fixations, paired-sample two-
tailed t-test, t(2) = -9.20, p = 0.012) and control subjects (7.1 ± 1.5 vs. 11.1 ± 2.9 
fixations, t(7) = -6.85, p = 2.42×10-4). 
Consistent with prior reports (New et al., 2007), more rapid detection of changes to 
animals and people was not accompanied by any loss of accuracy. On the contrary, both 
amygdala patients and control subjects were both faster (see Figure 3.3D,I) and more 
accurate for animate targets (hit rates, Figure 3.3E,J; amygdala: 86.2 ± 17.3% for 
animate vs. 78.3 ± 12.6% for inanimate; control: 91.6 ± 4.3% for animate vs. 84.1 ± 8.7% 
for inanimate; see Table 3.2, hit rates analysis, for statistics), and there was no difference 
between amygdala patients and control subjects. Thus, speed-accuracy trade-offs could 
not explain the faster detection of animate stimuli and the strong orienting towards 
animate stimuli resulted in both more rapid and accurate detection of changes. 
Within animate targets, animals showed the greatest detection advantages. For both 
amygdala patients and control subjects, animals had the steepest cumulative detection 
rate curve (Figure 3.3A,F) and the shortest detection RT (Figure 3.3D,I, two-tailed 
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pairwise t-tests to compare animals vs. every other category; amygdala: p = 0.041 (t(3) = 
-3.44) for people and ps < 0.081 for all other comparisons; controls: ps < 0.05 for all 
comparisons). Further, animals featured a higher detection rate over artifacts, plants and 
head direction changes (Figure 3.3E,J, two-tailed paired-sample t-test; ps < 0.05 for all 
comparisons of both amygdala patients and controls) and a lower time-out rate over head 
direction changes (Figure 3.3B,G, ps < 0.05 for both amygdala patients and controls).  
Finally, a series of direct and uncorrected t-tests showed no significant differences 
between amygdala patients and control subjects on change blindness (i.e., time-out), hit 
rates and RT for any categories (two-tailed unpaired t-tests, ps > 0.11 for all comparisons; 
confirmed by bootstrap with 1000 runs (all ps > 0.19)). 
!
3.5.3 Implicit measures of change detection from eye-tracking 
While we did not find any impairment of change blindness in amygdala patients at the 
level of phenomenology or explicit detection response, it remained possible that they 
might be impaired on more implicit measures. To address this possibility, we analyzed the 
eye-tracking data in more detail: subjects might look at targets more rapidly for animate 
stimuli (an attentional mechanism of faster orienting that could in principle be distinct 
from the conscious detectability mechanism (Koch and Tsuchiya, 2007)). We quantified 
this by computing the serial order of fixation that first entered the target area. 
Control subjects had earlier fixations onto animate than inanimate targets (Figure 3.4F; 
see Table 3.2, fixation order analysis; 6.3 ± 1.3 vs. 8.5 ± 2.2 for animate vs. inanimate, 
paired t-test: t(7) = -4.31, p = 0.0035) and animals attracted the earliest fixations (paired 
t-tests against every other category, ps < 0.005). We observed a similar pattern of earlier 
fixations onto animals and animate targets in the amygdala lesion patients (Figure 3.4E; 
6.4 ± 1.6 vs. 7.8 ± 2.1 for animate vs. inanimate; paired t-test: t(2) = -5.15, p = 0.036), 
and we observed no difference between amygdala lesion patients and control subjects. No 
target category showed any significant differences between amygdala patients and their 
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matched controls (two-tailed t-tests, all ps > 0.22; bootstrap with 1000 runs, all ps > 
0.19).  
In the above analysis, we counted as a datapoint the last fixation of the trial even when 
the subject never fixated onto the target (i.e., time-out trials). When we repeated the 
above analysis by excluding all time-out trials, we obtained qualitatively the same pattern 
of results. Furthermore, when we repeated the above analysis with the absolute latency 
(in seconds) of the first fixation onto the target (instead of the serial order of the first 
fixation), we obtained qualitatively the same pattern of results. 
So far, we have shown that detection advantages of animate stimuli could be attributed to 
either attention or conscious detection, but neither requires the amygdala. But how might 
initial attention and conscious detectability interact? We observed that faster detection of 
animate stimuli (by pushing a button) was typically preceded by more rapid initial 
fixation towards them (Figure 3.4E,F). Supporting a role for fast initial orientation in 
facilitating subsequent detection, there was a significant trial-by-trial correlation (on all 
correct trials) between the serial order of the first fixation onto the target ROI and the 
total number of fixations taken to detect the change (Pearson correlation; amygdala: r = 
0.89, p < 10-20; control: r = 0.76, p < 10-20); similarly, there was a correlation between 
latency (absolute time elapsed in seconds) of the first fixation onto the target ROI and 
button press RT (amygdala: r = 0.81, p < 10-20; control: r = 0.78, p < 10-20). To further 
establish the role of initial orienting in conscious detectability, we next measured the 
latency from having first fixated onto the target ROI to detecting the target change on all 
correct trials (Figure 3.4G,H). Once the target ROI had been fixated, this latency should 
reflect the efficacy of conscious detectability. We found a category-specific effect on 
latency (see Table 3.2 latency analysis), with animate stimuli featuring shorter latencies 
than inanimate stimuli. Again, there was no difference between amygdala patients and 
controls nor any interaction. No target category showed any significant differences 
between amygdala patients and their matched controls (two-tailed t-tests, all ps > 0.32; 
bootstrap with 1000 runs, all ps > 0.17). These results isolate a category-specific effect of 
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animate stimuli on the efficacy of conscious detectability, and furthermore demonstrate 
that this mechanism is independent of the amygdala. 
!
3.5.4 Detection advantages to animals were not lateralized 
Given that animal-selective neurons were discovered primarily in the right amygdala 
(Mormann et al., 2011), we expected that detection advantages might be lateralized to 
some extent. We thus divided target locations according to their horizontal positions. The 
category effects described above replicated for targets in either the left or right half of the 
image (see Table 3.2, horizontal position effect analysis), and there was no main effect of 
laterality (3.7 ± 1.2 vs. 3.6 ± 1.3 seconds (mean ± SD) for left vs. right) or subject group, 
nor any interactions. Similarly, no laterality effect was found separately within amygdala 
patients nor within control subjects. Further post-hoc paired-sample t-tests showed no 
difference in detecting the targets between left and right (ps > 0.05 for all categories and 
for both amygdala patients and control subjects, except one uncorrected p = 0.022 (t(18) 
= 2.50) for people detection from control subjects).  
We repeated this analysis in relation to upper vs. lower parts of the image. The category 
effects were observed for both upper and lower parts (see Table 3.2, vertical position 
effect analysis). We found a main effect of category, and to our surprise, a main effect of 
vertical position (4.0 ± 1.4 vs. 3.6 ± 1.1 seconds (mean ± SD) for upper vs. lower) as well 
as an interaction between category and vertical position. Separate analyses within 
amygdala patients and control subjects confirmed both the category effect and the vertical 
position effect (amygdala: 4.1 ± 1.5 vs. 3.7 ± 1.3 seconds for upper vs. lower; controls: 
4.0 ± 1.4 vs. 3.5 ± 0.9 seconds for upper vs. lower). This vertical position effect was 
primarily driven by faster detection of people and plants in the lower visual field. All 
above patterns held also with log-transformed RT as the dependent measure. 
!
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3.6 Discussion 
On a flicker change-blindness protocol, all our control subjects showed an advantage in 
detecting animate stimuli (animals, people and head directions) over inanimate stimuli 
(artifacts and plants), consistent with the prior finding of category-specific attention 
towards animals (New et al., 2007). Interestingly, the amygdala lesion patients also 
showed the same detection advantages. Category effects were not lateralized. Eye-
tracking data further dissociated two mechanisms contributing to these detection 
advantages: animate stimuli attracted initial gaze faster and were preferentially detected 
by button press. Amygdala lesions spared both of these components. Our findings argue 
against a critical participation of the amygdala in rapid, initial processing of attention to 
ecologically salient stimuli, and extend this conclusion to both initial orienting as well as 
to detectability. 
!
3.6.1 Advantages of our change detection task and comparison with other tasks 
Compared to previous studies of change detection (New et al., 2007, New et al., 2010), 
our addition of eye-tracking to the design strongly expanded the scope of our analyses 
and allowed us to elucidate the mechanisms underlying change detection and provide 
interesting insights into the visual search performance in change detection. One 
advantage of using change detection in this study is to better link with previous studies—
for instance, it permits comparisons with a large college population (New et al., 2007), a 
developmental population (i.e., 7–8 year olds) (New et al., 2010), and with individuals 
diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder (New et al., 2010). Most importantly, the 
change detection task allows us to quantify the percentage of misses to dissociate 
attention to animals from conscious detectability of them (eye-tracking vs. detection), 
which is difficult to probe with a free viewing task. 
Ultra-rapid categorization of animals has been shown in a forced choice saccadic task in 
which human participants can reliably make saccades to the sides containing animals in 
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as little as 120 ms (Kirchner and Thorpe, 2006). Our response latency was considerably 
longer compared to this markedly different task, which explicitly tasks the participants 
with detecting the specific target category, and typically presents one large, central object 
in each image. It is very likely that the participants in this study would have performed 
that explicit task far more quickly, even with the natural and complex scenes used here. 
Conversely, had the change detection task been conducted with far simpler stimuli, such 
as two side-by-side objects, the animate bias could easily have been revealed through first 
fixation locations. Interestingly, in the first studies of this bias in healthy participants 
(New et al., 2007), the fastest responses (< 1 second) were for detecting animate than 
inanimate objects. Change detection within the first second likely required the target 
object to be the first attended item in the scene (New et al., 2007). 
!
3.6.2 Possible caveats 
In this study, we have shown that the amygdala is not involved in rapid, initial processing 
of ecologically salient animate stimuli. Top-down contextual knowledge might have 
played a more important role (cf. (Kanan et al., 2009)) and the reliance on top-down 
control and contextual information in the task could have diminished the potential effect 
of amygdala lesions on detection performance. It has been shown that contextual 
knowledge can drive change detection performance (e.g., (Rensink et al., 1997)) and, 
interestingly, as a function of semantic inconsistency (Hollingworth and Henderson, 
2000). However, in our stimuli, all of the targets were comparably semantically 
consistent with their scenes. 
Top-down control and contextual knowledge are mostly effective when applied towards 
explicit tasks or targets. However, in our stimuli, the target from one category was often 
embedded in other distractor categories and the subject had no prior expectation of the 
target category to apply a specific contextual knowledge regarding that target category. In 
other words, since our natural scene stimuli mostly contain multiple categories of objects, 
!84
subjects could only apply a uniform strategy across all stimuli. For example, in a scene 
containing both faces and plants, subjects might look at faces first regardless of whether 
the target was a face or a plant. Therefore, top-down control involved in our study would 
be unlikely to affect within-subject comparisons between categories. It will be interesting 
to explore this issue further in future studies with quantitative analyses of the spatial 
layout of fixations with respect to the distribution of different target categories. 
Our findings were not explained by category differences in low-level saliency. Our 
stimulus set was biased, if anything, towards low-level features favoring better detection 
of inanimate stimuli, the opposite of the effect we found, and detection advantages 
towards animate stimuli are known to be abolished with inverted stimuli, which preserve 
low-level stimulus properties (New et al., 2007), an effect we replicated in SM and SM’s 
controls.  
!
3.6.3 Lateralized effects of category attention 
We did not observe lateralized effects of category attention in this study, even though 
there is a lateralized distribution of animal-selective neurons in the right human amygdala 
(Mormann et al., 2011). Behaviorally, lateralized effects have been reported for the 
sensory and cognitive processing of language, face, and emotion (MacNeilage et al., 
2009). Neurologically, laterality has been also well documented for attentional systems 
(Fox et al., 2006) as well as cortical components of face processing (De Renzi et al., 
1994). Recent studies also report laterality effects in frogs, chickens, birds and monkeys, 
implying an evolutionarily preserved mechanism for detecting salient stimuli that shows 
an asymmetry for the right hemisphere (Vallortigara and Rogers, 2005). The absence of 
laterality effects in our data may be due to the limited visual angle subtended by our 
stimuli (none of the stimuli were far in the left or right periphery), the nature of the 
stimuli (e.g., none included threatening or strongly valenced stimuli), or the nature of the 
task. In healthy subjects, a strong asymmetry in attentional resolution has been reported 
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between the upper and lower visual field (He et al., 1996), a finding that may be related 
to the intriguing effect of vertical position of change targets in our study. 
!
3.6.4 Amygdala lesions and plasticity 
All four amygdala patients have symmetrical complete damage of the basolateral 
amygdala and in general the damage is extensive, as documented in detail in prior 
publications (see Methods). Although, in the three patients other than SM, there is some 
sparing of the centromedial amygdala, it would seem unlikely that this remaining intact 
portion of the amygdala would be able to play the role required for attention or 
detectability in our task: since the basolateral amygdala is the primary source of visual 
input to the amygdala (Amaral et al., 1992) and all patients have complete lesions of the 
basolateral amygdala, this would effectively disconnect any remaining spared parts of the 
amygdala from temporal neocortex. Furthermore, patient SM has complete bilateral 
amygdala lesions yet her individual data still showed normal detection advantages for 
animate stimuli, demonstrating that the amygdala is indeed not necessary for the rapid 
detection of animate stimuli. 
A final consideration concerns the issue of reorganization and plasticity. While we found 
entirely intact orientation to, and detection of, animate stimuli in all four amygdala 
patients, all of them had developmental-onset lesions arising from Urbach-Wiethe 
disease. On the one hand, this made for a homogenous population to study; on the other it 
introduces the possibility that, over time, compensatory function was provided by other 
brain regions in the absence of the amygdala. Indeed, evidence for compensatory function 
(on an unrelated task) has been reported in one of the patients we studied (Becker et al., 
2012). Furthermore, normal recognition of prototypical emotional faces has been reported 
in some (Siebert et al., 2003) but not other (Adolphs et al., 1999) patients with amygdala 
lesions, and one study even reported a hyper-vigilance for fearful faces in three patients 
with Urbach-Wiethe disease (Terburg et al., 2012). A critical direction for future studies 
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will be to replicate our findings in patients with adult, and with acute-onset, amygdala 
lesions to investigate the added complexities introduced by developmental-onset 
amygdala lesions. 
!
3.6.5 The role of the amygdala in attention and saliency 
Since the early 1990s, an influential view of the role of the amygdala in sensory 
processing was that it plays a rather automatic, non-conscious role (Dolan, 2002, Ohman, 
2002) with long-standing debates about the amygdala’s response to fearful faces being 
either independent of attention (Vuilleumier et al., 2001, Anderson et al., 2003) or 
requiring attention (Pessoa et al., 2002). A subcortical pathway through the superior 
colliculus and pulvinar to the amygdala is commonly assumed to mediate rapid, 
automatic and non-conscious processing of affective and social stimuli, and to form a 
specific subcortical ‘low route’ of information processing (LeDoux, 1996, Tamietto and 
de Gelder, 2010). However, the same patient SM we tested here, who has complete 
bilateral amygdala lesions, nonetheless showed normal rapid detection and non-conscious 
processing of fearful faces, suggesting that the amygdala does not process fear-related 
stimuli rapidly and non-consciously ((Tsuchiya et al., 2009), replicated in (Yang et al., 
2012a)). A variety of evidence, including the long latencies that are observed from 
amygdala recordings in humans (Mormann et al., 2008, Rutishauser et al., 2011), further 
challenges the ‘low route’ account of amygdala function (Cauchoix and Crouzet, 2013). 
Instead, it has been proposed that the amygdala participates in an elaborative cortical 
network to evaluate the biological significance of visual stimuli (Pessoa and Adolphs, 
2010)—a role that appears to necessarily require the amygdala when detailed social 
judgments need to be made about faces (Adolphs et al., 1994, Adolphs et al., 1998), but 
not when rapid detection or conscious visibility are assessed. 
The human amygdala responds to both emotionally and socially significant information, 
and arguably social stimuli are often also emotionally salient. Yet there seem to be effects 
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of social saliency even independent of emotion: the human amygdala is more strongly 
activated for neutral social vs. non-social information but activated at a similar level 
when viewing socially positive or negative images (Vrticka et al., 2013). Socially 
relevant information in faces is expressed in large part in the eye region, including gaze 
directions (Argyle et al., 1973, Whalen et al., 2004), and viewers predominantly fixate the 
eyes, a tendency normally correlated with amygdala activation (Gamer and Büchel, 
2009). A range of psychiatric disorders feature abnormal fixations onto faces, including 
abnormal fixations onto the eye region of faces, and several of these are hypothesized to 
involve the amygdala (Baron-Cohen et al., 2000, Baron-Cohen, 2004, Dalton et al., 
2005). Patients with schizophrenia (Sasson et al., 2007), social phobia (Horley et al., 
2004), and autism (Adolphs et al., 2001) all show abnormal facial scanning patterns. 
While by no means eliminating the amygdala as one structure contributing to social 
dysfunction in these diseases, the data from the present study do argue that it may not 
play a key online role in those components involving orienting and attentional 
mechanisms. 
!
3.7 Conclusion 
Our results show unambiguously that an intact amygdala is not required for rapid 
orientation towards, and conscious detection of, animate stimuli that normally show 
preferential processing for these measures. This conclusion leaves open the question of 
what are the essential structures mediating this effect. Three plausible candidates worth 
further study would be the pulvinar nucleus of the thalamus, prefrontal cortex, or visual 
cortices. Both the pulvinar (Tamietto and de Gelder, 2010) and prefrontal cortex (Bar, 
2007) have been hypothesized to subserve rapid initial evaluation of stimuli, which can 
then influence subsequent processing; it is also possible that circuitry within visual 
cortices itself could suffice to detect salient stimulus categories. How such mechanisms 
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are initially set up during development, and whether any of them might be innate, remain 
important topics for future studies. 
!
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Chapter IV: Neurons in the human amygdala selective for perceived 
emotion 
!
4.1 Overview 
In Chapter III, we analyzed how animate stimuli attract attention and we showed that 
amygdala patients have a normal pattern of reliably faster and more accurate detection of 
animate stimuli. However, people not only attend to people and faces, but also pay 
attention to others’ facial emotions. Humans have a dedicated system to process faces and 
the amygdala has long been associated with a key role in recognizing facial emotions. In 
this chapter, we analyzed in detail how the neurons in the amygdala respond to facial 
emotions. This work is a continuation of our previous single-unit studies where we 
showed differential neuronal response to whole faces compared to facial parts 
(Rutishauser et al., 2011), and abnormal neuronal response in autism (Rutishauser et al., 
2013). Here, we for the first time showed that neurons in the human amygdala encode the 
subjective judgment of emotions shown in face stimuli, rather than simply their stimulus 
features. 
Our study makes three broad novel contributions. First, it tests a key hypothesized 
function of the amygdala, providing an important complement to studies of amygdala 
responses to faces in monkeys (where it is very difficult to ask the question that we 
asked). Second, it offers a clear result that suggests a specific transformation between 
visually responsive cortex in the temporal lobe, the main visual input, and the amygdala. 
Third, the amygdala is strongly implicated in mood and anxiety disorders, for which the 
present findings provide important detail. 
Connecting with Chapter III, in which we found that the amygdala does not play a role in 
advantageous attention to social stimuli, here we illustrate what the amygdala does in 
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processing faces, a particular category of salient social stimuli. The role of the amygdala 
in social attention will be further investigated in the next chapter. 
This work has been published as (Wang et al., 2014c). 
!
4.2 Summary 
The human amygdala plays a key role in recognizing facial emotions and neurons in the 
monkey and human amygdala respond to the emotional expression of faces. However, it 
remains unknown whether these responses are driven primarily by properties of the 
stimulus or by the perceptual judgments of the perceiver. We investigated these questions 
by recording from over 200 single neurons in the amygdalae of seven neurosurgical 
patients with implanted depth electrodes. We presented degraded fearful and happy faces 
and asked subjects to discriminate the emotion by button press. During trials where 
subjects responded correctly, we found neurons that distinguished fearful vs. happy 
emotions as expressed by the displayed faces. During incorrect trials, these neurons 
indicated the patients’ subjective judgment, regardless of whether it was correct or 
incorrect. Additional analysis revealed that, on average, all neuronal responses were 
modulated most by increases or decreases in response to happy faces, and driven 
predominantly by judgments about the eye region of the face stimuli. Following the same 
analyses, we showed that hippocampal neurons, unlike amygdala neurons, only encoded 
emotions but not subjective judgment. Our results suggest that the amygdala specifically 
encodes the subjective judgment of emotional faces, but that it plays less of a role in 
simply encoding aspects of the image array. The conscious percept of the emotion shown 
in a face may thus arise from interactions between the amygdala and its connections 
within a distributed cortical network, a scheme also consistent with the long response 
latencies observed in human amygdala recordings. 
!
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4.3 Introduction 
The human amygdala plays a crucial role in processing socially and emotionally salient 
stimuli (Kling and Brothers, 1992, Adolphs, 2010). A large literature, primarily from 
studies in animals, shows that the amygdala is critical for conditioned fear responses 
(LeDoux, 1993). However, a number of other studies show that it is involved also in 
broader aspects of social perception, notably aspects of face processing (Rolls, 1992). 
These two themes converge in several human studies: there is an impairment in 
recognizing fearful faces in subjects that lack a functional amygdala (Adolphs et al., 
1994) in addition to the impairment of fear conditioning (Bechara et al., 1995, LaBar et 
al., 1995). Neuroimaging studies have also reported significant activation of the 
amygdala to fearful faces (Morris et al., 1996). 
In humans, it has been reported that amygdala neurons are selective for a variety of visual 
stimuli (Fried et al., 1997, Kreiman et al., 2000). One category of stimuli that the 
amygdala plays a key role in analyzing is faces and facial emotions. Subjects with 
amygdala damage fail to recognize fearful faces (Adolphs et al., 1994), although there is 
now a consensus that the amygdala is involved in processing many emotions from faces, 
not just fear (Fitzgerald et al., 2006). Electrophysiological recordings in monkeys have 
found single neurons that respond not only to faces as such (Rolls, 1984, Leonard et al., 
1985), but also to face identities, facial expressions and gaze directions (Gothard et al., 
2007, Hoffman et al., 2007). Single neurons in the human amygdala discriminate faces 
from inanimate objects (Fried et al., 1997). Furthermore, single neurons in the human 
amygdala were found to encode whole faces selectively (Rutishauser et al., 2011) and 
show abnormal facial feature selectivity in autism (Rutishauser et al., 2013). Thus, there 
is substantial evidence from neurophysiological, lesion and fMRI studies for the 
involvement of the primate amygdala in face processing. 
More detailed investigations suggest that impaired fear recognition after amygdala 
damage can be attributed to a failure to fixate on the eyes (Adolphs et al., 2005), 
suggesting that the amygdala might act as a detector of perceptual saliency and biological 
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relevance (Sander et al., 2005, Adolphs, 2008). This was complemented by a 
neuroimaging study showing that amygdala activity was specifically enhanced for fearful 
faces when saccading from the mouth to the eye region (Gamer and Büchel, 2009). 
Patients with schizophrenia (Sasson et al., 2007), social phobia (Horley et al., 2004), and 
autism (Pelphrey et al., 2002) also show abnormal facial scanning patterns, which have 
been hypothesized to result from amygdala dysfunction (Baron-Cohen et al., 2000). The 
functional role of the amygdala is supported by its connection with visual cortices 
specialized for face processing (Vuilleumier et al., 2004, Moeller et al., 2008, Hadj-
Bouziane et al., 2012) as well as reciprocal connections with multiple visually responsive 
areas in the temporal (Desimone and Gross, 1979, Amaral et al., 2003, Freese and 
Amaral, 2006) and frontal lobes (Ghashghaei and Barbas, 2002). All of these findings, 
while supporting a clear role for the amygdala in face processing, also suggest that this 
role may be relatively specific for certain properties or features of faces, raising the 
question of what function distinguishes the amygdala’s role in face processing from the 
better known role of temporal cortex in face processing (see Discussion). We focused on 
one particular question in the present study. 
Neurons in the monkey and human amygdala respond to the emotional expression of 
faces, but it remains unknown whether these responses are driven primarily by image 
properties of the stimuli, by the perceptual judgments of the perceiver, or by behavioral 
categorization in terms of motor output. To investigate this question, we recorded 210 
neurons from 7 neurosurgical patients with implanted depth electrodes on an established 
‘bubbles’ task (Gosselin and Schyns, 2001, Adolphs et al., 2005), in which patients 
discriminated emotions from sparsely sampled fearful or happy faces. We first 
characterize neurons that distinguished fearful vs. happy emotions expressed by the 
displayed faces, on those trials where subjects responded correctly. Next we show that 
these neurons tracked the patients’ subjective judgment regardless of whether it was 
correct or incorrect. Population permutation analysis confirmed the robustness of this 
result, on average, across the entire population of neurons. Our data suggest that neuronal 
responses within the human amygdala are selective for perceived emotion shown in faces 
!93
and track subjective judgment expressed by behavior rather than visual properties of the 
stimuli. 
!
4.4 Methods 
4.4.1 Subjects 
In this study we recorded single-units from 10 neurosurgical patients who had chronically 
implanted depth electrodes in the amygdalae (Table 4.1). 3 patients (total of 3 sessions) 
did not contribute well-isolated units and hence were excluded from analysis. 2 patients 
completed 2 sessions, resulting a total of 9 recording sessions that we analyzed. 
The subjects’ electrophysiology as well as construction of bubbles stimuli, scrambled 
face stimuli and classification images were described in our previous publications 
(Rutishauser et al., 2011, Rutishauser et al., 2013). 
!
Table 4.1. List of patient demographics, pathology, and neuropsychological 
evaluation. 
Abbreviations: Hand: Dominant handedness; Lang Dom: language dominance as 
determined by Sodium Amybarbital (Wada) test; Benton: Benton Facial Recognition Test, 
long form score; WAIS-III: IQ scores from the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale: 
performance IQ (PIQ), verbal IQ (VIQ), full scale IQ (FSIQ), perceptual organization 
index (POI), verbal comprehension index (VCI). Benton scores 41–54 are in the normal 
range. Tests indicated with n/a were not performed for clinical reasons. Rey-Osterrieth 
Complex Figures test are raw scores, subtests are copy, immediate recall reproduction 
(IR), and 30-minute delayed recall reproduction (DR). 36 possible points for each, 18+ is 
normal depending on age. Patients 20, 21 and 27 did not contribute neurons and were 
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thus excluded for analysis. Patients 17 and 28 were diagnosed with ASD. Patients 28 and 
29 performed two sessions (each row of neurons represents a separate recording session). 
!
(continued) 
ID Age Sex Hand
Lang 
Dom Benton
Epilepsy 
diagnosis
WAIS-III Rey-O
PIQ VIQ VCI POI FSIQ Copy IR DR
P17 19 M R L 43
Left inferior 
frontal 128 131 122 133 134 34 23 21
P18 40 M R L 52
Right mesial 
temporal 
hippocampus 69 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
P19 34 M R n/a 39
Left 
supplementary 
motor neocortex 81 74 76 80 86 31 23 20.5
P20 27 M R L 49
Right mesial 
temporal 
hippocampus 88 98 89 101 81 33 21 23.5
P21 20 M R n/a 45
Right dorsolateral 
neocortex n/a n/a 93 89 n/a 34 27.5 27
P23 35 M R L 41
Left mesial 
temporal 
amygdala n/a n/a 74 86 n/a 34 n/a 9.5
P25 31 M R L 47
Right dorsolateral 
neocortex 81 91 98 82 87 36 9 5
P27 41 M R n/a 49
Bilateral 
independent 
temporal lobe 86 91 86 88 89 36 5 5
P28 23 M R L 47
Right mesial 
temporal 
hippocampus 79 77 78 80 76 34 9.5 13
P29 18 F L L 49 Left deep insula 104 110 107 101 107 36 19.5 19.5
ID
Nr Amygdala Neurons Nr Hippocampus Neurons
Total Fear Happy Total Fear Happy
P17 10 0 1 0 n/a n/a
P18 26 8 0 5 0 0
P19 12 0 3 2 0 0
P20 0 n/a n/a 0 n/a n/a
P21 0 n/a n/a 0 n/a n/a
P23 19 2 1 0 n/a n/a
P25 4 0 0 0 n/a n/a
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4.4.2 Task 
We employed a facial emotion discrimination task in which patients were asked to judge 
fearful or happy faces as quickly and accurately as possible from randomly selected parts 
of the face (‘bubbles’; Figure 4.2B). In each trial, a scrambled face with a central fixation 
circle was presented for 0.8–1.2 second (randomized). Then the target face stimulus was 
presented for 500 ms and a blank gray screen followed. Patients started to respond after 
the target face stimulus onset and regardless of reaction time (RT), the next trial started 
after an interval of 2.3–2.7 second after stimulus onset. If the patient did not respond by 
that time, a time-out was indicated by a beep (2.2% of trials were timeouts) (Figure 
4.2A). Each block contained 72 trials and patients completed 5–7 blocks. Time-out trials 
were excluded from analysis so all trials included had a behavioral response. We 
displayed the performance score to the patients at the end of each block as an incentive. 
We used 8 face base images (chosen from the Ekman and Friesen stimulus set, 4 different 
individuals (2 female and 2 male)) showing fearful and happy expressions each. We 
normalized all faces for mean luminance, contrast, and position of eyes and mouth. We 
randomly flipped 50% of the stimuli along the vertical axis to prevent any influence of 
left-right asymmetries present in the faces. This resulted in 16 different face images in 
total and these face stimuli were then sparsely sampled and presented to participants.  
!
4.4.3 Data analysis: spikes 
Only single units with an average firing rate of at least 0.2 Hz (entire task) were 
considered. Trials were aligned to stimulus onset, except when comparing the baseline (a 
P27 0 n/a n/a 0 n/a n/a
P28
46 
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8 
0
1 
4
9 
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0 
0
1 
2
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11
3 
1
2 
2
!96
1 second interval of blank screen right before scramble onset) to the scramble-response 
for which trials were aligned to scramble onset (which precedes the stimulus onset). 
Average firing rates (PSTH, see Figure 4.4 and Figure 4.6) were computed by counting 
spikes across all trials in consecutive 250 ms bins. In order to investigate the temporal 
dynamics of the significant difference, pairwise comparison was made at each bin using a 
two-tailed t-test at p < 0.05 and Bonferroni-corrected for multiple comparisons across 
bins in the group PSTH (this is not the unit selection). The PSTH of individual neuron 
examples were smoothed by a Gaussian kernel with sigma 200 ms (for plotting purposes 
only, all statistics are based on the raw counts). 
!
4.4.4 Data analysis: selection of emotion-selective and interactive units 
Statistical comparisons between the firing rates in response to different stimuli were 
based on the total number of spikes produced by each unit in a 1.5 s interval starting at 
250 ms after stimulus onset (see Figure 4.4 and Figure 4.6). Based on behavior, we 
categorized each trial as either correct or incorrect. In the following, correct/incorrect 
thus always refers to whether or not the subject successfully identified the correct 
emotion of the stimulus shown (fearful or happy). Since only two emotions were shown, 
an incorrect trial always implies that the subject chose the opposite emotion. 
The selection criterion for emotion-selective units (see Figure 4.4 and Figure 4.6) was 
based on the correct trials only, leaving the incorrect trials statistically independent. Units 
were defined as emotion-selective if they responded with a different firing rate to fearful 
relative to happy faces after stimulus onset. By definition, fear-selective units responded 
significantly more in correct fearful trials compared to correct happy trials, and vice versa 
for happy-selective units. One-tailed t-tests with p < 0.05 were used. 
We also quantified whether units responded to emotions conditionally on behavior. For 
this, a two-way ANOVA ([correct vs. incorrect trials] X [fearful stimuli vs. happy 
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stimuli]) was used to probe for a significant interaction term with p < 0.05 (see Figure 
4.4E).  
!
4.4.5 Data analysis: response index 
We quantified for each neuron whether its response differed between fearful and happy 
trials using a single-trial response index Ri (Eq. 4.3; see Figure 4.8). The response index 
can facilitate group analysis and comparisons between different types of cells (i.e., fear 
and happy selective cells in this study), as motivated by previous studies (Rutishauser et 
al., 2008, Rutishauser et al., 2011). The response index quantifies the response during 
trial i relative to the mean response to correct happy stimuli and baseline (a 1 second 
interval of blank screen right before scramble onset). The mean response and baseline 
was calculated individually for each unit. 
!  (Eq. 4.3) 
For each trial i, which can be either fearful or happy, Ri is the baseline normalized firing 
rate (FR) during a 1.5-second interval 250 ms post stimulus-onset (the same time interval 
as cell selection). Different time intervals were tested as well, to ensure that results were 
qualitatively the same and not biased by particular spike bins. 
If a neuron distinguishes happy from fearful trials, the average value of Ri will be 
significantly different from 0. Since fear-selective neurons have more spikes in fearful 
trials and happy-selective neurons have more spikes in happy trials (the selection process 
is described above), on average Ri is positive for fear-selective neurons and negative for 
happy-selective neurons. To get an aggregate measure of activity that pools across 
neurons, Ri was multiplied by -1 if the neuron is classified as a happy-selective neuron 
(Eq. 4.4). This makes Ri on average positive for both types of emotion-selective neurons. 
Notice that the factor -1 depends only on the neuron type, which is determined by t-tests 
Ri =
FRi −mean(FRHappyCorrect )
mean(FRBaseline )
⋅100%
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on correct trials as described above, but not trial type. Thus, negative Ri values are still 
possible. 
!  (Eq. 4.4) 
After calculating Ri for every trial, we subsequently averaged all Ri of trials that belong to 
the same category. We used four categories: fearful correct (FC), fearful incorrect (FI), 
happy correct (HC) and happy incorrect (HI). By definition, the average value of Ri for 
HC trial will be equal to zero because the definition of Ri is relative to the response to 
happy correct trials (see Eq. 4.4). The mean baseline firing rate was calculated across all 
trials. The same FRHappyCorrect was subtracted for both correct and incorrect trials. 
The cumulative distribution function (CDF) (see Figure 4.8D and Figure 4.9A,C) was 
constructed by calculating for each possible value x of the response index how many 
examples are smaller than x. That is, F(x) = P(X ≤ x), where X is a vector of all response 
index values. The CDF of fearful and happy trials were compared using two-tailed two-
sample Kolmogorov–Smirnov tests. All error bars are ± SE unless indicated otherwise. 
!
4.4.6 Data analysis: split analysis and permutation test 
We used 1000 runs for the permutation analysis. In each run, we randomly selected half 
of the correct trials to identify emotion-selective units and to determine the neuron type 
(as described above). We then used the remaining half of correct trials to calculate the 
response indices. This makes the response index values statistically independent of the 
cell selection. We also calculated the responses indices for all the incorrect trials for the 
selected cells.  
To summarize the population difference in response to fearful compared to happy faces, 
we calculated a summary metric that provided a single number for a population of cells 
(see Figure 4.10 and Figure 4.16). This provided a single quantity for every run of the 
Ri = −
FRi −mean(FRHappyCorrect )
mean(FRBaseline )
⋅100%
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permutation test. The population summary metric is equal to the difference between the 
average of response indices from all fearful trials (either correct or incorrect) collapsed 
across all selected cells and the average of response indices from all happy trials (either 
correct or incorrect) collapsed across all selected cells (Eq. 4.5). 
!  (Eq. 4.5) 
in which !  is the response index for the j-th fearful trial of the i-th selected cell, !  is 
the response index for the j-th happy trial of the i-th selected neuron, N is the total 
number of selected cells, !  is the total number of fearful trials of the i-th selected cell, 
!  is the total number of happy trials of the i-th selected cell, !  is the total 
number of viable fearful trials from all selected cells, and !  is the total number of 
viable happy trials from all selected cells. 
Note that the summary metric can be calculated either for correct or incorrect trials. Thus, 
for the summary metric for correct or incorrect trials, the fearful/happy trials refer only to 
correct or incorrect trials, respectively. We analyzed correct trials and incorrect trials 
separately to derive population metric distributions shown in Figure 4.15 and Figure 
4.17. 
The selected cells can be fear-selective neurons, happy-selective neurons and pooled 
populations of fear and happy selective neurons. Note that for all happy-selective 
neurons, we flipped the sign of all the response indices for that neuron (refer to Eq. 4.4), 
so that we can combine them with fear-selective neurons to get a pooled population. 
To quantify how sensitive neurons were to specific facial parts, we repeated the 
permutation analysis with only a subset of trials that revealed the ROI of interest. First, 
we selected trials according to the overlap of the bubbles with the specified eye and 
Metric =
Ri, jF
j=1
NiF
∑
i=1
N
∑
Ni, jF
−
Ri, jH
j=1
NiH
∑
i=1
N
∑
Ni, jH
Ri, jF Ri, jH
NiF
NiH N(Ri, jF )
N(Ri, jH )
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mouth ROIs (as shown in Figure 4.2B). The more overlap between bubbles and ROIs, 
the more is revealed within the ROI. We chose two categories of ROI trials: those where 
predominantly only the eye or the mouth was shown. This was achieved by enforcing 
either ‘High Eye AND Low Mouth’ overlap or ‘Low Eye AND High Mouth’ overlap. 
‘High’ or ‘Low’ here was above or below the median of the overlapping values across all 
correct trials. Selection of trials based on ROIs revealed was only based on the stimulus 
shown to the patient and did not involve the neuronal response. We subsequently repeated 
the permutation analysis as described above on the subset of trials that revealed the 
desired ROI. There were too few incorrect trials that satisfied the strict ROI criteria and 
these are thus not considered for the ROI analysis.  
To estimate the expected difference in the population summary metric as well as the 
number of significant units, we performed the same analysis but randomly scrambled the 
trial labels. This resulted in an empirical estimate of the null distribution. We used 1000 
runs.  
!
4.4.7 Electrode localization from structural MRIs 
To identify electrode recording sites in the amygdala, T2 relaxation times were measured 
using spin-echo dual-echo sequences on a 1.5-T Toshiba MR scanner. 25 contiguous axial 
slices were acquired (0.575 × 0.575 mm in-plane, 5 mm thick, TR = 5777.5 ms, TE = 105 
ms, flip angle = 90°). The imaging slices covered the entire brain, including the 
amygdala. The electrodes were clearly visible as dark lines in the T2 scans. Images were 
subsequently processed using SPM8 (Friston, 2007). Scans were first segmented and 
normalized to the standard MNI space. The electrode tip coordinates were visualized and 
manually labeled in FSL (Jenkinson et al., 2012). A mask was created in MATLAB for 
each patient with each recording site as a 3 × 3 × 3 mm cube centered on the identified 
electrode tip. All masks were then overlaid on the standard MNI152 template with 1 mm 
isotropic resolution. 
!101
!
4.4.8 Eye tracking 
Eye tracking was carried out using a non-invasive infra-red remote Tobii X300 system. It 
was recorded at 300 Hz with a 23-inch screen (screen resolution: 1920x1080). Both eyes 
were recorded. A professional visualization software (Tobii StudioTM 2.2) manufactured 
by Tobii was used together to record the eye movements and perform the gaze analysis. 
Fixations were detected by Tobii Fixation Filter implemented in Tobii Studio. The Tobii 
Fixation Filter is a classification algorithm proposed by Olsson (Olsson, 2007) and 
detects quick changes in the gaze point using a sliding window averaging method. 
Velocity threshold was set to 35 [pixels/samples] and distance threshold was set to 35 
[pixels] in our study. 
Fixations were smoothed by a 40-pixel Gaussian kernel with a standard deviation of 10 
pixels (the same as is used for display of the stimuli to the subjects and in the analysis of 
the spikes). Each heat map indicates the probability of fixating a given location (in 
arbitrary units). The fixation probability is calculated based on the number and duration 
of fixations. The heat maps show an average over all face trials. Maps M(x,y) are 
calculated as following: i) the average map is initialized M(x,y) = 0 at all locations. ii) 
Each fixated location is marked by setting M(x,y) = M(x,y)+ni, where ni is the number of 
samples of fixation i (corresponding to the duration of fixation i). iii) the number of 
fixations from each subject was normalized by the total number of fixations N of this 
subject by setting M(x,y) = M(x,y)/N, resulting in the probability of fixating each pixel; 
the fixation maps M(x,y) from all subjects were then averaged and lastly smoothly by the 
Gaussian kernel. This procedure ensured an equal contribution from each subject and thus 
the statistical independence between subjects. 
We performed a post-hoc drift-correction procedure for each trial. Before the presentation 
of faces, a fixation circle superimposed on a scrambled face image was presented for a 
random duration between 800 to 1200 ms. We assumed subjects fixated on the fixation 
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circle during this period (which was confirmed by visual inspection) and hence we 
subtracted the mean fixation position of the last 500 ms during this fixation period from 
all subsequent fixations during the face presentation period. We excluded trials in which 
more than 70% of the fixations were not within the face image. 
To quantitatively compare the fixation densities within certain parts of the face, we 
defined three regions of interest (ROIs): eyes (left and right), mouth and center. Each ROI 
is round and has a radius of 30 pixels. Paired t-tests were performed to compare the 
fixation densities within the ROIs between fearful and happy trials during the 500 ms 
stimulus presentation period. 
!
4.5 Results 
4.5.1 Behavioral performance 
We recorded single neurons in the human amygdala while neurosurgical patients 
performed an emotion discrimination task (Table 4.1; see Figure 4.1 for recording sites 
for each patient). All patients (9 sessions from 7 patients in total; 2 patients did 2 
sessions; neurons from each individual recording session are considered independent 
even if they are from the same patient) were undergoing epilepsy monitoring and had 
normal basic ability to discriminate faces. Six healthy subjects (6 sessions) served as 
behavioral controls and participated in the same experiment. Subjects were asked to 
judge, for every trial, whether the stimulus was fearful or happy by pushing 
corresponding buttons as quickly and accurately as possible (Figure 4.2). Each trial was 
fearful or happy with 50% probability. No other attribute of the stimuli (such as identity) 
predicted the emotion. Each stimulus was preceded by a phase-randomized baseline 
image of equal luminance and complexity (‘scramble’). Trials with no response 
(timeouts, see Methods) were excluded from analysis. 
!
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!  
Figure 4.1. Recording sites mapped from post-implantation MRIs.  
Each square represents the recording site of the electrode; different colors correspond to 
individual patients (codes indicated at bottom legend).  
!
We showed randomly selected parts of faces (‘bubbles’; Figure 4.2B) that allowed us to 
derive a behavioral classification image (BCI) (Gosselin and Schyns, 2001) based on 
accuracy and reaction time (RT) of the responses (derived separately for happy trials and 
fearful trials; Figure 4.2C). The BCI shows, for every pixel, whether revealing this pixel 
is likely to increase accuracy and decrease RT. The higher a pixel’s value, the more it 
contributed to behavioral judgment in the task. BCIs from patients and controls did not 
differ within key facial features (ROIs used are shown in Figure 4.2B; two-tailed 
unpaired t-test comparing average z-scores within the ROIs: for fearful trials, p = 0.51 for 
y=-4
p29p28p27p25p23p21p20p17 p19p18
x=+21
R L
!104
eyes and p = 0.36 for mouth; for happy trials, p = 0.68 for eyes and p = 0.14 for mouth), 
confirming that patients performed the task with a normal strategy. Both patients and 
controls primarily utilized information revealed by eyes to judge fearful faces, while they 
utilized more mouth information to judge happy faces, consistent with previous studies 
(Smith et al., 2005, Scheller et al., 2012). 
!
!  
Figure 4.2. Stimuli and behavioral performance.  
(A) Task structure. Immediately preceding the target image, a scrambled version of a face 
was presented for a variable time between 0.8 and 1.2 s. The target image was presented 
for 500 ms and showed either a fearful (50%) or happy (50%) expression. Subjects 
indicated whether the presented face was happy or fearful. (B) Example bubbles stimuli. 
The regions of interest (ROIs) used for analysis are shown in red (not shown to subjects). 
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(C) Behavioral classification images for fearful and happy trials for the neurosurgical 
patients and control subjects. Color code is the z scored correlation between the presence 
or absence of a particular region of the face and behavioral performance. (D) Learning 
curve for both patients (n = 8 sessions, one session omitted here because the learning 
algorithm was disabled as a control; mean ± standard error of the mean [SEM]) and 
controls (n = 6 sessions). Only first 200 trials are shown. (E) Reaction time for patients (n 
= 9 sessions, circles) and controls (n = 6 sessions, squares). Each data point represents a 
single recording session and the error bars denote SEM of the mean. Fearful Correct: 
fearful trials with a correct response; Happy Correct: happy trials with a correct response; 
Fearful Incorrect: fearful trials but incorrectly judged as happy; Happy Incorrect: happy 
trials but incorrectly judged as fearful. (F) Response choice for patients (n = 9 sessions, 
circles) and controls (n = 6 sessions, squares). 
!
The proportion of the face revealed in the bubbles stimuli was adaptively modified to 
achieve an asymptotic target performance of 80% correct; the number of bubbles required 
to achieve this criterion decreased, on average, over trials (Figure 4.2D). Patients 
completed on average a total of 401 trials, and the average number of bubbles required 
ranged from 100 at the beginning to 29.4 ± 29.5 on the 200th trial (n = 8 sessions, mean ± 
standard deviation [SD]; one session omitted here because the learning algorithm was 
disabled as a control). Control subjects completed on average a total of 216 trials, and the 
average number of bubbles was 33.2 ± 25.2 on the 200th trial, showing no statistical 
difference compared to controls (t-test, p = 0.81). 
RT was in general longer for patients (n = 9 sessions, 1047 ± 197 ms, mean ± SD, 
relative to stimulus onset) than control subjects (n = 6 sessions, 793 ± 152 ms; p < 0.05; 
Figure 4.2E). This is likely due to the uncontrolled hospital environment compared to 
well-controlled lab environment. However, there is no significant RT difference between 
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subjects (two-way ANOVA; Emotion [fearful vs. happy] X Correctness [correct vs. 
incorrect]: for Patients, F(1,32) = 0.0193, p = 0.89 for Emotion, F(1,32) = 0.455, p = 0.51 
for Correctness, and F(1,32) = 0.128, p = 0.72 for interaction; for Controls, F(1,20) = 
0.0491, p = 0.83 for Emotion, F(1,20) = 1.09, p = 0.31 for Correctness, and F(1,20) = 
0.0759, p = 0.79 for interaction). 
Average accuracy across all trials was (by design) 81.9 ± 8.3% for patients (n = 9 
sessions, mean ± standard deviation [SD]) and 80.5 ± 4.1% for control subjects. There 
was no significant difference in accuracy between patients and control subjects (two-
tailed t-test: p = 0.64). Importantly, there was no difference in the proportion of “fearful” 
or “happy” responses for both correct trials (p = 0.87 for patients and p = 0.86 for 
controls) and incorrect trials (p = 0.95 for patients and p = 0.49 for controls), showing 
that neither patients nor controls had any response bias (Figure 4.2F). Overall, the 
behavioral performance-related metrics confirmed that patients were alert and attentive 
and had largely normal ability to discriminate emotion from faces. 
!
4.5.2 Eye tracking 
We asked three patients to conduct an eye-tracking experiment in the laboratory after 
completion of their surgery. Patients were shown the identical stimuli they saw in the 
hospital (“replay”), while we recorded eye movements. We also recruited six 
neurotypically developed control subjects for this task. We computed the fixation density 
maps during the 500 ms stimulus presentation period and subsequently performed ROI 
analysis.  
Epileptic patients had similar fixation patterns as control subjects, showing that patients 
used the same strategy as neurotypical subjects to discriminate emotional faces and the 
eye movement patterns were not affected by the epileptic morbidity or the experimental 
conditions in the hospital. Further, the density maps are similar between fearful and 
happy trials for both patients and control subjects (see Figure 4.3). 
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Figure 4.3. Fixation density maps.  
Each heat map indicates the probability of fixating a given location in arbitrary units 
(blue: zero probability, and red: maximal probability). The sum of density is 1 in each 
plot. Fixations were smoothed by a 40-pixel Gaussian kernel with a standard deviation of 
10 pixels (the same as is used for display of the stimuli to the subjects and in the analysis 
of the spikes). 
!
For epileptic patients, quantitative ROI analysis comparing fearful and happy bubbles 
trials showed that the large majority of fixations within the 500 ms stimulus presentation 
time remained on the center of the face (69.5% for fearful correct trials and 71.6% for 
happy correct trials, p = 0.21). While few saccades away from the center were made, 
these nevertheless showed the expected differences between fear vs. happy: mainly, eyes 
were more likely to be fixated in fearful compared to happy trials (5.26% vs. 1.75%, 
respectively, p = 0.02); whereas the fixation probability for the mouth was 1.82% vs. 
3.5% for fearful and happy trials, respectively, showing a tendency of higher density on 
the mouth (p = 0.075). These results are consistent with the behavioral classification 
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images and consistent with previous studies (Scheller et al., 2012). Interestingly, for 
incorrect trials this difference was no longer significant (fear vs. happy: 2.13% vs. 5.76% 
for eyes (p = 0.33) and 1.33% vs. 1.23% for mouth (p = 0.51)). 
Similar results were observed for control subjects: the large majority of fixations also 
remained on the center of the face (77.6% for fearful correct trials and 78.4% for happy 
correct trials, p = 0.81). Higher fixation density was observed on eyes in fearful 
compared to happy trials (4.9% vs. 1.47% for fearful vs. happy, respectively, p = 0.0068), 
whereas the fixation probability for the mouth was 1.86% vs. 5.92% for fearful vs. happy, 
respectively (p = 0.2). Still, for incorrect trials, the significant difference for eyes no 
longer exists (fear vs. happy: 5.1% vs. 1.23% for eyes (p = 0.12) and 1.46% vs. 4.46% for 
mouth (p = 0.3)). 
!
4.5.3 Emotion-selective neurons 
210 single units were isolated from 9 recording sessions in 7 patients. Of these, 185 units 
(102 in the right amygdala, 83 in the left) that had an average firing rate of at least 0.2 Hz 
were chosen for further analysis. Structural MRI analyses of the amygdala with the 
electrodes in situ showed that recordings were mostly from the basomedial and 
basolateral nucleus of the amygdala (Figure 4.1). Electrodes were positioned such that 
their tips were located in the upper third to center of the deep amygdala, ∼7 mm from the 
uncus. Microwires projected medially out at the end of the depth electrode and electrodes 
were thus likely sampling neurons in the midmedial part of the amygdala (basomedial 
nucleus or deepest part of the basolateral nucleus; (Oya et al., 2009)). The isolation 
criteria and other face-responsive characteristics of the same dataset were described 
previously (Rutishauser et al., 2011, Rutishauser et al., 2013). To analyze neuronal 
responses, we aligned all trials to the onset of the face. The firing rate was normalized by 
dividing by average baseline (the firing rate 500 ms prior to scramble onset) across all 
trials, separately for each unit. 
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We here investigate the response characteristics of the amygdala neurons to emotions. We 
define emotion-selective units as those that responded differentially to fearful faces 
compared to happy faces. We selected emotion-selective units by comparing the total 
number of spikes in a time window 250 ms to 1750 ms post stimulus-onset between 
correct fearful trials and correct happy trials. A trial was classified as correct if the subject 
indicated the emotion associated with the stimulus displayed (ground truth). We used a 
one-tailed t-test to identify units with a greater response to fearful faces or happy faces 
separately, each with α = 0.05. We found that 24 units showed significantly greater 
response to fearful faces compared to happy faces (13.0%, binomial test on the number of 
significant cells: p < 0.00001) and 17 units (9.2%, p < 0.01) that showed a greater 
response to happy faces compared to fearful faces. We refer to these units as neurons 
selective for fearful expressions (“fear-selective” for short) (Figure 4.4A–B) and neurons 
selective for happy expressions (“happy-selective” for short) (Figure 4.4C–D), 
respectively. The probability of observing 41 emotion-selective neurons in a population 
of 185 neurons by chance is very low (p < 10-6, estimated by a binomial distribution with 
false positive rate of 0.1 for each neuron due to performing two one-tailed tests at p < 
0.05), indicating that amygdala neurons signal information about emotions (see Table 
4.2). However, it is important to emphasize that we do not know the response selectivity 
of the same neurons to other stimuli. In particular, it is possible that the same neurons 
would also respond to other emotions that we did not test in this study. Our labels of units 
as fear- or happy-selective are not meant to imply that these units would not respond to 
other, not tested, emotions or stimuli. 
!
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Figure 4.4. Single-unit examples of emotion-selective neurons in the amygdala.  
(A–B) Example fear-selective neurons, which have a higher firing rate for correct fearful 
trials compared to correct happy trials (selection t-test: p < 0.005). (C–D) Example 
happy-selective neurons, which have a higher firing rate for correct happy trials 
compared to correct fearful trials (selection t-test: p < 10-8). Each raster (top) and post-
stimulus time histogram (PSTH) (bottom) is shown with color coding as indicated. Trials 
are aligned to face stimulus onset (dark gray shade, fixed 500 ms duration). Trials within 
each stimulus category are sorted according to reaction time (black line). Waveforms for 
each unit are shown at the bottom of the raster plot. (E) Average firing rate 250–1750 ms 
post stimulus-onset for each unit. Red: fearful trials with a correct response; blue: happy 
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trials with a correct response; magenta: fearful trials but incorrectly judged as happy; 
green: happy trials but incorrectly judged as fearful. Black lines connect conditions with 
the same response: fear (black) and happy (gray). Note that the lines do not cross, 
implying that whatever response tuning the neuron had was maintained regardless of 
whether the response was correct or not. Error bars denote ± SEM across trials. Two-
tailed t-tests were applied to compare between conditions. *: p < 0.05, **: p < 0.01 and 
***: p < 0.001. n.s.: not significant (p > 0.05). 
!
Table 4.2. Summary of neuronal response characteristics. 
All percentages are derived from a total of 185 units. Comparisons between scramble and 
face stimuli was performed using a two-tailed paired t-test at p < 0.05. Selection of 
interactive neurons was performed using a two-tailed t-test at p < 0.05. Selection of 
emotion-selective cells was performed using a one-tailed t-test at p < 0.05. 
Patients with autism show abnormal processing of faces and we previously showed that 
neurons in the patients with autism responded significantly more to the mouth but less to 
the eyes (Rutishauser et al. 2013). In total, there are 83 cells (40.0% of 210 cells) 
recorded from two neurosurgical patients with autism (3 sessions), and among these cells, 
62 (74.7%) are from the left amygdala and 21 (25.3%) are from the right amygdala. 
Regarding emotion coding, 8 cells (9.64%) are fear-selective and 6 cells (7.23%) are 
happy-selective. Compared to neurosurgical patients without autism, 127 (60%) cells 
were recorded from 6 sessions, among which 30 (23.6%) are from the left amygdala and 
97 (76.4%) are from the right amygdala. 16 cells (12.6%) are fear-selective and 11 cells 
(8.67%) are happy-selective (Note for all 210 cells, 24 (11.4%) cells are fear-selective 
and 17 cells (8.1%) cells are happy-selective). The percentage of emotion-selective cell 
from each subject is about equal between patients with vs. without autism (a three-way 
mixed model ANOVA: autism X emotion X laterality; main effect of autism: F(1,17) = 
7.67×10-6, p = 1.00), as well as between left vs. right amygdala (main effect of laterality: 
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F(1,17) = 2.86, p = 0.11). There is no main effect of emotion (F(1,17) = 0.027, p = 0.80) 
nor interactions (all ps > 0.52). Furthermore, there is no difference across subjects (nested 
factor: F(7,17) = 0.31, p = 0.94). 
!
Figure 4.4 shows four single-neuron examples (see Figure 4.5 for more examples). The 
fear-selective neurons (Figure 4.4A–B) increased their activity for fearful trials and 
decreased their activity in happy trials. In contrast, the happy-selective neurons (Figure 
4.4C–D) increased their activity in happy trials. On average, significant differences in 
response between fearful and happy faces appeared 625 ms post stimulus-onset and lasted 
for up to 1.5 seconds (Figure 4.6). For fear-selective neurons, the difference was mainly 
due to a suppression of activity in happy trials (Figure 4.6A), whereas for happy-
selective neurons, it was mainly due to an increase in activity for happy trials (Figure 
4.6B). A similar plot for all recorded neurons (n = 185, Figure 4.7) showed no significant 
difference, indicating that overall mean activity was not different between the two 
conditions. 
!
Response Characteristics Nr cells % cells
Face responsive (face stimulus vs. scramble, all trial 
categories pooled)
95 51.4% 
Interactive neurons 23 total 
10 fearful 
13 happy
12.4% 
5.4% 
7.0%
Emotion-selective neurons 41 total 
24 fearful-selective 
17 happy-selective
22.2% 
13.0% 
9.2%
Emotion-selective AND Interactive neurons 9 4.9%
Emotion-selective AND Whole-face neurons 
(see Discussion and (Rutishauser et al. 2011))
8 4.3%
Emotion-selective AND autism neurons (see below) 14 7.6%
Laterality 83 left amygdala 
102 right amygdala
44.9% 
55.1%
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Figure 4.5. More single-unit examples of emotion-selective neurons in the amygdala.  
(A–D) Each panel represents a single-unit example (all from different patients). Post-
stimulus time histograms (PSTH) (left) are shown with color coding as indicated. Trials 
are aligned to face stimulus onset (dark gray shade, fixed 500 ms duration). On the right 
are plots of average firing rate in a time window 250 ms to 1750 ms post stimulus-onset 
of each unit. Red: fearful trials with a correct response; blue: happy trials with a correct 
response; magenta: fearful trials but incorrectly judged as happy; green: happy trials but 
incorrectly judged as fearful. Lines connect conditions with the same response: black 
lines for a fearful response and gray lines for a happy response. Note that the lines do not 
cross, implying that whatever response tuning the neuron had was maintained regardless 
of whether the response was correct or not. Error bars denote standard error of the mean. 
Two-tailed t-tests were applied to compare between conditions. #: p < 0.1, *: p < 0.05, 
**: p < 0.01 and ***: p < 0.001. n.s.: not significant (p > 0.05). 
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Figure 4.6. Average PSTH of all emotion-selective neurons.  
(A) Mean response of all fear-selective units that increased their spike rate for correct 
fearful trials compared to correct happy trials (n = 24 units; shaded area denotes ± SEM; 
the firing rate was normalized to average baseline response for each unit separately). (B) 
Mean response of all happy-selective units for correct trials (n = 17 units). Asterisk 
indicates a significant difference between the response to fearful trials and happy trials in 
that bin (p < 0.05, two-tailed t-test, Bonferroni-corrected).  
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Figure 4.7. Average PSTH of all 185 neurons (correct trials only).  
The only significant difference appears 125 ms after stimulus onset, showing no bias of 
the population as a whole towards one of the emotions (Bonferroni corrected). 
!
So far we only considered trials where patients judged the emotion expressed correctly. 
Here, correctness was assessed by the ground truth of the stimuli, which control subjects 
have classified unequivocally as either happy or fearful when shown the entire face for 
extended periods of time (Ekman and Friesen, 1975). How did the same neurons respond 
during errors in emotional judgment? We next compared the neuronal response during 
incorrect trials to the response during correct trials (for which the neurons were selected 
in the first place, see above). We found that the neuronal response during incorrect trials 
was similar to the one for the same behavioral response during correct trials rather than 
the actual emotion shown. For example, when a fearful face was incorrectly judged as 
happy, the neurons responded as if a happy face was correctly judged as happy (and vice-
versa; compare magenta and blue lines for the examples shown in Figure 4.4A–B). 
Similarly, when a happy face was incorrectly judged as fearful, the neurons responded as 
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if a fearful face had been correctly judged as fearful (compare green and red lines for the 
examples shown in Figure 4.4C–D). In Figure 4.4E, lines connect the conditions with 
the same response (fearful or happy). Note that the lines do not intersect, indicating that 
the relationship between the responses for the two emotions was similar in correct and 
incorrect trials, regardless of overall mean firing rate. For example, if a neuron showed a 
greater response in fearful correct trials compared to happy correct trials, it would also 
show a greater response in happy incorrect trials compared to fearful incorrect trials. 
Thus, firing rate increased whenever a fearful judgment was made, regardless of whether 
it was correct or incorrect. The neuronal response of the examples shown in Figure 4.4 
thus indicated the subjective perceptual judgment that subjects made, rather than the 
ground truth of the emotion shown in the stimulus. A significant interaction between 
stimulus emotion (fearful/happy) and accuracy of judgment (correct/incorrect) as tested 
by a 2x2 ANOVA with number of spikes fired in a 1.5 second window after stimulus 
onset (250–1750 ms post stimulus onset) confirmed this impression: the interaction term 
was significant for all example neurons at p < 0.01 (F(1,429) = 9.04 for Figure 4.4A, 
F(1,405) = 7.09 for Figure 4.4B, F(1,429) = 16.06 for Figure 4.4C, and F(1,429) = 9.47 
for Figure 4.4D). We next quantified this phenomenon across the population. 
!
4.5.4 Interactive neurons encode perceptual judgment of emotions other than ground 
truth shown in stimulus 
We next assessed for all neurons whether there was a significant interaction between the 
emotion shown and the correctness of the subject’s judgment using a two-way ANOVA 
([correct vs. incorrect trials] X [fearful stimuli vs. happy stimuli]). Units with a 
significant interaction term are referred to as “interactive units” henceforth, and reflect 
the subjective judgment regardless of the emotion shown in the image. There were 23 
units with a significant interaction term (12.4%, binomial test p < 0.00005), 10 of which 
responded with a higher firing rate in correct fearful trials and 13 of which responded 
!117
with a higher firing rate in correct happy trials, hence denoted as fearful interactive 
neurons and happy interactive neurons, respectively (see Table 4.2). 
To further quantify the response of the interactive neurons, we next plotted the average 
baseline-normalized firing rate for correct and incorrect trials for each interactive neuron 
(Figure 4.8A,B). Each neuron contributed two data points: one for correct (red, blue) and 
one for incorrect trials (gray), respectively. By definition, fearful interactive neurons 
increased their firing rate for correctly identified fearful face trials (Figure 4.8A, red). 
Similarly, happy interactive neurons increased their firing rate for correctly identified 
happy face trials (Figure 4.8B, blue). Incorrect trials (gray dots), in contrast, tended to 
have greater firing rates for the emotion opposite to the one actually shown in the 
stimulus (Fearful interactive neurons: Figure 4.8A; χ2-test on the number of neurons 
falling on each side of the diagonal line (gray bars), p < 10-5; Happy interactive neurons: 
Figure 4.8B, p < 0.01). In each case, the mean of all incorrect trials from all neurons was 
on the opposite side of the diagonal shown in Figure 4.8 from that for correct trials: the 
average normalized firing rate thus indicated the behavioral judgment of the subjects. 
!
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Figure 4.8. Interactive neurons followed perceptual judgment rather than stimulus 
identity.  
N = 23 units, selected by a significant interaction term. (A,B) Scatter plot of mean 
normalized firing rate for fearful and happy trials, shown separately for fearful interactive 
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(A) and happy interactive (B) neurons. Red and blue dots denote correct trials, which 
were distributed below and above the diagonal, respectively (by definition). Gray dots 
denote incorrect trials, which tended to be distributed on the opposite side of the diagonal 
line compared to the correct trials. Error bars (Green) are mean ± SD. Gray bars (upper 
right) show the number of neurons falling on each side of the diagonal. (C) Scatter plot of 
the normalized firing rate difference comparing the response to fearful and happy trials 
for correct (x-axis) and incorrect (y-axis) trials. Fearful interactive neurons (red) and 
happy interactive neurons were largely located in the lower right and upper left, 
respectively. (D) Cumulative distribution of the response index (see Methods). The 
response during incorrect trials was opposite to the one during correct trials, implying 
that the neuronal response followed the behavioral judgment. (E) Mean response index 
across all trials. Note similar response magnitude for fearful correct (FC) and happy 
incorrect trials (HI), which shows that when a happy face was shown but judged as a 
fearful face, the neurons responded as if a real fearful face was shown. The same 
interpretation can be derived for happy correct trials (HC) and fearful incorrect trials (FI). 
FC: fearful trials with a correct response; HC: happy trials with a correct response; FI: 
fearful trials but incorrectly judged as happy; HI: happy trials but incorrectly judged as 
fearful. Note that HC is equal to zero by definition (see Methods). *: p < 0.05, **: p < 
0.01 and ***: p < 0.001. 
!
To summarize the population response, we next visualized the mean difference in 
response between fearful and happy stimuli for both correct and incorrect trials (Figure 
4.8C). For fearful interactive neurons, this response difference tended to be positive for 
correct and negative for incorrect trials (Figure 4.8C, red) and vice-versa for happy 
interactive neurons (Figure 4.8C, blue). Thus, the response during incorrect trials tended 
to be similar to the correct trials of the opposite emotional category. This result shows 
that interactive neurons code the subjective judgment of emotion. 
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To directly relate neuronal responses to the emotion judgments made on the task, we next 
performed a single-trial analysis that permits analysis of response variability. In contrast, 
the analysis discussed so far was based on an average across all fearful or happy trials for 
each neuron. We used a simple response index Ri as a single-trial metric (see Eq. 4.3), 
which takes into account the opposite signs of the two types of neurons—the fearful type 
and the happy type—and normalizes for different baseline firing rates. The response 
index is a function of a neuron’s response in a 1.5 second interval starting 250 ms after 
stimulus-onset (the same interval used above for selecting emotion-selective and 
interactive cells). Ri is equal to the firing rate during a particular trial i, minus the mean 
firing rate of all correct happy trials divided by the average of the baseline (Eq. 4.3). For 
example, if a neuron doubles its firing rate for a fearful stimulus and remains at baseline 
for a happy stimulus, the response index would equal 100%. By definition, Ri is negative 
for happy units, and thus we multiplied Ri by -1 if the unit was previously classified as a 
happy unit (Eq. 4.4). 
We next utilized the response index as defined above to quantify trial-by-trial variability 
by comparing the distribution of Ri between different conditions. For the interactive 
neurons (n = 23), the distribution for fearful and happy stimuli was significantly different 
for both correct and incorrect trials (two-tailed two-sample Kolmogorov–Smirnov (KS) 
test, p < 0.0005 for both correct and incorrect trials, Figure 4.8D). Comparing the 
distributions using a cumulative distribution function (Figure 4.8D, see Methods) shows 
that the response during incorrect trials was similarly distributed compared to the correct 
trials of the opposite category. For example, happy incorrect trials (Figure 4.8D, green 
curve) were similarly distributed to fearful correct trials (Figure 4.8D, red curve), and 
vice-versa. Confirming this observation, there was no significant difference between 
happy incorrect and fearful correct trials (KS-test, p = 0.62) nor between fearful incorrect 
and happy correct trials (p = 0.087, uncorrected). Thus, single-trial neuronal responses 
confirmed the previous cell-by-cell findings. The mean of the distribution of response 
indices for both fearful correct and happy incorrect trials (in both cases the perceptual 
judgment was fearful) had response indices significantly above 0 (Figure 4.8E; two-
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tailed one-sample t-test, p < 10-13 for fearful correct trials and p < 0.0005 for happy 
incorrect trials), and there was no significant difference between correct and incorrect 
trials for fearful subjective judgments (two-tailed two-sample t-test comparing fearful 
correct and happy incorrect, p = 0.99). Interestingly, there was a significant difference 
between the two types of happy subjective judgments (comparing happy correct and 
fearful incorrect, p = 0.027), with fearful incorrect trials significantly below 0 (t-test 
against 0: p < 0.05). This was because the firing rate for fearful incorrect trials was lower 
than it was for happy correct trials. Separate analyses for only fearful or happy-selective 
neurons led to similar results (see Figure 4.9), with both classes of neurons showing the 
same pattern of response independently. In conclusion, we found that the neurons with a 
significant interaction term encoded the perceptual judgment made by the patient rather 
than the stimulus identity, at both the single-neuron and single-trial level. 
!
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Figure 4.9. Analysis of neurons with significant ANOVA interaction, broken down by 
fear-selective and happy-selective.  
Analyses for (A–B) fearful interactive neurons (n = 10 units), and (C–D) happy 
interactive neurons (n = 13 units). (A,C) Cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the 
response index, which was calculated as the baseline-normalized difference in response 
to fearful trials compared to happy trials. The response was significantly different 
between correct and incorrect for both happy and fearful trials for either type of neuron 
(KS-test, p < 0.05 for all comparisons). In contrast, comparing trials according to their 
subjective judgment (i.e., fearful correct with happy incorrect, and happy correct with 
fearful incorrect) resulted in no significant difference (KS-test, p > 0.05 for all 
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comparisons). (B,D) Bar plots of the response index across all trials (top) and across all 
cells (bottom). Pairwise t-tests are indicated by *: p < 0.05, **: p < 0.01 and ***: p < 
0.001. FC: fearful trials with a correct response; HC: happy trials with a correct response; 
FI: fearful trials but incorrectly judged as happy; HI: happy trials but incorrectly judged 
as fearful. 
!
4.5.5 Emotion-selective neurons encode perceptual judgment 
Are all emotion-selective neurons sensitive to subjective judgment, or is this a property 
only of a subset of neurons? Above, we explicitly selected for a significant interaction to 
begin with, and subsequently analyzed this sub-group. To obtain a broader inventory, we 
next analyzed the previously described units (n = 41, among which 6 were fearful 
interactive neurons and 3 were happy interactive neurons; see Table 4.2) that were only 
selected for emotion selectivity on correct trials (incorrect trials were not used for this 
selection). We computed the response indices for every trial and pooled across all trials as 
described above in our analysis of interactive neurons. We then computed a population 
summary metric that summarized the response difference across a group of cells as the 
mean difference between the response index for fearful and happy trials (see Methods, 
Eq. 4.5). To assess statistical significance, we estimated the null distribution by first 
randomly shuffling the labels of trials (fearful/happy) and then computing the population 
summary metric. We repeated this permutation test 1000 times. We then compared the 
observed value of the metric with this null distribution of metrics. The chance values of 
the null distribution were clustered around 0 as expected (Figure 4.10, gray). In contrast, 
the value of the population effect metric was 25.0% for correct trials (Figure 4.10, red; p 
< 0.001 (estimated by counting the number of permutation runs from the null distribution 
that had a population metric greater than the observed value)), which is expected as the 
cells were selected for this effect in the first place. However, as cells were selected 
considering only correct trials, incorrect trials remain statistically independent. We found 
that the population response metric of incorrect trials was significantly negative (-4.63%, 
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p = 0.002 (estimated by counting the number of permutation runs from null distribution 
that had a population metric smaller than observed value); Figure 4.10, blue). 
Importantly, the metric from the incorrect trials was significantly negative and thus on the 
opposite side of the null distribution compared to the metric from correct trials (Figure 
4.10, blue). This shows that when the behavioral response was incorrect (opposite as 
what was shown on the screen), the neuronal response was consistent with the behavioral 
response rather than the ground truth (if the blue bar were on the same side as the red bar, 
by contrast, it would indicate that neuronal responses instead tracked the emotion shown 
in the stimulus). We thus conclude that the 41 emotion-selective neurons signaled the 
subjective emotional judgment. We found similar results when we considered fear and 
happy selective neurons separately (see Figure 4.11). 
!
!  
Figure 4.10. The mean response across all emotion-selective neurons encoded 
subjective perceptual judgment.  
The gray distribution is the null distribution from permutation tests. The red bar is the 
metric from observed correct trials and the blue bar is the metric from observed incorrect 
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trials. Both the red bar and blue bar were located outside the null distribution (p < 0.005 
for all, estimated by counting the number of permutation runs from the null distribution 
that had a population metric greater/smaller than the observed value). The blue bar was 
located on the opposite side of the red bar. 
!
!  
Figure 4.11. Population summary metrics, compared to permutation distribution, 
shown separately for fear-selective and happy-selective cells.  
Both fear-selective cells (A) and happy-selective cells (B) showed coding of subjective 
perceptual judgment. The gray distribution is the null distribution from permutation tests. 
The red bar is the metric from observed correct trials and the blue bar is the metric from 
observed incorrect trials. Both the red bar (p < 0.001 in both cases) and blue bar were 
located outside the null distribution (p = 0.007 and p = 0.11, respectively). Importantly, 
the blue bar was located on the opposite side of the red bar. 
!
Were the results influenced by difficulty? The mean number of bubbles shown was 38.2 ± 
34.2 (mean ± SD) for correct and 21.9 ± 21.2 for incorrect trials (p < 10-10, unpaired t-
test). Thus, as expected, incorrect trials tended to occur when less visual information was 
Correct Incorrect Permuted 
ï ï      








Difference in Mean Response Index [%] (F-H) 
Nr
 
  
ï ï      







Difference in Mean Response Index [%] (F-H) 
Nr
 
A B 
!126
revealed. As a control, we repeated our analysis by using only a subset of trials such that, 
on average, equal amounts of the eye and mouth ROIs were revealed (on average, 28.92 
± 26.90 for correct trials and 28.86 ± 26.91 for incorrect trials, two-tailed paired t-test: p 
> 0.05; and for each individual session, p > 0.05 for both fearful correct vs. fearful 
incorrect and happy correct vs. happy incorrect). We found very similar results (Figure 
4.12A–C), confirming that emotion-selective neurons signal the perceptual judgment 
independent of difficulty. We also repeated the analysis by using equal numbers of trials 
for correct and incorrect to exclude any potential bias and we found very similar results 
(Figure 4.12D–F). We further repeated the analysis by excluding any recordings obtained 
from epileptic tissue (31 out of a total of 210 units were from tissue subsequently 
resected as part of the epileptic focus, among which 10 units were fear-selective and 1 
unit was happy-selective). The results were qualitatively the same (see Figure 4.12G–I). 
Finally, two of the neurosurgical patients had a clinical diagnosis of autism (Rutishauser 
et al 2013). We repeated the analysis after excluding these two patients and again found 
very similar results (Figure 4.12J–L). 
!
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Figure 4.12. Control analyses, using population summary metrics.  
Emotion-selective cells still showed coding of subjective perceptual judgment when 
equalizing the proportion of the face shown in eye and mouth ROIs (A–C), when 
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equalizing the number of correct and incorrect trials (D–F), when excluding epileptic 
areas (G–I), and when excluding neurons from patients with autism (J–L). (A,D,G,J) 
Combined emotion-selective cells. (B,E,H,K) Fear-selective cells. (C,F,I,L) Happy-
selective cells. The gray distribution is the null distribution from permutation tests. The 
red bar is the metric from observed correct trials and the blue bar is the metric from 
observed incorrect trials. Both the red bar and blue bar stood outside the null distribution. 
Importantly, the blue bar stood on the opposite side of the red bar. (A–C): for correct 
trials, p < 0.001 in all cases; for incorrect trials, p < 0.05 for combined emotion-selective 
cells (n = 41) and fear-selective cells (n = 24), and p = 0.158 for happy-selective cells (n 
= 17). (D–F): for correct trials, p < 0.001 in all cases; for incorrect trials, p < 0.005 for 
combined emotion-selective cells (n = 41), p < 0.01 for fear-selective cells (n = 24), and p 
= 0.111 for happy-selective cells (n = 17). (G–I): for correct trials, p < 0.001 in all cases; 
for incorrect trials, p < 0.001 for combined emotion-selective cells (n = 30) and fear-
selective cells (n = 14), and p = 0.106 for happy-selective cells (n = 16). (J–L): for 
correct trials, p < 0.001 in all cases; for incorrect trials, p < 0.001 for combined emotion-
selective cells (n = 27), p < 0.005 for fear-selective cells (n = 16), and p < 0.05 for happy-
selective cells (n = 11). 
!
4.5.6 A full inventory of neurons in the amygdala that encode perceptual judgment 
How representative were the subsets of cells described so far of the entire population of 
amygdala neurons recorded? We next conducted a permutation analysis on the entire 
population of cells to assess the likely effect size across the population. This analysis 
used independent subsets of trials for cell selection and response quantification during 
each repetition of the permutation. We ran 1000 iterations in total. In each, we randomly 
selected half of the correct trials to select emotion-selective units and to classify them as 
either fear or happy selective. Subsequently, we calculated the response indices for the 
remaining half of the correct trials and all incorrect trials. Again, we calculated the 
population summary metric (as shown in Figure 4.10) but only using this independent 
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subset of trials not previously used for selecting the cells. For the null distribution, we did 
the same permutation test (1000 runs) with randomly shuffled trial labels. But here, we 
still use half of the trials to select cells and the other half to predict response indices. The 
complete independence between selection and prediction insured our results against 
biases and false positives during selection since only out-of-sample errors were 
calculated. 
Out of our total 210 neurons recorded, we considered 185 cells with >0.2Hz firing rate 
for this analysis. Many cells were reliably selected over the 1000 repetitions (Figure 
4.13A, upper panels; 40 and 34 cells were selected in at least 10% of runs for fear and 
happy conditions, respectively). In contrast, selection was random in the control 
condition with permuted labels (Figure 4.13A, lower panels; no cells were selected in at 
least 10% of the runs). Not surprisingly, there was considerable overlap between the cells 
consistently selected by the present split analysis and the cells selected with all trials (n = 
41) as analyzed previously (Figure 4.14, upper panels). In contrast, for the permutation 
test which randomly shuffled labels, each cell was equally likely to be selected with a 
probability of 0.05 (lower panels of Figure 4.14); the selected cells were evenly 
distributed across all 185 cells and across permutation runs (lower panels of Figure 
4.13A) and did not show a bias towards those that could be selected with all trials 
(Figure 4.14). On average, 16.3 ± 3.1 (mean ± SD) units (8.8% of 185) were categorized 
as fear-selective and 13.5 ± 2.8 (7.3% of 185) as happy-selective, above the chance 
estimate of 9.25 cells for each category (p < 0.01 for fear-selective and p = 0.077 for 
happy-selective; Figure 4.13B). In contrast, the control permutation test resulted in 9.2 ± 
3.0 units that were fear-selective and 9.4 ± 2.8 units that were happy-selective (Figure 
4.13B, middle panels), with no difference between the two categories (p = 0.14) and the 
chance value 9.25 (p > 0.05 for both). Furthermore, the symmetric shape of the null 
distribution (see Figure 4.15) showed that the permutation test was not biased. 
!
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Figure 4.13. Illustration of the split analysis method to compute the population 
response.  
(A) Cells selected across runs. Each black dot means a particular cell was selected. There 
was substantial consistency of cells selected in the split analysis (upper panels) but cell 
selection was evenly distributed across cells and runs in the permutation test (lower 
panels). (B) Summary of the number of cells selected across all runs. Gray and red 
vertical line indicates the mean of the chance and actual distribution, respectively. The 
number of cells selected in the split analysis was well above chance while the number of 
cells selected in the permutation test was near chance. See Figure 4.16 for results. 
!
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Figure 4.14. Summary of the likelihood of each cell being selected.  
In the split analysis (upper panels), cells were consistently selected and there was 
substantial overlap with cells selected by all trials (shown as red bars at the bottom of 
each color-map with probability equal to 1). But in the permutation test (lower panels), 
each cell was equally likely to be selected with the predetermined false discovery rate of 
0.05. Also, the selection was not biased towards the cells selected by all trials. 
!
We next quantified the responses of the groups of cells selected in each run using the 
population summary metric as described above (Figure 4.16). The population summary 
metric is calculated as the difference between the average of response indices from all 
fearful trials (either correct or incorrect) collapsed across all selected cells and the 
average of response indices from all happy trials (either correct or incorrect) collapsed 
across all selected cells (see Eq. 4.5). The population metric here combined both fear and 
happy selective cells. The population response was significantly different from the null 
distribution, for both correct trials and incorrect trials (unpaired two-tailed t-test, p < 
0.0001). The distribution of the incorrect trials was shifted in the opposite direction 
relative to the distribution of the correct trials. This also held separately for fear and 
happy selective neurons (see Figure 4.15 for population metric distributions separately 
for fear and happy selective neurons). Thus, the neural signals always followed the 
behavioral response instead of stimulus ground truth, regardless of whether the 
behavioral response was correct or incorrect. We thus conclude that emotion-selective 
neurons in the amygdala encode perceptual judgment robustly. 
!
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Figure 4.15. Population summary metric for amygdala neurons separately for fear- 
and happy- selective neurons.  
(A,C) Fear-selective neurons. (B,D) Happy-selective neurons. (A,B) Histogram 
representation. (C,D) Cumulative distribution function (CDF) representation. The gray 
distribution is the null distribution from permutation tests. The red distribution is from 
correct trials and the blue distribution is from incorrect trials. Both the red distribution 
and blue distribution shifted away from the null distribution. Importantly, the blue 
distribution was on the opposite side of the red distribution. 
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4.5.7 Neuronal response characteristics dependent on facial information revealed 
Were the emotion-selective units predominantly driven by information conveyed by 
specific parts of the face? We randomly revealed parts of the face, allowing us to select 
subsets of trials that reveal only specific parts of the face. We selected trials according to 
how much of pre-defined eye and mouth ROIs was revealed (shown in Figure 4.2C). The 
more overlap between bubbles and ROIs, the more is revealed within the ROIs specified. 
We picked two types of ROI trials: ‘High Eye AND Low Mouth’ (Figure 4.16A and see 
Figure 4.17A–B for the distribution), and ‘Low Eye AND High Mouth’ (Figure 4.16A 
and see Figure 4.17C–D for the distribution). ‘High’ or ‘Low’ here refer to above or 
below the median across all correct trials of each subject. The conjunction between one 
high facial feature and one low facial feature ensured that the neuronal response was 
primarily driven by one facial feature only. We subsequently repeated the split analysis as 
described above on these ROI trials. Since only correct trials were involved in the 
selection of ROI trials, the distributions in Figure 4.16A did not involve incorrect trials 
(the incorrect trials may not obey the above division according to eye and mouth ROIs). 
The population metric here combined both fear and happy selective cells. 
!
!  
Figure 4.16. Quantification of the population response using split analysis.  
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(A) Emotion-selective neurons are primarily driven by information revealed by the eyes. 
(B) Hippocampal neurons also encode emotions but not subjective judgment. In contrast, 
a subset of amygdala neurons equal to the total number of hippocampal neurons (n = 67) 
could encode both emotion and subjective judgment as computed from the entire 
amygdala neuron population. Red: population metric from correct trials. Blue: population 
metric from incorrect trials. Gray: population metric from trials with shuffled labels. 
Error bars denote 95% confidence interval. ***: p < 0.001. Only correct trials were 
analyzed for the ROI-restricted analysis. 
!
Information conveyed by the eyes strongly modulated the neuronal response (Figure 
4.16A and Figure 4.17A–B). On average, 16.7 ± 3.2 (mean ± SD) cells were selected as 
fear-selective neurons and 10.0 ± 2.4 cells were selected as happy-selective neurons, both 
significantly above chance (p < 0.001, Figure 4.17E). For this subset, the separation 
between the distribution of correct trials (red) and null distribution (gray) was prominent 
(unpaired two-sample t-test: p < 0.0001) and the difference was much larger than with all 
trials (p < 0.0001, Figure 4.16A). The results held when analyzing fear-selective and 
happy-selective neurons separately (both p < 0.0001, Figure 4.17A–B). 
!
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Figure 4.17. Comparison of neuronal responses during trials where predominantly 
the eyes or the mouth was shown.  
Information revealed by the eyes but not the mouth area most strongly modulated the 
neuronal response that differentiated fearful and happy faces. (A–D) Population summary 
metric. The gray distribution is the null distribution from permutation tests and the red 
distribution is from correct trials. The shift of the red distribution from the gray indicates 
the modulation of neuronal response. (E–F) Summary of the number of cells selected. 
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In contrast, information provided by the mouth did not modulate neuronal response 
strongly, as shown by the overlap between the distribution of correct trials and the null 
distribution (p = 0.59). Although we observed a statistically significant difference when 
analyzing separately for fear-selective neurons and happy-selective neurons, the 
difference was very small (Figure 4.17C–D). On average, 10.8 ± 2.9 cells were selected 
as happy-selective neurons, which was significantly above chance (p < 0.0001, Figure 
4.17F). By contrast, only 8.3 ± 2.4 cells were selected as fear-selective neurons, which 
was significantly below the chance value of 9.25 (p < 0.0001, Figure 4.17F), indicating 
that when eyes were absent and mouth was present, the neuronal response to fearful faces 
was suppressed. 
In conclusion, we found that information conveyed by eyes but not mouth modulated 
emotion-selective neuronal responses in the amygdala. 
!
4.5.8 Specificity of the amygdala neurons in coding subjective judgment 
How specific were amygdala neurons in encoding subjective judgment? We next 
analyzed neurons from an adjacent brain region—the hippocampus—to test the 
specificity of amygdala neurons in coding subjective judgment. We recorded in total 67 
single neurons in 6 sessions from 4 patients (2 patients had 2 sessions; see Table 4.1). 63 
cells had a firing rate greater than 0.2 Hz and were used for the subsequent analyses. 
Using identical criteria as for the analysis of amygdala neurons, we found 4 fear-selective 
neurons (6.4%) and 7 happy-selective neurons (11.1%). 
We repeated the split analysis for the entire population of hippocampal cells using a 
random subset of 50% of the trials to select the neurons and the remaining 50% of the 
trials to quantify the response. We ran 1000 iterations in total. For the null distribution, 
we conducted the same permutation test with randomly shuffled trial labels. The result 
shows that both happy-selective neurons and fearful-selective neurons were consistently 
selected across repetitions (Figure 4.18A). Interestingly, only happy-selective neurons, 
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but not fear-selective neurons were selected above chance (Figure 4.18B). The selected 
neurons differentiated fearful from happy faces in correct trials (p < 0.001; Figure 4.16B; 
also see Figure 4.19). Thus, a subset of hippocampal neurons distinguished happy from 
fearful emotions in correct trials. Crucially, however, this was only the case for correct 
trials. In contrast to the amygdala neurons, the hippocampal neurons did not indicate the 
behavioral response made during incorrect trials. Rather, the response indicated, albeit 
only weakly so (Figure 4.16B), what the correct response would have been (ground truth, 
as shown on the screen). The crucial difference, however, is that the distribution of the 
response during incorrect trials was shifted in the same direction (p < 0.001) relative to 
the distribution of the correct trials. This is in contrast to the amygdala neurons, for which 
the distribution of the response during the incorrect trials was shifted in the opposite 
direction relative to the distribution of the correct trials (Figure 4.16A). In conclusion, 
hippocampal neurons, unlike amygdala neurons, did not track the subjective judgment of 
facial emotion in incorrect trials. 
!
!  
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Figure 4.18. Quantification of the split analysis and permutation test for 
hippocampal neurons.  
(A) Cells selected across runs. Each black dot means a particular cell was selected. There 
was substantial consistency of cells selected in the split analysis (upper panels) but cell 
selection was evenly distributed across cells and runs in the permutation test (lower 
panels). (B) Summary of the number of cells selected. The number of cells selected in the 
split analysis was well above chance while the number of cells selected in the 
permutation test was near chance. (C) Summary of the likelihood of each cell being 
selected. In the split analysis (upper panels), cells were consistently selected and there 
was substantial overlap with cells selected by all trials (shown as red bars at the bottom of 
each color-map with probability equal to 1). But in the permutation test (lower panels), 
each cell was equally likely to be selected with the predetermined false discovery rate of 
0.05. Also, the selection was not biased towards the cells selected by all trials. 
!
!  
Figure 4.19. Emotion coding in hippocampal neurons (combined emotion-selective 
neurons), quantified using population summary metric.  
(A) Histogram representation. (B) Cumulative distribution function (CDF) representation. 
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The gray distribution is the null distribution from permutation tests. The red distribution 
is from correct trials and the blue distribution is from incorrect trials. Only the correct 
trials (red) were different from the null distribution. 
!
There were fewer hippocampal neurons than amygdala neurons (67 vs. 210), which could 
have biased the effect size. We thus next repeated the analysis of the amygdala neurons 
by randomly selecting a subset of 67 amygdala neurons in each run of the split analysis. 
We found very similar results compared to the entire population of amygdala neurons 
(Figure 4.16B; but note the larger variance due to fewer number of neurons), and again 
found a different pattern of results than what was seen in the hippocampus (with an 
identical number of selected neurons). 
In conclusion, we found that only amygdala neurons, but not hippocampal neurons, 
indicated the subjective judgment of emotions. 
!
4.5.9 Reaction time (RT) and laterality analysis 
In an attempt to distinguish perceptual judgments from motor outputs, we lastly analyzed 
whether the response of emotion-selective units was correlated with behavioral output. 
We analyzed the correlation between RT and spike timing or spike counts for the 41 
emotion-selective neurons (Pearson correlation, false positive rate = 0.05, uncorrected for 
multiple comparisons). When correlating RT with peak firing time (center of the 250 ms 
bin which had the highest firing rate), we observed only two fear-selective neurons with a 
significant positive correlation (binomial test on the number of significant cells, p = 0.12; 
two neurons with a significant negative correlation, p = 0.12), while we observed no 
happy-selective neurons having a significant positive correlation (p = 0.58; one neuron 
had a significant negative correlation, p = 0.21). When correlating RT with the total 
number of spikes in a time window 500 ms prior to button press, we found only one 
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significant positive correlation for fear-selective neurons (p = 0.34) but no significant 
positive correlation for happy-selective neurons (p = 0.58; five fear-selective neurons (p 
< 0.001) and two happy-selective neurons (p = 0.050) had a significant negative 
correlation). Separate analyses for fearful trials and happy trials showed very similar 
results. We conclude that there was no significant correlation between firing rate and RT. 
One confounding factor of our experimental setup is that the same motor action is always 
associated with the same emotion (the left button denoted fearful and the right button 
happy in our setup). To our knowledge there is no evidence that the amygdala encodes 
such specific motor actions. We further analyzed the distribution of emotion-selective 
neurons to investigate whether the button presses were associated with emotion coding in 
the amygdala. If the emotion neurons are associated with the button press, they should 
appear contralaterally to the pressed buttons. However, we did not observe such laterality. 
Of the total 210 cells, 92 cells were recorded from the left amygdala and 118 cells were 
recorded from the right amygdala (see Figure 4.20). Among the emotion-selective cells, 
6 fear-selective cells were from the left amygdala, 18 fear-selective cells were from the 
right amygdala, 6 happy-selective cells were from the left amygdala and 11 happy-
selective cells were from the right amygdala. The proportion of emotion-selective cell did 
not differ between left vs. right amygdala in any of these categories (Fisher’s exact test, p 
= 0.51; paired two-tailed t-test across patients on the percentages, all ps > 0.1), showing 
that the emotion neurons are not lateralized nor related to the output button response 
associated with the emotion. Further, the same results held when excluding neurons from 
the epileptic areas (all ps > 0.25). 
!
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Figure 4.20. Distribution of emotion-selective neurons.  
(A) Number of emotion-selective neurons from each patient. (B) Percentage of emotion-
selective neurons. Red: neurons recorded from the left amygdala. Blue: neurons recorded 
from the right amygdala. Patients 17 and 28 were diagnosed with ASD. 
!
Our results suggest that the amygdala encodes the subjective judgment of emotional 
faces, but that it plays less of a role in helping to program behavioral responses. 
!
4.6 Discussion 
In this study, we found that a subset of amygdala neurons encode the subjective judgment 
of the emotion shown in faces. Behaviorally, our epilepsy patients did not differ from 
healthy controls in terms of learning performance on the task, and both epilepsy patients 
and control subjects primarily used the eye region of the stimuli to correctly judge fearful 
faces and primarily used the mouth region to correctly judge happy faces, findings 
consistent with prior studies (Smith et al., 2005, Scheller et al., 2012). 41 cells 
significantly differentiated the two emotions and subsequent analyses indicated that these 
cells encoded the patients’ subjective judgment regardless of whether it was correct or 
incorrect. Population permutation analysis with full independence between selection and 
prediction confirmed the robustness of this result when tested across the entire 
population. ROI analysis revealed that eyes but not mouth strongly modulated population 
neuronal responses to emotions. Lastly, when we carried out identical recordings, in the 
same patients, from neurons within the hippocampus, we found responses driven only by 
the objective emotion shown in the face stimulus, and no evidence for responses driven 
by subjective judgment.  
It is notable that the population response metric for the correct trials was further away 
from the null distribution relative to the incorrect trials (25.0% vs. -4.63%). It is not 
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surprising that the strength of emotion coding in incorrect trials was weaker given fewer 
incorrect trials and thus potentially increased variability and decreased reliability. In 
addition, incorrect trials were likely a mixture of different types of error trials, such as 
true misidentifications of emotion, guesses, or accidental motor errors. Regardless, on 
average, the neural response during incorrect trials reliably indicated the subjectively 
perceived emotion. This suggests that a proportion of error trials were likely true 
misidentifications of the emotion rather than pure guesses.  
Interestingly, there was a significant difference between the two types of happy subjective 
judgments (comparing happy correct and fearful incorrect, Figure 4.8E). This might 
reflect a different strategy used by subjects to compare the two emotions in our specific 
task. Future studies with a range of different tasks will be needed to understand how 
relative coding of emotion identity and task demands may interact in shaping neuronal 
responses. 
!
4.6.1 Possible confounds 
Our stimuli were based on the well validated set of facial emotion images from Ekman 
and Friesen (Ekman and Friesen, 1975), from which we chose a subset depicting fear and 
happiness with the highest reliability. We normalized these base faces for luminance, 
orientation, color and spatial frequency, eliminating these low-level visual properties as 
possible confounds. Likewise, we showed a balanced number of male and female faces, 
and multiple identities, ensuring that neither gender nor individual identity of the face 
was driving the responses we report (each of these was completely uncorrelated with the 
emotion shown in the face). Nonetheless, it remains possible that our findings reflect 
higher-level properties that are correlated with the emotions fear and happiness—such as 
negative vs. positive valence. Furthermore, since we only tested two facial emotions, our 
conclusions can only speak to the emotions that we tested and are relative to the task that 
we used. Different facial regions would have likely been informative for other facial 
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emotions (had the task been a discrimination task that required a choice between, say, 
surprise and happiness) and we do not know whether the cells studied here might 
contribute to perceptual decisions for other emotions. A larger set of emotions, as well as 
of facial expressions without emotional meaning, would be important to study in future 
studies. 
Our results suggest that emotion-selective neurons were not merely encoding the motor 
output associated with the perceived emotions (button press), as corroborated by the lack 
of correlation between the neuronal and behavioral response (consistent with similar prior 
findings (Rutishauser et al., 2011)), and the lack of lateralization of emotion neurons 
given the lateralized and fixed motor output actions. Although there has been a recent 
report of an interaction between spatial laterality and reward coding in the primate 
amygdala probed with lateralized reward cues (Peck et al., 2013), that effect appeared 
primarily as a difference in latency but not as the lateralization of reward coding neurons 
to the reward-predicting cues. It will be interesting to investigate in future studies 
whether these findings with basic rewards (Peck et al., 2013) can be generalized to 
emotions or other salient stimuli. 
We initially selected emotion-selective neurons using a one-tailed t-test of fear vs. happy 
for correct trials only. Clearly, some cells surviving this test will be false positives and to 
quantify the robustness of the effect we thus conducted several additional analyses. First, 
we conducted a 50/50 split analysis procedure, which keeps the trials used for selection 
and prediction independent (Figure 4.13). The result (Figure 4.16) is an out-of-sample 
estimate of the true effect size and would thus not be expected to be different from 
chance if all selected cells were false positives. In contrast, we observed a highly reliable 
effect (Figure 4.16), which is very unlikely to be driven by chance alone. Second, the set 
of cells selected by the two different methods were comparable (see Figure 4.14), 
showing that emotion-selective neurons were consistently selected even with a random 
subset of trials. Third, we rigorously established chance levels using permutation tests 
(Figure 4.16) and found that the number of cells selected was well above chance (Figure 
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4.13). Fourth, we conducted additional control analyses using a time window -250 ms to 
750 ms relative to scramble onset (no information about the upcoming face was available 
during this time window). The number of selected cells was as expected by chance and 
we did not find the significant patterns we report in the case of responses to faces. 
Similarly, we also did not replicate the pattern of amygdala responses to faces when we 
analyzed responses from hippocampal neurons. Taken together, the last two findings 
provide both stimulus specificity and neuroanatomical specificity to our conclusions. 
Lastly, we conducted analyses using a random subset of the amygdala neurons (n = 67, 
the number of hippocampal neurons recorded) at each permutation run and we derived 
qualitatively the same results (Figure 4.16B), showing that our results were not driven by 
a particular subset of neurons. 
!
4.6.2 Comparison with neuroimaging studies 
While the relationship between BOLD responses and single-neuron activity in the 
amygdala is complex and largely unknown, our findings are nevertheless consistent with 
an fMRI study which found that the overall BOLD response in the amygdala to fearful 
faces followed subjective judgment (Pessoa et al., 2006). That study divided trials into 
hits, misses, correct rejects and false alarms, and showed that not only were amygdala 
BOLD responses during hit trials greater than those during physically identical miss 
trials, but also that responses during false alarm trials were greater than those during 
misses, even though in the former no actual fearful face was present while in the latter it 
was. While our single-neuron level findings are compatible with this interpretation, our 
study in addition showed that there are at least two sub-populations of emotion-sensitive 
neurons (responding to judged happiness and judged fearfulness, respectively) and that 
these neurons both code subjective emotion. Our findings are also consistent with 
previous work showing that presenting eyes but not the mouth result in a significant 
BOLD response in the amygdala (Morris et al., 2002, Whalen et al., 2004). 
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Interestingly, in contrast to increased neuroimaging responses of fearful faces compared 
to happy faces (Morris et al., 1996), we found neuronal selectivity for fearful faces in the 
amygdala comes mainly from a suppression of activity in happy trials (Figure 4.6A), 
whereas selectivity for happy faces is mainly due to an increase in activity for happy 
trials (Figure 4.6B). Such complex relationships between single-neuron dynamics and 
stimulus dimensions are not visible with an aggregate signal such as the BOLD response. 
Pooling across all recorded neurons (a condition more directly comparable to BOLD-
fMRI, Figure 4.7) does not differentiate the two emotions either, a finding consistent 
with some more recent neuroimaging studies (Fitzgerald et al., 2006). This might be due 
to the population of neurons that we sampled, our stimuli with only sparsely sampled 
parts, or the non-linear response characteristics of amygdala neurons responding to facial 
parts (Rutishauser et al., 2011). 
!
4.6.3 Selectivity of amygdala neurons 
Faces can be readily characterized by independent attributes, such as identity, expression, 
and gender, which have segregated cortical representation (Fried et al., 1982, Perrett et 
al., 1984, Rolls, 1984, Baylis et al., 1985, Hasselmo et al., 1989, Young and Bruce, 1991), 
and single-unit recordings in the primate amygdala have documented responses selective 
for faces, their identity or emotional expression (Fried et al., 1997, Gothard et al., 2007). 
We previously showed that neurons in the human amygdala selectively respond to whole 
faces as compared to facial parts, suggesting a predominant role of the amygdala in 
representing global information about faces (Rutishauser et al., 2011). How do these 
whole-face-selective cells overlap with the emotion-selective cells we report in the 
present work? We found 3 out of 24 (12.5%) fear-selective cells and 5 out of 17 (29.4%) 
happy-selective cells are also whole-face-selective, a ratio of whole-face cells similar to 
that found in the entire population (36 out of 185, 19.5%). This suggests that amygdala 
neurons encode whole-face information and emotion independently.  
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We found that face information conveyed by the eyes, but not the mouth region, 
modulated emotion-selective neuronal responses. Compared to our previous neuronal 
classification images which were based on pixel-wise analyses of face regions that drive 
neuronal response (Rutishauser et al., 2013), we here used a fully independent 
permutation test to further illustrate that when eyes are more visible, the population of 
neurons can discriminate the emotions better (also see Table 4.2). Together with a 
substantial prior literature, this finding supports the idea that amygdala neurons 
synthesize their responses based substantially on information from the eye region of faces 
(Morris et al., 2002, Whalen et al., 2004, Adolphs et al., 2005, Gamer and Büchel, 2009, 
Scheller et al., 2012). 
!
4.6.4 Functional role of the amygdala 
The amygdala is in a pivotal position to modulate perceptual processing of faces. It sends 
output to many areas along the visual cortical pathways (Amaral and Price, 1984, Amaral 
et al., 2003, Catani et al., 2003, Pessoa and Adolphs, 2010). Monkey electrophysiological 
data show that stimulation of face-selective regions in temporal cortex (the anterior 
medial (AM) face patch) can induce activation in the lateral nucleus of the amygdala 
(Moeller et al., 2008). The amygdala could enhance sensory processing of emotional 
stimuli by prioritizing emotional stimuli over neutral stimuli in perception (Fox, 2000, 
Anderson and Phelps, 2001, Vuilleumier and Schwartz, 2001). Taken together, these 
findings suggest that feedback signals from the amygdala that encode emotional 
information can modulate face representations in temporal cortex, a prediction supported 
by findings in humans (Vuilleumier et al., 2004) and monkeys (Hadj-Bouziane et al., 
2012). 
Conversely, our findings also argue for responses emerging at the level of the amygdala 
that are unlikely to be present at earlier stages of processing. The long latency of the 
amygdala responses we observed already argues for considerable synthesis, consistent 
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with the integration of face input from temporal cortex with signals from other brain 
regions, as well as substantial processing internal to the amygdala. In this regard, it is 
worth noting a recent neuroimaging study, which found that whereas temporal cortical 
signals track the physical dimension of morphed facial expressions of emotion, signal in 
the amygdala showed a distinctly categorical response that sharply separated the stimuli 
according to their judged emotion (Harris et al., 2012). 
The amygdala’s proposed modulation of face representations by the subjectively judged 
emotion is in line with a large literature documenting the pervasive modulation by this 
structure of a host of cognitive processes. Amygdala activity is correlated with long-term, 
free recall of emotional information at the encoding phase (Cahill et al., 1996) and it 
influences memory storage by regulating parahippocampal and frontal regions (Kilpatrick 
and Cahill, 2003). The primate amygdala represents both positive and negative values of 
visual stimuli during learning (Paton et al., 2006), and is modulated by expectations to 
pleasant or aversive stimuli (Belova et al., 2007). Neuroimaging studies in patients with 
bilateral destruction of the amygdala showed that the human amygdala contributes to 
reward expectancy and choice signals in prefrontal cortex, which in turn may influence 
behavioral decision making (Hampton et al., 2007). Both the synthesis of long-latency 
amygdala responses sensitive to subjectively perceived emotion, and the subsequent 
effects these responses have on cognitive processing, will require future analyses of 
signals obtained concurrently from the amygdala and other brain regions. 
!
4.6.5 The amygdala, consciousness and perception 
Does the amygdala’s response to emotional faces require, or contribute to, conscious 
awareness? Some studies have suggested that emotional faces can modulate amygdala 
activity without explicit awareness of the stimuli (Morris et al., 1998, Whalen et al., 
1998), and there are reports of amygdala BOLD discrimination to the presentation of 
fearful faces even if such faces are presented to patients in their blind hemifield in cases 
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of hemianopia due to cortical lesions (Morris et al., 2001). Our finding that amygdala 
neurons track subjective perceptual judgment argues for a key role in conscious 
perception, although it does not rule out a role in non-conscious processing as well. 
Further support for a role in contributing to our conscious awareness of the stimuli comes 
from the long response latencies we observed, consistent with previous findings on long 
latencies in the medial temporal lobe (Mormann et al., 2008). Our findings suggest that 
the amygdala might interact with visual cortices in the temporal lobe to construct our 
conscious percept of the emotion shown in a face, an interaction that likely requires 
additional components such as frontal cortex, whose identity remains to be fully 
investigated (Pessoa and Adolphs, 2010). In particular, since we failed to find any coding 
of subjectively perceived emotion in the hippocampus, it will be an important future 
direction to record from additional brain regions to fully understand how the amygdala 
responses we report might be synthesized. 
Microstimulation of inferotemporal cortex in monkeys (Afraz et al., 2006) and electrical 
brain stimulation in fusiform areas in humans (Parvizi et al., 2012) have suggested a 
causal role of the temporal cortex in face categorization and perception. Future studies 
utilizing direct stimulation of the amygdala will be important to further determine the 
nature of its contribution to the subjective perception of facial emotion. Given the long 
average response latency observed in the amygdala neurons we analyzed, it may well be 
that the responses we report here reflect perceptual decisions that were already computed 
at an earlier time epoch. We would favor a distributed view, in which the subjective 
perceptual decision of the facial emotion emerges over some window of time, and 
drawing on a spatially distributed set of regions. The neuronal responses we report in the 
amygdala may be integral part of such computations, or they may instead reflect the 
readout of processes that have already occurred elsewhere in the brain. Only concurrent 
recordings from multiple brain regions will be able to fully resolve this issue in future 
studies. 
!
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4.7 Conclusion 
In conclusion, we suggest that the amygdala serves to integrate sensory information about 
faces, conveyed via temporal neocortex, with reward value (Paton et al., 2006), task, and 
social context (Ochsner et al., 2002, Schaefer et al., 2002, Kim et al., 2004), through its 
dense web of connectivity with structures such as basal ganglia and prefrontal cortex. 
Such processing would underlie the synthesis of subjective judgments about the emotion 
shown in faces, as our present findings demonstrate, and would also account for the 
remarkably long neuronal response latencies that we (Rutishauser et al., 2011) and others 
(Mormann et al., 2008) have described previously. Responses tracking subjective 
judgments of emotion, in turn, could form the basis for other social judgments that have 
been linked to the amygdala, such as trustworthiness (Adolphs et al., 1998, Winston et al., 
2002) and approachability (Kennedy et al., 2009), as well as to our conscious percept of 
the face (Pessoa et al., 2006) and the conscious experience of the emotion induced by 
seeing the face (Feinstein et al., 2011). It will be critical to compare our findings to 
responses obtained from face-selective neurons in temporal cortex (Tsao et al., 2006), 
which provide the primary visual input to the amygdala (Amaral et al., 1992), and which 
in turn receive feedback from the amygdala (Freese and Amaral, 2006). It may be that 
subjective percepts of facial emotion are represented through iterative cycles of 
processing between the amygdala, temporal cortex, and other brain structures involved in 
valuation and social inference. 
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Chapter V: Autism spectrum disorder, but not amygdala lesions, 
impairs social attention in visual search 
!
5.1 Overview 
In the Chapter III, we have shown that neural-typically developed people pay special 
attention to faces and conspecifics than inanimate stimuli. This process is independent of 
the amygdala, a neural structure that has long been associated with social cognition. But 
how about people with autism spectrum disorders (ASD), who have been diagnosed with 
impairments in social interactions? In this chapter, we tested two independent groups of 
people with ASD and three rare patients with selective bilateral amygdala lesions, in 
order to address an important open question: is there an amygdala-dependent attentional 
deficit in autism? There is substantial evidence both for a reduced orientation towards 
social stimuli in autism, and also for the amygdala’s involvement in attention to social 
stimuli. Here, for the first time, we investigated both of these issues, by testing groups of 
high-functioning adults with ASD, as well as three rare patients with amygdala lesions, 
on the same stimuli and task to enable direct comparisons. We found reliable deficits of 
attention, especially social attention, in people with ASD, but not amygdala lesion 
patients. Our findings further contributed to the understanding of social attention and its 
dependent neural structures. 
In the previous chapters, we have compared social cues vs. non-social cues and its 
dependence on the amygdala. We find that the amygdala does not play a role in attention 
but encodes facial emotions. As the last chapter, here we investigate again the role of the 
amygdala in social attention in a different task (visual search), and further include a 
clinical population—people with ASD who are known to have social deficits—to directly 
compare with patient with amygdala lesions. Once again, we find intact social attention 
in patients with amygdala lesions, corroborating the findings in Chapter III that the 
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amygdala is not involved in social attention, but instead involved in encoding perceptual 
judgments as shown in Chapter IV. 
!
5.2 Summary 
People with autism spectrum disorders (ASD) have pervasive impairments in social 
interactions, a diagnostic component that may have its roots in atypical social motivation 
and attention. One of the brain structures implicated in the social abnormalities seen in 
ASD is the amygdala. To further characterize the impairment of people with autism in 
social attention, and to explore the possible role of the amygdala, we employed a visual 
search task with both social (faces and people with different postures, emotions, ages, and 
genders) and non-social targets (e.g., electronics, food, utensils), which participants were 
asked to find in an array of 24 objects. We defined target-relevant effects as the difference 
in the percentage of fixations that fell on target-congruent vs. target-incongruent objects 
in the array. In Experiment 1, we tested 8 high-functioning adults with ASD, 3 adults with 
focal bilateral amygdala lesions, and 19 controls. Controls rapidly oriented to target-
congruent objects and showed a strong and sustained preference for fixating them. 
Strikingly, people with autism oriented significantly more slowly to target-congruent 
objects, an effect driven primarily by reduced orientation towards social objects and not 
evident from global attentional effects independent of the target-directed search. By 
contrast, patients with amygdala lesions performed indistinguishably from controls. In 
Experiment 2, we recruited a different sample of 13 people with autism and 8 autism-
matched controls, and tested them on the same search arrays but with all stimuli equated 
for low-level saliency to rule out possible effects of brightness, size or eccentricity. The 
results replicated those of Experiment 1. In Experiment 3, we recruited 13 people with 
autism, 8 autism-matched controls, 3 amygdala lesion patients and another group of 11 
controls and tested them on a simpler array with only 12 array objects. Here our group 
effect for ASD strongly diminished and all four subject groups showed similar target-
relevant effects. These findings argue for an attentional deficit in ASD that is 
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disproportionate for social stimuli, cannot be explained by low-level visual properties of 
the stimuli, and is more severe with high-load top-down task demands. Furthermore, this 
deficit appears to be independent of the amygdala. 
!
5.3 Introduction 
People with autism spectrum disorders (ASD) are characterized by pervasive 
impairments in social interaction and communication, together with restricted interests 
and repetitive behaviors (DSM-5, 2013). Laboratory-based measures reflecting the social 
impairments have documented abnormal eye-tracking to social videos (Klin et al., 2002) 
as well as static faces (Pelphrey et al., 2002). Work from our laboratory has argued for an 
increased tendency in adults with ASD to saccade away from the eye region of faces 
when information was present in those regions (Spezio et al., 2007b), and instead an 
increased preference to fixate the location of the mouth (Neumann et al., 2006), together 
with reliance of information from the mouth (Spezio et al., 2007a). Similarly, other eye-
tracking studies have found active avoidance of fixating the eyes in faces in people with 
ASD (Kliemann et al., 2010).  
These abnormalities in how eyes are fixated by people with ASD may be related to the 
more subtle and heterogeneous findings in the literature regarding face processing. In 
particular, several studies have found reliable, but weak, deficits in the ability to 
recognize emotions from facial expressions (Law Smith et al., 2010, Philip et al., 2010, 
Wallace et al., 2011, Kennedy and Adolphs, 2012) (for review, see (Harms et al., 2010)). 
The recognition of more complex mental states from faces may show a more reliable 
impairment in ASD, particularly if only the eye region of faces is shown (Baron-Cohen et 
al., 2001). Interestingly, abnormal fixations onto faces (Adolphs et al., 2005), abnormal 
recognition of emotion from facial expressions (Adolphs et al., 1999), and abnormal 
recognition of mental states from the eye region of faces (Adolphs et al., 2002), have also 
all been reported in rare patients with amygdala lesions, providing some support for a 
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long-standing hypothesis about the amygdala’s involvement in ASD (Baron-Cohen et al., 
2000). 
Although there is evidence for global dysfunction at the level of the whole brain in ASD 
(Piven et al., 1995, Geschwind and Levitt, 2007, Amaral et al., 2008, Anderson et al., 
2010), several studies emphasize abnormalities in the amygdala both morphometrically 
(Ecker et al., 2012) and in terms of functional connectivity (Gotts et al., 2012). Tying 
together the abnormal eye fixations onto faces in ASD mentioned above, and a 
correlation with amygdala processing, functional neuroimaging studies have found 
associations between abnormal fixation behavior and abnormal amygdala activation in 
people with ASD (Dalton et al., 2005, Kliemann et al., 2012). One recent study even 
found evidence for abnormal processing of information from the eye region of faces in 
single cells recorded from the amygdala in neurosurgical patients with ASD (Rutishauser 
et al., 2013). Despite considerable variability in reports of abnormal face processing in 
ASD, and despite the fact that there is brain dysfunction at a more global level in ASD, 
studies largely support (a) abnormal processing of faces in ASD, and (b) a link between 
this abnormality and amygdala function. 
Much of the work cited above has focused on abnormal social processing in ASD in 
relation to the features of faces. Yet it is clear that the impairment is broader than this: 
two-year-olds with autism orient to non-social contingencies rather than biological 
motion (Klin et al., 2009), and attention to pictures of people is reduced in relation to 
pictures that are non-social when these compete for visual attention in arrays (Sasson et 
al., 2008, Sasson et al., 2011). We capitalized on these prior findings, and used the 
identical stimuli developed in these prior studies, with slight modification (see Methods 
for further details). Notably, these images provided stimuli that fell into three categories: 
social, non-social, and special interest. The prior findings had shown, both in children 
and adolescents (Sasson et al., 2008), as well as in 2–5 year-olds (Sasson et al., 2011), 
that participants with ASD fixated social images less than controls when freely viewing 
the arrays. Our approach here extends this prior work in four important respects: 
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(1) We assessed high-functioning adults with ASD, and also manipulated the 
difficulty of our task (number of items in the array) to test whether abnormal 
social attention would be revealed even in high-functioning adults; (2) We provide a comparison to a small sample (three) of subjects with bilateral 
amygdala lesions, to enable comparisons between these two populations in light 
of the prior findings we reviewed above;  (3) We modified the experiment so that all subjects were performing a uniform search 
task for either social or non-social targets (rather than free viewing); (4) We added a control experiment that equates the items in the search array for low-
level visual properties (standard saliency, size, and distance to center). 
Visual search tasks are not new to autism research. While a sizable literature in ASD has 
investigated search for simple, non-social objects (shapes and letters, etc.) and only 
manipulated low-level attributes of the stimuli (Plaisted et al., 1998, O'Riordan and 
Plaisted, 2001, O'Riordan et al., 2001, O'Riordan, 2004, Manjaly et al., 2007, Kemner et 
al., 2008), far fewer studies have examined visual search with social stimuli. In the 
present study, we used a more general framework that does not restrict the stimuli to 
specific facial emotions, or investigate internal features of faces, but tests competition for 
attention between natural social (faces and people with various emotions and poses) and 
non-social (e.g., furniture, toys and food) objects when presented simultaneously in a 
search array. We found that people with ASD had significantly fewer and slower fixations 
towards socially relevant objects, while fixations towards non-social objects were less 
impaired. This impairment was not evident in patients with amygdala lesions. The 
findings were replicated in a separate experiment with search arrays in which social 
objects and non-social objects had equal saliency, distance to center and sizes. Taken 
together, our findings argue that people with autism have attentional deficits that are 
disproportionate for social stimuli and that this deficit cannot be explained by low-level 
visual properties of the stimuli nor amygdala dysfunction. 
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5.4 Methods 
5.4.1 Subjects 
In Experiment 1, eight high-functioning people with ASD were recruited (see Table 5.1 
and Table 5.2). All ASD participants met DSM-IV/ICD-10 diagnostic criteria for autism, 
and all met the cutoff scores for ASD on both the Autism Diagnostic Observation 
Schedule (ADOS) (Lord et al., 1989) and the Autism Diagnostic Interview-Revised 
(ADI-R) (LeCouteur et al., 1989) (Table 5.1). We assessed IQ for participants using the 
Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASITM). The ASD group had a full scale 
IQ of 106.9 ± 11.8 (mean ± SD). 
!
Table 5.1. List of ASD diagnosis and evaluation.  
Autism traits were evaluated by the Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule (ADOS) 
and the Autism Diagnostic Interview-Revised (ADI-R). Cutoff scores for ASD on ADOS 
are 2 for A (communication) and 4 for B (social interaction). C is total (sum of A and B), 
and D is for stereotyped behavior. Cutoff scores for ASD on ADI-R are 10 for A (social 
interaction), 8 for B (communication) and 3 for C (stereotyped behavior). Higher score 
means more autistic. 
Abbreviations: Exp: Experiments in which the subject participated. SCQ: Social 
Communication Questionnaire (cutoff score = 14). AQ: Autism Spectrum Quotient. SRS 
A-SR:  Social Responsiveness Scale-2 Adult Form (Self Report). n.a: not available. 
Exp ID
ADOS ADI-R
SCQ
SRS
AQA B C D A B C D A-SR
1 RA0780 5 11 16 1 29 18 10 4 31 63 17
1 RA0796 4 9 13 0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 7 71 n.a.
1 RA0364 6 11 17 0 21 20 7 3 19 99 30
1 RA0083 4 8 12 0 12 12 2 1 n.a. 78 27
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Table 5.2. List of demographics and psychological evaluation for people with ASD 
and matched controls.  
Intelligence was measured by the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI). 
Abbreviations: Exp: Experiments in which the subject participated. Age: age at testing. 
Hand: Dominant handedness (A: ambidextrous, L: left, R: right). WASI: IQ scores from 
the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence: full scale IQ (FSIQ), performance IQ 
(PIQ), verbal IQ (VIQ). n.a.: not available. 
1 RA0844 6 13 19 0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 20 71 26
1 RA0100 7 14 21 3 25 18 3 3 24 67 28
1 RA0101 7 13 20 3 24 18 4 3 23 32 21
1,3 RA0846 4 11 15 0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 60 33
2,3 RA0582 3 5 8 3 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 116 n.a.
2,3 RA0784 2 5 7 0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 26 94 26
2,3 RA0085 4 9 13 1 21 11 6 3 12 114 n.a.
2,3 RA0880 3 6 9 2 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 20
2,3 RA0843 3 6 9 1 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 66 29
2,3 RA0584 3 4 7 3 14 12 5 0 21 92 28
2,3 RA0080 6 14 20 2 16 14 5 1 15 110 39
2,3 RA0869 3 8 11 0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 71 20
2,3 RA0847 5 7 12 1 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 90 31
2 RA0871 2 6 8 2 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 79 19
2,3 RA0626 3 11 14 0 28 22 8 3 21 78 25
2,3 RA0090 3 8 11 4 8 10 3 0 n.a. n.a. 16
2,3 RA0849 5 8 13 1 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 30 97 28
Subject 
Category Exp ID Age Sex Hand Race Education
WASI
FSIQ PIQ VIQ
1 RA0780 25 M R
Asian/Pacific 
Islander High School 103 125 87
1 RA0796 26 M R Caucasian Bachelor's Degree 133 127 131
1 RA0364 31 M A Caucasian Bachelor's Degree 106 99 111
1 RA0083 26 M R Caucasian Some College 106 118 94
1 RA0844 24 M R Caucasian n.a. 107 103 109
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ASD
1 RA0100 23 F R Caucasian Some College 107 110 102
1 RA0101 23 F R Caucasian Some College 102 103 101
1,3 RA0846 33 M R Caucasian Bachelor's Degree 91 111 50
2,3 RA0582 32 M R
Asian/Pacific 
Islander Master's Degree 124 115 127
2,3 RA0784 27 M R Caucasian Master's Degree 128 121 129
2,3 RA0085 38 F A Caucasian Bachelor's Degree 133 122 135
2,3 RA0880 28 M R Caucasian Bachelor's Degree 108 99 114
2,3 RA0843 20 F A Multiracial Some College 124 114 128
2,3 RA0584 26 F R Caucasian Bachelor's Degree 125 119 123
2,3 RA0080 30 M L Caucasian Some College 115 109 117
2,3 RA0869 32 F R Hispanic/Latino Bachelor's Degree 88 85 95
2,3 RA0847 21 M R
Asian/Pacific 
Islander Some College 90 97 86
2 RA0871 44 M R Caucasian Associate's Degree 89 80 101
2,3 RA0626 21 M A
Asian/Pacific 
Islander Middle School 125 119 123
2,3 RA0090 46 M R Caucasian Some College 56 60 57
2,3 RA0849 21 M R Hispanic/Latino n.a. 108 103 110
ASD 
Controls
2,3 RA0782 32 M L Hispanic/Latino Bachelor's Degree 104 114 95
2,3 RA0817 24 M R Caucasian Bachelor's Degree 109 106 109
2,3 RA0829 30 F R Caucasian Bachelor's Degree 116 111 116
2,3 RA0749 59 M R Caucasian Associate's Degree 120 128 109
2,3 RA0548 46 M R Caucasian Some College 97 109 85
2,3 RA0830 25 M R Caucasian Bachelor's Degree 125 121 122
2,3 RA0842 32 M R Caucasian Bachelor's Degree 117 110 119
2,3 RA0835 39 F R Hispanic/Latino Bachelor's Degree 102 99 104
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AP, AM and BG are three patients with selective bilateral amygdala lesions as a result of 
Urbach-Wiethe disease (Hofer, 1973). AM and BG are monozygotic twins. The details of 
these patients have been described previously (Buchanan et al., 2009, Becker et al., 
2012). The anatomical scans of the lesions are shown in Figure 5.1. The amygdala group 
had a full scale IQ of 98.3 ± 2.5 (mean ± SD). 
!
!  
Figure 5.1. MRI anatomical scans of the amygdala lesions.  
Displayed are high-resolution (0.5–1 mm isotropic) horizontal T1-weighted magnetic 
resonance imaging sections of the anterior medial temporal lobes with red arrows 
indexing the focal bilateral amygdala calcification damage. R: right. 
!
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Eight healthy subjects were recruited as general controls for both people with ASD and 
amygdala lesion patients, matched on IQ (full scale: 104.7 ± 6.1 (mean ± SD); t-test: p = 
0.68 for people with ASD and p = 0.13 for amygdala patients) and education (Table 5.3).  
!
Table 5.3. List of demographics and psychological evaluation for amygdala lesion 
patients (AP, AM and BG) and general controls.  
Intelligence was measured by the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI). 
AM and BG’s IQ was measured by the HAWIE-R ('Hamburg-Wechsler Intelligenztest für 
Erwachsene in revidierter Fassung'), a German-language adaptation of the WAIS-R 
(Wechsler Intelligence Test for Adults-Revised), which provides a measure of verbal, 
performance, and full-scale IQ. 
Abbreviations: Age: age at testing. Hand: Dominant handedness (A: ambidextrous, L: 
left, R: right). Benton: Benton Facial Recognition Test, long form score. Benton scores 41–
54 are in the normal range. WASI: IQ scores from the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of 
Intelligence: full scale IQ (FSIQ), performance IQ (PIQ), verbal IQ (VIQ). n.a.: not 
available. 
!
ID Age Sex Hand Race Education Benton
WASI
FSIQ PIQ VIQ
AP 27 F R Asian/Pacific Islander Bachelor's Degree 50 98 106 92
AM 38 F A Caucasian
13 years of 
education in 
Germany
36 101 103 99
BG 38 F R Caucasian
13 years of 
education in 
Germany
41 96 97 94
RA0629 32 F A Caucasian Some College n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
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Eleven students from the National University of Singapore (NUS) were tested for all 
three versions of the task (Experiment 1–3) to provide an independent reference group. 
Subjects gave written informed consent and the experiments were approved by the 
Caltech and NUS Institutional Review Boards. All subjects had normal or corrected-to-
normal visual acuity. 
In Experiment 2 we tested thirteen high-functioning people with ASD (different from 
those who participated in Experiment 1; see Table 5.1 and Table 5.2), eight healthy ASD 
controls (Table 5.2) and eleven NUS control subjects (the same as Experiment 1; 
experiment order counterbalanced). The ASD group had a full scale IQ of 108.7 ± 22.3 
(mean ± SD) and ASD controls had a comparable full scale IQ of 111.3 ± 9.8 (t-test, p = 
0.76). The ASD group had a mean age of 29.7 ± 8.6 years and ASD controls had a mean 
RA0633 27 F R Asian/Pacific Islander Bachelor's Degree n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
RA0762 23 F A Hispanic/Latino Some College 50 100 105 95
RA0764 31 F R Caucasian Master's Degree n.a. 102 103 101
RA0829 29 F R Caucasian Bachelor's Degree n.a. 116 111 116
RA0835 38 F R Hispanic/Latino Bachelor's Degree 49 102 99 104
RA0848 40 F R Caucasian High School n.a. 101 104 98
RA0851 35 F R Caucasian Bachelor's Degree n.a. 107 103 108
ID Age Sex Hand Race Education Benton
WASI
FSIQ PIQ VIQ
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age of 35.9 ± 11.8 years (t-test, p = 0.18). ASD controls also matched on gender, race and 
education. 
In Experiment 3, we tested the same three amygdala lesion patients from Experiment 1 
(AP, AM and BG), thirteen high-functioning people with ASD (see Table 5.1 and Table 
5.2), eight healthy ASD-matched controls (the same as Experiment 2; Table 5.2), and 
eleven NUS control subjects (the same as Experiment 1 and 2; experiment order 
counterbalanced). The ASD group had a full scale IQ of 108.8 ± 22.1 (mean ± SD) and 
ASD controls had a comparable full scale IQ of 111.3 ± 9.8 (t-test, p = 0.78). The ASD 
group had a mean age of 28.8 ± 7.6 years and ASD controls had a mean age of 35.9 ± 
11.8 years (t-test, p = 0.11). ASD controls also matched on gender, race and education. 
!
5.4.2 Stimuli and apparatus 
We used 20 distinct visual search arrays. In each array there were 24 objects whose 
spatial locations were randomized between the 20 arrays. 12 objects were social (faces 
and people	  with different postures, emotions, ages, and genders, etc.) and 12 objects were 
non-social (furniture, toys, food, etc.). These social and non-social objects composing the 
array stimuli have been characterized and described previously (Sasson et al., 2012) and 
were obtained from two prior studies that investigated visual attention in infants and 
children with ASD (Sasson et al., 2008, Sasson et al., 2011). From each array stimulus, 
we randomly assigned 4 social objects and 4 non-social objects as targets (on 8 distinct 
trials). For each array, we also had 2 catch trials, i.e., the target was not among the objects 
in the search array (one catch trial with a social target, and one with a non-social target). 
Therefore, in total we had 100 trials with social targets and 100 trials with non-social 
targets, and 20% of trials were catch trials. 
The experimental setup of Experiment 2 was identical to Experiment 1 except that low-
level properties of social and non-social objects were equalized within each search array. 
The social and non-social objects did not differ in standard low-level saliency as 
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quantified by the Itti-Koch model (Itti et al., 1998, Itti and Koch, 2001), distance to the 
center or size (all ps > 0.79; Figure 5.2A–C). 
!
!  
Figure 5.2. Low-level properties of the stimuli.  
(A–C) Standard arrays used in Experiment 2. (D–F) Simpler arrays used in Experiment 
3. (A) Standard low-level saliency measured with Itti-Koch model (Itti et al., 1998, Itti 
and Koch, 2001) did not differ between social and non-social objects in the search array 
(two-tailed t-test, p = 0.98 for standard arrays and p = 0.46 for simpler arrays). The sum 
of saliency of all objects was normalized to 1 for each search array. (B) Distance to center 
did not differ between social and non-social objects (measured in pixel, p = 0.85 for 
standard arrays and p = 0.96 for simpler arrays). (C) Object size did not differ between 
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social and non-social objects (measured in pixel2, p = 0.79 for standard arrays and p = 
0.34 for simpler arrays). 
!
The experimental setup of Experiment 3 was identical to Experiment 2 except that there 
were only 12 objects in total in each search array (6 social and 6 non-social). Low-level 
properties of social and non-social objects were also equalized within each search array, 
as we had done for Experiment 2 (Figure 5.2D–F). The social and non-social objects did 
not differ in standard low-level saliency, distance to the center, or size (all ps > 0.34). 
Subjects sat approximately 65 cm from an LCD display with a 23-inch screen (screen 
resolution: 1920x1080). The refresh rate of the display was 60 Hz and the stimuli 
occupied the center of the display (14.9° × 11.2° visual angle). Stimuli were presented 
using MATLAB with the Psychtoolbox 3 (Brainard, 1997) (http://psychtoolbox.org). 
!
5.4.3 Task 
We used a standard visual search task (Figure 5.3). A target was presented for 1 second 
followed by the search array. Subjects were instructed to find the object in the array that 
matched the target and explicitly told that the array might or might not contain the target. 
The search array stayed up for at most 14 seconds, or until the subject responded, either 
by pushing the space bar to indicate that the target was found in the array, or by pushing 
the button ‘N’ to indicate the target was absent in the array. If they pushed the space bar 
in target-present trials, subjects were asked to click on the target object in the array with a 
mouse. If subjects clicked on the correct target, a message ‘Correct’ was displayed to the 
subjects for 1 second. Otherwise, a message ‘Incorrect’ was displayed for 1 second. 
Subjects were instructed to respond as quickly and accurately as possible. If subjects did 
not respond within 14 seconds after array onset, a message ‘Time Out’ was displayed. An 
inter-trial-interval (ITI) was jittered between 1 to 2 seconds. The array and target orders 
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were completely randomized for each subject. Subjects practiced 5 trials before the 
experiment to familiarize themselves with the task. 
!
!  
Figure 5.3. Task and sample stimuli.  
(A) Task structure. A target is presented for 1 second followed by the search array. 
Subjects have a maximum of 14 seconds to respond by pressing the space bar to indicate 
that the target is present, or the letter ‘N’ to indicate that the target is absent. Following 
target detection, subjects provide a mouse click on targets. A feedback message of 
‘Correct’, ‘Incorrect’ or ‘Time Out’ is displayed for 1 second before an ITI of 1 to 2 
seconds. (B) Sample visual search arrays with fixations. Left: standard array used in 
Experiment 2. Right: simple array used in Experiment 3. Each circle represents a fixation. 
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Green circle: start fixation. magenta circle: end fixation. Yellow line: eye movement 
(saccade). Red box: target. 
!
5.4.4 Eye tracking 
Eye tracking was carried out using a non-invasive infra-red remote Tobii X300 system 
which recorded binocular gaze at 300 Hz. The Tobii visualization software (Tobii 
StudioTM 2.2) was used to record eye movements and perform gaze analysis. Fixations 
were detected by Tobii Fixation Filter implemented in Tobii Studio. The Tobii Fixation 
Filter is a classification algorithm proposed by (Olsson, 2007) and detects quick changes 
in the gaze point using a sliding window averaging method. Velocity threshold was set to 
35 [pixels/samples] and distance threshold was set to 35 [pixels] in our study. 
NUS control subjects were recorded with a non-invasive infra-red Eyelink 1000 system 
(SR Research, Canada). One of the eyes was tracked at 2000 Hz. The eye tracker was 
calibrated with the built-in 9-point grid method.  
!
5.4.5 Data analysis 
Prior to data collection, we defined a rectangular region that encompassed each target as 
the target region to define acceptable mouse click locations for each search. In 
Experiment 1, out of 4800 target-present trials, in 4547 trials (94.73%) subjects found the 
target and clicked within the pre-defined areas (correct trials). Subjects missed targets 
altogether (judged target-present trials as target-absent) in 183 trials (3.81%) and 
correctly reported target presence but clicked outside the target rectangle in 69 trials 
(1.44%) (both are incorrect trials). Subjects did not respond within 14 seconds after array 
onset (time-out trials) in only 1 trial (0.021%). Out of 1200 target-absent trials, subjects 
had 1129 (94.08%) correct trials, 70 (5.83%) false-alarm trials (reported target presence 
in target-absent trials), and 1 (0.08%) time-out trial. We found similar percentages of 
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correct, incorrect, time-out and false-alarm trials for Experiment 2 and Experiment 3. We 
only analyzed correct target-present trials (correct target-present response followed by 
correct identification of the target). Further, we only included trials with reaction times 
(RTs, with respect to search array onset) within ± 2.5 standard deviations for all analyses 
(in Experiment 1, 114 trials were excluded, 2.51%). There was no difference between 
participants with ASD, amygdala patients and control subjects in any of the above 
proportions (all ps > 0.10).  
!
5.5 Results 
5.5.1 Behavioral Performance: Accuracy and Reaction Time 
We first analyzed the behavioral performance of all subject groups. Across all three 
experiments, all subject groups (ASD, ASD controls, amygdala lesions, general controls 
and NUS students) had an average performance above 90% (Figure 5.4), indicating that 
they were able to perform the task without difficulty. In Experiment 1 (Figure 5.4A), 
only a marginal difference was found between social targets and non-social targets (two-
way mixed ANOVA (target type X subject group); main effect of target type: F(1,26) = 
4.21, p = 0.051, effect size η2 = 0.030), and no difference was found between subject 
groups (main effect of subject group: F(3,26) = 1.58, p = 0.22, η2 = 0.12) or interaction 
(F(3,26) = 0.94, p = 0.44, η2 = 0.020). Similarly, in Experiment 2 (Figure 5.4C), no 
difference was found between social targets and non-social targets (main effect of target 
type: F(1,29) = 0.17, p = 0.69, η2 = 0.0022), and no difference was found between subject 
groups (main effect of subject group: F(2,29) = 0.86, p = 0.43, η2 = 0.034) or any 
interaction (F(2,29) = 0.32, p = 0.73, η2 = 0.0086). Finally, also in Experiment 3 (Figure 
5.4E), no difference was found between social targets and non-social targets (main effect 
of target type: F(1,31) = 3.59, p = 0.068, η2 = 0.036), nor between subject groups (main 
effect of subject group: F(3,31) = 0.15, p = 0.93, η2 = 0.0089) or interaction (F(3,31) = 
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0.58, p = 0.63, η2 = 0.018), showing that overall people with ASD and amygdala lesion 
patients still had similar performance in terms of accuracy compared to controls. 
!
!  
Figure 5.4. Behavioral performance.  
(A–B) Experiment 1. (C–D) Experiment 2. (E–F) Experiment 3. (A,C,E) Percentage of 
correct response. (B,D,F) Reaction time (RT).	  Error bars denote one SEM of the mean. 
!
In Experiment 1, non-social targets were detected more quickly by all subject groups 
(Figure 5.4B; two-way mixed ANOVA (target type X subject group); main effect of 
target type: F(1,26) = 199.4, p = 1.05×10-13, η2 = 0.13), an effect that showed only a weak 
interaction with subject group (F(3,26) = 2.83, p = 0.058, η2 = 0.0057). General control 
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subjects and NUS control subjects showed overall faster detection of targets (main effect 
of subject group: F(3,26) = 5.40, p = 0.0050, η2 = 0.32), but there was no difference 
between amygdala patients vs. general controls, amygdala patients vs. people with ASD, 
people with ASD vs. general controls, or general controls vs. NUS controls (two-tailed t-
test, all ps > 0.05). In Experiment 2, non-social targets still featured faster detection due 
to their being more distinct from one another (Figure 5.4D; main effect of target type: 
F(1,29) = 75.4, p = 1.47×10-9, η2 = 0.068), but the faster detection of non-social targets 
did not depend on subject groups (the interaction of target type and subject group: 
F(2,29) = 0.31, p = 0.74, η2 = 5.60×10-4; main effect of subject group: F(2,29) = 3.01, p = 
0.065, η2 = 0.16). Notably, across independent samples of people with ASD, we found no 
difference between Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 in detection accuracy (unpaired t-test: 
t(19) = -0.69, p = 0.50, effect size in Hedges's g (standardized mean difference): g = 
-0.30) or RT (t(19) = -0.39, p = 0.70, g = -0.17). This argues against any influence of low-
level visual properties on our task.  
With simpler arrays in Experiment 3, non-social targets that were more distinct from one 
another retained their advantage to be detected faster (Figure 5.4F; two-way mixed 
ANOVA (target type X subject group); main effect of target type: F(1,31) = 13.2, p = 
9.82×10-4, η2 = 0.0078). ASD controls and NUS controls showed marginally faster 
detection of targets (main effect of subject group: F(3,31) = 2.38, p = 0.088, η2 = 0.18), 
but there was no interaction (F(3,31) = 0.38, p = 0.77, η2 = 6.80×10-4) or significant 
difference between amygdala patients vs. people with ASD, people with ASD vs. ASD 
controls, or ASD controls vs. NUS controls (two-tailed t-tests separately for social vs. 
non-social targets, all ps > 0.05). Lower task difficulty was confirmed with a shorter RT 
compared to Experiment 1 (paired t-test for NUS controls: t(10) = 10.2, p = 1.38×10-6, g 
= 2.11; paired t-test between amygdala patients: t(2) = 17.7, p = 0.0032, g = 2.27; 
unpaired t-test between people with ASD: t(19) = 4.56, p = 2.13×10-4, g = 1.97) and 
Experiment 2 (paired t-test for ASD controls: t(7) = 6.13, p = 4.76×10-4, g = 1.95; paired 
t-test for NUS controls: t(10) = 10.8, p = 7.83×10-7, g = 2.53). 
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5.5.2 Eye tracking: general social preference does not differ between subject groups 
We first tested whether people with ASD had reduced global preference to look at social 
objects in the search array. For each fixation, we calculated a social bias in attention as 
the difference between the percentage of all fixations (within a specified number of serial 
order of fixations) on social objects as compared to non-social objects (Figure 5.5). In 
Experiment 1 (Figure 5.5A), we observed an overall reduced proportion of fixations onto 
social objects for people with ASD (one-way ANOVA across four subject groups on the 
average social bias for fixations number 2 to 10: ASD: 5.97 ± 2.31 (mean ± SEM), 
amygdala: 15.10 ± 4.91, general control: 17.24 ± 1.39, NUS control: 14.06 ± 1.96;	  
F(3,26) = 5.02, p = 0.007, η2 = 0.37; two-tailed t-test compared to general controls: t(14) 
= -4.18, p = 9.17×10-4, g = -1.98). This reduced social preference persisted over time as 
both early fixations (average of fixations 2 to 5) and late fixations (average of fixations 6 
to 10) showed a difference compared to general controls (Early: ASD: 2.66 ± 1.90, 
general control: 10.66 ± 1.55; t(14) = -3.26, p = 0.0057, g = -1.54; Late: ASD: 8.63 ± 
3.11, general control: 23.50 ± 3.19; t(14) = -3.34, p = 0.0049, g = -1.58), although 
fixation-by-fixation comparisons across subject groups (one-way ANOVA) and with 
general controls did not reveal reliable differences when corrected for multiple 
comparisons with false discovery rate (FDR) of 0.05 (Benjamini and Hochberg, 1995) 
(all statistical comparisons are listed in Table 5.4). Comparing people with ASD and 
amygdala lesion patients, we observed differences only for early fixations (ASD: 2.66 ± 
1.90, amygdala: 10.55 ± 2.05; t = 2.32, p = 0.045, g = 1.44; also difference at the 2nd and 
4th fixations). However, we observed no difference in social preference between 
amygdala lesion patients and general controls (two-tailed t-test; p > 0.05 for all fixations 
and averages; see statistics in Table 5.4). Furthermore, we observed no difference 
between general controls and NUS controls (p > 0.05 for all fixations and averages). Our 
results suggest a possibly mildly reduced bias for social preference in ASD. 
!
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Figure 5.5. General social preference.  
(A) Experiment 1. (B) Experiment 2. (C) Experiment 3. We calculated social preference 
as the average number of fixations (irrespective of task condition) across all trials that fell 
onto social stimuli, minus the average number of fixations that fell onto non-social 
stimuli, expressed as a percentage. 
!
Table 5.4. Statistical results for general social preference.  
All is the average of fixation 2 to 10. Early is the average of fixation 2 to 5, and Late is 
the average of fixation 6 to 10. 
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Experiment 1
One-Way ANOVA
Fixation Order 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 All Early Late
F-statistic F(3,26) 1.00 5.61 0.82 3.84 2.04 1.45 2.35 0.61 0.54 1.30 5.02 5.85 2.80
p-value 0.41 0.0042 0.50 0.021 0.13 0.25 0.10 0.61 0.66 0.30 0.0070 0.0034 0.060
Effect Size 0.10 0.39 0.086 0.31 0.19 0.14 0.21 0.066 0.060 0.13 0.37 0.40 0.24
Amygdala vs. ASD
Fixation Order 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 All Early Late
t-statistic t(9) -0.71 2.72 -0.13 2.34 1.43 0.31 1.27 0.67 1.67 1.66 1.92 2.32 1.53
p-value 0.50 0.024 0.90 0.044 0.19 0.76 0.23 0.52 0.13 0.13 0.086 0.045 0.16
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Effect Size Hedges's g -0.44 1.68 -0.08 1.45 0.88 0.19 0.79 0.42 1.03 1.03 1.19 1.44 0.95
Amygdala vs. General control
Fixation Order 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 All Early Late
t-statistic t(9) 0.38 0.23 -1.14 0.46 0.55 -0.96 -0.94 -0.17 0.90 -0.57 -0.60 -0.040 -0.71
p-value 0.72 0.82 0.29 0.66 0.60 0.36 0.37 0.87 0.39 0.59 0.57 0.97 0.50
Effect Size Hedges's g 0.23 0.14 -0.70 0.28 0.34 -0.59 -0.58 -0.11 0.56 -0.35 -0.37 -0.025 -0.44
ASD vs. General control
Fixation Order 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 All Early Late
t-statistic t(14) 1.66 -3.24 -1.23 -2.63 -1.77 -1.79 -2.68 -1.41 -0.83 -2.59 -4.18 -3.26 -3.34
p-value 0.12 0.0059 0.24 0.020 0.10 0.094 0.018 0.18 0.42 0.022 9.17 ×10 0.0057 0.0049
Effect Size Hedges's g 0.78 -1.53 -0.58 -1.24 -0.84 -0.85 -1.26 -0.66 -0.41 -1.26 -1.98 -1.54 -1.58
General control vs. NUS Control
Fixation Order 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 All Early Late
t-statistic t(17) -1.35 1.78 1.07 -0.52 -1.06 0.10 0.91 1.14 0.44 0.23 1.23 0.46 1.21
p-value 0.19 0.094 0.30 0.61 0.30 0.92 0.37 0.27 0.67 0.82 0.24 0.65 0.24
Effect Size Hedges's g -0.60 0.79 0.48 -0.23 -0.47 0.046 0.41 0.50 0.20 0.10 0.54 0.21 0.54
Experiment 2
One-Way ANOVA
Fixation Order 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 All Early Late
F-statistic F(2,29) 0.54 0.98 0.15 1.88 0.80 2.25 0.70 1.92 4.06 0.35 2.28 1.14 2.14
p-value 0.59 0.39 0.86 0.17 0.46 0.12 0.50 0.16 0.03 0.71 0.12 0.33 0.14
Effect Size 0.036 0.064 0.010 0.11 0.052 0.13 0.05 0.12 0.22 0.02 0.14 0.073 0.13
ASD vs. ASD Control
Fixation Order 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 All Early Late
t-statistic t(19) 0.12 -0.97 0.39 0.84 -0.52 -0.13 -1.09 -0.80 1.66 1.20 0.35 -0.09 0.51
p-value 0.90 0.34 0.70 0.41 0.61 0.90 0.29 0.43 0.11 0.25 0.73 0.93 0.62
!174
Effect Size Hedges's g 0.053 -0.42 0.17 0.36 -0.22 -0.055 -0.47 -0.35 0.72 0.52 0.15 -0.037 0.22
ASD Control vs. NUS Control
Fixation Order 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 All Early Late
t-statistic t(17) -0.74 0.41 0.48 2.21 0.67 2.00 -0.62 1.03 2.90 0.65 2.30 1.24 2.20
p-value 0.47 0.69 0.64 0.041 0.51 0.062 0.54 0.32 0.010 0.52 0.034 0.23 0.042
Effect Size Hedges's g -0.33 0.18 0.21 0.98 0.30 0.89 -0.28 0.46 1.29 0.29 1.02 0.55 0.98
Experiment 3
One-Way ANOVA
Fixation Order 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 All Early Late
F-statistic F(3,31) 0.36 0.050 0.79 2.10 0.69 1.13 1.92 0.51 0.63 1.21 1.20 1.13 0.62
p-value 0.79 0.98 0.51 0.12 0.56 0.35 0.15 0.68 0.60 0.34 0.32 0.35 0.61
Effect Size 0.032 0.0048 0.071 0.17 0.063 0.10 0.18 0.056 0.083 0.22 0.10 0.10 0.057
ASD vs. ASD Control
Fixation Order 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 All Early Late
t-statistic t(19) 0.52 -0.24 0.064 -1.44 -0.78 -0.47 -1.09 -0.10 -0.73 1.15 -0.73 -1.09 -0.63
p-value 0.61 0.81 0.95 0.17 0.45 0.64 0.29 0.92 0.48 0.27 0.48 0.29 0.54
Effect Size Hedges's g 0.22 -0.10 0.028 -0.62 -0.34 -0.20 -0.48 -0.043 -0.37 0.83 -0.31 -0.47 -0.27
Amygdala vs. ASD
Fixation Order 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 All Early Late
t-statistic t(14) -0.14 -0.008 -1.50 -0.15 -1.11 -0.18 0.10 -0.63 -0.13 0.032 -0.69 -1.24 -0.21
p-value 0.89 0.99 0.16 0.88 0.29 0.86 0.92 0.54 0.90 0.97 0.50 0.23 0.83
Effect Size Hedges's g -0.09 -0.005 -0.91 -0.090 -0.67 -0.11 0.069 -0.45 -0.10 0.023 -0.42 -0.75 -0.13
Amygdala vs. ASD Control
Fixation Order 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 All Early Late
t-statistic t(9) 0.27 -0.18 -1.44 -1.34 -1.06 -0.33 -0.49 -0.38 -0.34 0.58 -0.67 -1.60 -0.41
p-value 0.79 0.86 0.19 0.21 0.32 0.75 0.64 0.71 0.75 0.62 0.52 0.14 0.69
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However, this was not borne out in Experiment 2 (Figure 5.5B). When low-level saliency 
between social and non-social objects was equalized, people with ASD showed entirely 
normal general social preference as compared to ASD controls (one-way ANOVA across 
three subject groups, p > 0.05 for all fixations and averages; two-tailed t-tests compared 
to ASD controls, p > 0.05 for all fixations and averages; see Table 5.4). 
Similarly, in Experiment 3 (Figure 5.5C) in which low-level saliency between social and 
non-social objects was also equalized, people with ASD showed normal general social 
preference to our stimuli as compared to ASD controls (one-way ANOVA across four 
subject groups, p > 0.05 for all fixations and averages; two-tailed t-tests compared to 
ASD controls, p > 0.05 for all fixations and averages; see Table 5.4). Amygdala lesion 
patients also had normal social preference compared to ASD controls (p > 0.05 for all 
fixations and averages) and similar social preference compared to people with ASD (p > 
0.05 for all fixations and averages), suggesting that neither people with ASD nor 
amygdala lesion patients have global deficits in social preference. 
!
5.5.3 Reduced orientation towards target-relevant objects in visual search 
The above analysis showed that people with ASD do not have globally reduced social 
preferences, once low-level saliency was equalized. But how might social attention 
interact with task demands during visual search? We next analyzed target-relevant effects 
to answer this question. 
All subjects oriented to social objects rapidly and kept on searching within social objects 
if the target was social (Figure 5.6 upper row). Pronounced differences in the proportion 
Effect Size Hedges's g 0.17 -0.11 -0.89 -0.83 -0.66 -0.20 -0.35 -0.27 -0.24 0.33 -0.41 -0.99 -0.26
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of fixations onto social and non-social objects were evident as early as the 2nd fixation 
and lasted until the 10th fixation. Symmetrically, when searching for a non-social target 
(Figure 5.6 lower row), subjects oriented to non-social objects and kept on searching 
within non-social objects. 
!
!  
Figure 5.6. Social and non-social target effects in Experiment 1.  
All subjects looked at target-congruent objects in a fast and sustained manner. (A–B) 
Amygdala patients. (C–D) People with ASD. (E–F) General controls. (G–H) NUS 
controls. Red: social objects. Blue: non-social objects. Upper row (A,C,E,G): when 
searching for social targets. Lower row (B,D,F,H): when searching for non-social targets. 
Asterisk indicates significant difference between target congruent objects and target 
incongruent objects (two-tailed paired t-test: p < 0.05, FDR corrected). Shaded area 
denotes ± SEM over the group of subjects. 
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We define a target-relevant effect as the difference in the percentage of fixations on 
target-congruent objects and the percentage of fixations on target-incongruent objects. All 
subjects showed rapid and sustained target-relevant effects, for both social targets and 
non-social targets (Figure 5.7). In Experiment 1, we found disproportionate target-
relevant effects between social and non-social stimuli across fixations (two-way mixed 
ANOVA (target type X subject group); main effect of target type; average of fixations 2 
to 10: social: 37.84 ± 2.31, non-social: 24.69 ± 1.72; F(1,26) = 55.4, p = 6.63×10-8, η2 = 
0.26; see Table 5.5 for statistics), showing stronger attention towards social objects than 
non-social objects when searching for their respective targets. Both early (average of 
fixations 2 to 5: social: 33.54 ± 2.39, non-social: 21.97 ± 1.88; F(1,26) = 43.9, p = 
4.97×10-7, η2 = 0.20) and late fixations (average of fixations 6 to 10: social: 41.53 ± 2.58, 
non-social: 27.27 ± 2.52; F(1,26) = 26.3, p = 2.38×10-5, η2 = 0.21) showed stronger social 
target-relevant effects, which persisted through fixation 7. However, here we also found 
pronounced target-relevant effects that differed between subject groups (main effect of 
subject group; average of fixations 2 to 10 collapsing social and non-social: ASD: 22.20 
± 3.30, amygdala: 28.81 ± 1.02, general control: 35.64 ± 3.05, NUS control: 35.34 ± 
2.53; F(3,26) = 4.76, p = 8.94×10-3, η2 = 0.21), especially during early fixations (average 
of fixations 2 to 5: ASD: 16.78 ± 3.54, amygdala: 26.38 ± 1.35, general control: 31.47 ± 
2.62, NUS control: 33.41 ± 2.58; F(3,26) = 6.79, p = 1.57×10-3, η2 = 0.28), with people 
with ASD showing reduced target-relevant effects. The reduced target-relevant effect in 
people with ASD persisted from the 2nd fixation to the 5th fixation, showing that they did 
not look at relevant targets as rapidly as controls during the initial fixations of their 
search. However, there was no difference between people with ASD and controls for later 
fixations (average of fixations 6 to 10: ASD: 26.54 ± 3.56, amygdala: 30.76 ± 2.14, 
general control: 40.11 ± 5.39, NUS control: 36.96 ± 2.81; F(3,26) = 2.38, p = 0.093, η2 = 
0.12; also see Table 5.5 for fixation-by-fixation analysis), showing that people with ASD 
could catch up at later points in time. Although the impaired target-congruency effect in 
ASD was qualitatively more pronounced for social than for non-social search (cf. Figure 
!178
5.7; social–non-social for average of fixations 2 to 10: ASD: 6.88 ± 4.08, amygdala: 
18.57 ± 7.42, general control: 17.85 ± 2.85, NUS control: 12.80 ± 2.55), there was no 
significant interaction between target type and subject group (F(3,26) = 2.07, p = 0.13, η2 
= 0.030; also see Table 5.5 for fixation-by-fixation analysis). 
!
!  
Figure 5.7. Target-relevant effects.  
(A–B) Experiment 1. (C–D) Experiment 2. (E–F) Experiment 3. People with ASD had 
reduced attention towards social objects when searching for social targets (A,C), an 
impairment that was less severe when searching for non-social targets (B,D) and with 
simpler search arrays (E,F). 
!
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Table 5.5. Statistical results for target-relevant effects.  
All is the average of fixation 2 to 10. Early is the average of fixation 2 to 5, and Late is 
the average of fixation 6 to 10. NaN: values not available (NUS controls did not have 10 
fixations for non-social targets in Experiment 3). 
!
Experiment 1
Two-way ANOVA (target type X subject group): All subject groups
Fixation Order 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 All Early Late
Main effect of target type
F-statistic 
F(1,26)
29.6 34.1 7.38 20 13 16.4 11.4 1.92 3.27 6.97 55.4 43.9 26.3
p-value
1.0E-05 3.70E-06 0.0116 0.000135 0.00128 0.00041 0.00234 0.178 0.0824 0.015 6.63E-08 4.97E-07 2.38E-05
Effect Size 
0.388 0.262 0.0613 0.150 0.124 0.183 0.112 0.0291 0.0517 0.174 0.264 0.199 0.213
Main effect of subject group
F-statistic 
F(3,26)
0.731 3.73 7.57 4.95 3.86 1.91 0.94 2.20 0.525 0.595 4.76 6.79 2.38
p-value
0.543 0.0236 0.000851 0.00752 0.0207 0.152 0.435 0.112 0.669 0.625 0.00894 0.00157 0.0927
Effect Size 
0.018 0.124 0.325 0.227 0.192 0.0924 0.0599 0.112 0.0318 0.0177 0.206 0.285 0.121
Interaction
F-statistic 
F(3,26)
1.00 5.47 0.995 1.38 0.240 0.519 0.693 0.445 0.356 0.553 2.07 2.50 0.704
p-value
0.407 0.00475 0.411 0.270 0.867 0.673 0.565 0.723 0.785 0.651 0.129 0.0817 0.558
Effect Size 
0.0394 0.126 0.0248 0.0311 0.00686 0.0173 0.0204 0.0203 0.0169 0.0414 0.0296 0.034 0.0171
Two-way ANOVA (target type X subject group): ASD vs. General control
Fixation Order 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 All Early Late
Main effect of target type
F-statistic 
F(1,14)
17.0 10.5 5.76 7.58 8.35 10.5 4.99 3.38 2.29 8.34 24.7 16.6 18.2
p-value
0.00103 0.00585 0.0309 0.0156 0.0119 0.00584 0.0423 0.0872 0.154 0.0127 0.000205 0.00113 0.000781
Effect Size 
0.417 0.175 0.105 0.0798 0.0945 0.165 0.0576 0.0774 0.0728 0.226 0.209 0.150 0.171
Main effect of subject group
F-statistic 
F(1,14)
1.76 5 9.55 6.44 10.5 3.77 1.4 2.92 1.7 2.23 8.97 11.1 4.56
!180
p-value
0.206 0.0422 0.00798 0.0237 0.0059 0.0725 0.256 0.109 0.214 0.159 0.00964 0.00489 0.0508
Effect Size 
0.0191 0.109 0.251 0.234 0.320 0.126 0.0691 0.104 0.0595 0.0454 0.247 0.298 0.166
Interaction
F-statistic 
F(1,14)
2.75 10.7 1.09 2.89 0.0232 1.34 1.81 0.0103 0.00109 4.1 4.86 5.5 2.32
p-value
0.119 0.00551 0.313 0.111 0.881 0.267 0.199 0.921 0.974 0.0638 0.0447 0.0342 0.150
Effect Size 
0.0675 0.178 0.0199 0.0304 0.000263 0.0209 0.0210 0.000235 3.48E-05 0.111 0.0411 0.0498 0.0218
Two-way ANOVA (target type X subject group): ASD vs. NUS Control
Fixation Order 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 All Early Late
Main effect of target type
F-statistic 
F(1,17)
11.2 7.57 2.19 6.78 6.48 8.33 4.58 0.417 1.15 1.85 20.8 14.5 9.77
p-value
0.00388 0.0137 0.157 0.0185 0.0209 0.0103 0.0471 0.527 0.299 0.195 0.000275 0.00139 0.00616
Effect Size 
0.269 0.105 0.0280 0.083 0.0946 0.139 0.103 0.00941 0.0272 0.0865 0.164 0.100 0.168
Main effect of subject group
F-statistic 
F(1,17)
1.64 10.1 26.1 11.6 6.64 3.14 0.766 6.48 1.09 0.264 10.3 15.2 5.68
p-value
0.217 0.00545 8.75E-05 0.00335 0.0196 0.0942 0.394 0.0209 0.311 0.615 0.00509 0.00115 0.0290
Effect Size 
0.0277 0.216 0.457 0.278 0.183 0.0884 0.0207 0.163 0.0343 0.00419 0.260 0.361 0.134
Interaction
F-statistic 
F(1,17)
0.335 5.66 0.0687 2.02 0.300 0.695 1.47 0.762 0.0293 0.688 1.67 2.52 0.387
p-value 0.570 0.0294 0.796 0.173 0.591 0.416 0.242 0.395 0.866 0.421 0.213 0.131 0.542
Effect Size 
0.00807 0.0787 0.000877 0.0247 0.00438 0.0116 0.033 0.0172 0.000694 0.0322 0.0132 0.0174 0.00666
Two-way ANOVA (target type X subject group): Amygdala vs. General control
Fixation Order 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 All Early Late
Main effect of target type
F-statistic 
F(1,9)
21.6 32.7 6.04 20.9 10.1 9.11 10.2 1.99 3.24 12.6 41.1 38.5 21.9
p-value
0.00121 0.000287 0.0363 0.00134 0.0112 0.0145 0.011 0.191 0.110 0.00745 0.000123 0.000158 0.00115
Effect Size 
0.614 0.609 0.144 0.389 0.344 0.346 0.13 0.093 0.150 0.457 0.521 0.546 0.306
Main effect of subject group
F-statistic 
F(1,9)
0.0201 0.128 2.16 1.07 1.26 0.00292 1.2 0.216 0.399 1.24 1.74 1.28 1.04
p-value 0.890 0.729 0.176 0.327 0.292 0.958 0.303 0.653 0.545 0.298 0.219 0.286 0.335
Effect Size 
0.00028 0.00311 0.118 0.0462 0.0398 9.04E-05 0.0885 0.0114 0.0205 0.0328 0.0592 0.0407 0.0588
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Interaction
F-statistic 
F(1,9)
0.153 0.022 1.3 0.528 0.718 0.861 0.00812 0.0061 1.05 0.233 0.0129 0.00824 0.0169
p-value 0.705 0.885 0.284 0.486 0.419 0.378 0.930 0.939 0.335 0.642 0.912 0.930 0.900
Effect Size 
0.00436 0.000409 0.0311 0.00983 0.0244 0.0327 0.000104 0.000285 0.0487 0.00845 0.000163 0.000117 0.000236
One-Way ANOVA: Social Targets
Fixation Order 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 All Early Late
F-statistic 
F(3,26) 1.7259 6.9582 5.3581 6.5733 3.6054 1.8027 1.9806 1.1955 0.295 1.1938 5.0931 7.8157 2.8907
p-value 0.1863 0.0014 0.0052 0.0019 0.0266 0.1714 0.1416 0.3309 0.8286 0.3324 0.0066 7.03E-04 0.0545
Effect Size 0.1661 0.4453 0.382 0.4313 0.2938 0.1722 0.186 0.1212 0.0342 0.1253 0.3701 0.4742 0.2501
One-Way ANOVA: Non-social Targets
Fixation Order 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 All Early Late
F-statistic 
F(3,26) 0.3116 1.0076 4.9305 1.6222 1.7633 0.7273 0.3568 1.4464 0.5923 0.1074 2.6043 3.2903 0.9206
p-value 0.8168 0.4052 0.0077 0.2084 0.1789 0.5449 0.7846 0.2521 0.6258 0.9549 0.0733 0.0364 0.4447
Effect Size 0.0347 0.1042 0.3626 0.1577 0.1691 0.0774 0.0395 0.143 0.0664 0.0144 0.2311 0.2752 0.096
 
Experiment 2
Two-way ANOVA (target type X subject group): All subject groups
Fixation Order 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 All Early Late
Main effect of target type
F-statistic 
F(1,29)
93.9 28.2 19.9 14.2 12.1 7.64 12.4 9.04 0.646 2.33 31.3 39.2 15
p-value
1.34E-10 1.07E-05 0.000112 0.000748 0.00161 0.00982 0.00144 0.0054 0.428 0.139 4.91E-06 7.88E-07 0.000574
Effect Size 
0.699 0.315 0.118 0.0847 0.134 0.0749 0.135 0.113 0.00570 0.0452 0.169 0.224 0.105
Main effect of subject group
F-statistic 
F(2,29)
0.250 4.82 2.82 7.18 4.31 3.63 4.89 2.47 3.36 0.422 6.00 6.63 4.52
p-value
0.78 0.0156 0.0763 0.00293 0.0229 0.0392 0.0148 0.102 0.0487 0.660 0.00662 0.00426 0.0196
Effect Size 
0.00131 0.084 0.116 0.244 0.124 0.124 0.135 0.0749 0.133 0.0134 0.195 0.189 0.162
Interaction
F-statistic 
F(2,29)
0.56 1.13 0.00234 0.531 0.299 1.1 0.768 0.44 1.81 0.644 0.567 0.569 0.669
p-value 0.578 0.337 0.998 0.593 0.744 0.348 0.473 0.648 0.182 0.533 0.573 0.572 0.520
Effect Size 
0.00832 0.0252 2.76E-05 0.00634 0.00661 0.0215 0.0167 0.0110 0.0319 0.025 0.00614 0.00651 0.00939
Two-way ANOVA (target type X subject group): ASD vs. ASD Control
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Fixation Order 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 All Early Late
Main effect of target type
F-statistic 
F(1,19)
50 19.7 10.1 6.04 9.7 1.69 11.5 4.67 0.215 1.31 14.1 20.5 6.62
p-value
1.00E-06 0.000279 0.00487 0.0238 0.0057 0.209 0.00309 0.0437 0.648 0.266 0.00133 0.000231 0.0186
Effect Size 
0.677 0.285 0.109 0.0729 0.102 0.0298 0.183 0.0792 0.00354 0.0291 0.138 0.188 0.0861
Main effect of subject group
F-statistic 
F(1,19)
0.142 3.12 0.129 4.49 4.58 2.95 1.52 4.59 0.544 0.0133 2.7 3.61 1.85
p-value 0.710 0.0934 0.724 0.0475 0.0456 0.102 0.232 0.0453 0.47 0.909 0.117 0.0729 0.19
Effect Size 
0.000485 0.0590 0.00461 0.132 0.135 0.0854 0.0374 0.116 0.0174 0.000364 0.0838 0.102 0.0581
Interaction
F-statistic 
F(1,19)
0.0169 1.55 0.000241 0.419 0.298 0.0203 0.617 0.167 3.60 1.27 0.233 0.147 0.779
p-value 0.898 0.229 0.988 0.525 0.592 0.888 0.442 0.687 0.0731 0.274 0.635 0.706 0.388
Effect Size 
0.00023 0.0223 2.59E-06 0.00506 0.00312 0.000357 0.00985 0.00284 0.0593 0.0281 0.00228 0.00134 0.0101
Two-way ANOVA (target type X subject group): ASD vs. NUS Control
Fixation Order 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 All Early Late
Main effect of target type
F-statistic 
F(1,22)
80.0 15.7 21.7 15.8 7.15 6.62 6.05 6.27 2.4 3.69 23.8 24.6 13.2
p-value
8.85E-09 0.000653 0.00012 0.000636 0.0138 0.0173 0.0222 0.0202 0.136 0.0698 7.16E-05 5.78E-05 0.00145
Effect Size 
0.710 0.269 0.118 0.0966 0.120 0.0849 0.0853 0.102 0.0278 0.0990 0.161 0.193 0.115
Main effect of subject group
F-statistic 
F(1,22)
0.167 9.88 5.04 12.4 6.11 5.84 8.73 1.85 6.12 0.711 9.43 10.9 7.27
p-value
0.687 0.00473 0.0352 0.00194 0.0217 0.0245 0.00732 0.187 0.0215 0.410 0.0056 0.00322 0.0132
Effect Size 
0.000641 0.101 0.142 0.276 0.110 0.129 0.171 0.041 0.156 0.0141 0.206 0.208 0.172
Interaction
F-statistic 
F(1,22)
1.11 1.69 0.004 0.194 0.479 1.4 0.28 0.804 0.213 0.00367 0.345 0.937 0.0427
p-value 0.303 0.207 0.950 0.664 0.496 0.249 0.602 0.379 0.649 0.952 0.563 0.344 0.838
Effect Size 
0.00988 0.0288 2.17E-05 0.00118 0.00802 0.0180 0.00395 0.0131 0.00247 9.83E-05 0.00233 0.00735 0.000371
One-Way ANOVA: Social Targets
Fixation Order 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 All Early Late
F-statistic 
F(2,29) 0.6669 3.731 2.1064 5.2707 2.8341 3.692 1.4271 2.5374 2.6888 1.392 3.5797 4.5291 2.7592
p-value 0.521 0.0361 0.1399 0.0112 0.0751 0.0373 0.2564 0.0965 0.0849 0.2653 0.0408 0.0194 0.0800
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Effect Size 0.0440 0.2047 0.1268 0.2666 0.1635 0.2029 0.0896 0.1489 0.1564 0.0904 0.198 0.238 0.1599
One-Way ANOVA: Non-social Targets
Fixation Order 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 All Early Late
F-statistic 
F(2,29) 0.2385 0.6854 2.2795 5.6748 2.1057 1.5259 9.5718 0.781 3.0718 0.5727 8.0094 5.8843 4.7523
p-value 0.7893 0.5119 0.1204 0.0083 0.140 0.2344 6.43E-04 0.4673 0.0617 0.5707 0.0017 0.0072 0.0164
Effect Size 0.0162 0.0451 0.1359 0.2813 0.1268 0.0952 0.3976 0.0511 0.1748 0.0407 0.3558 0.2887 0.2468
 
Experiment 3
Two-way ANOVA (target type X subject group): All subject groups
Fixation Order 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 All Early Late
Main effect of target type
F-statistic 
F(1,31)
0.429 32.9 4.07 3.78 3.03 0.268 1.24 0.0262 1.18 0.305 6.50 20.9 0.297
p-value
0.517 2.59E-06 0.0524 0.0611 0.0916 0.609 0.277 0.873 0.301 0.596 0.0159 7.38E-05 0.590
Effect Size 
0.0084 0.204 0.0168 0.0214 0.0196 0.00239 0.0179 0.000541 0.0554 0.00917 0.0432 0.065 0.00311
Main effect of subject group
F-statistic 
F(3,31)
0.912 2.61 1.5 1.11 3.39 0.251 0.337 1.8 8.27 0.52 3.54 2.52 2.42
p-value
0.446 0.0693 0.234 0.360 0.0301 0.860 0.799 0.177 0.00367 0.680 0.0259 0.076 0.0855
Effect Size 
0.0295 0.121 0.107 0.0762 0.189 0.0173 0.0250 0.115 0.279 0.112 0.189 0.163 0.131
Interaction
F-statistic 
F(3,31)
0.371 0.0487 0.596 0.925 0.810 0.918 0.385 0.111 0.181 0.702 0.528 0.750 0.352
p-value 0.774 0.986 0.622 0.440 0.498 0.444 0.765 0.953 0.907 0.577 0.667 0.531 0.788
Effect Size 
0.0218 0.000905 0.00741 0.0158 0.0157 0.0246 0.0167 0.00686 0.0255 0.0633 0.0105 0.00702 0.0111
Two-way ANOVA (target type X subject group): ASD vs. ASD Control
Fixation Order 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 All Early Late
Main effect of target type
F-statistic 
F(1,19)
1.45 14.7 3.39 0.992 3.19 0.319 0.101 0.00325 1.33 0.235 2.30 13.7 0.0445
p-value
0.243 0.00110 0.0811 0.332 0.0898 0.579 0.755 0.955 0.276 0.641 0.146 0.00152 0.835
Effect Size 
0.0405 0.230 0.0286 0.00931 0.0297 0.00615 0.00224 0.000107 0.0945 0.00971 0.0371 0.0758 0.00122
Main effect of subject group
F-statistic 
F(1,19)
0.812 1.74 0.143 2.5 4.15 0.0206 0.000245 2.06 3.12 0.00966 5.15 2.66 4.21
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p-value 0.379 0.203 0.709 0.131 0.0558 0.887 0.988 0.172 0.108 0.924 0.0352 0.120 0.0541
Effect Size 
0.0173 0.0395 0.00607 0.0941 0.138 0.00068 8.91E-06 0.0606 0.0421 0.000689 0.139 0.0997 0.087
Interaction
F-statistic 
F(1,19)
0.290 0.0256 0.144 0.177 2.70 0.000237 0.0624 0.163 0.242 2.13 0.134 1.15 0.0428
p-value 0.597 0.875 0.708 0.678 0.117 0.988 0.806 0.692 0.634 0.182 0.719 0.297 0.838
Effect Size 
0.00808 0.000400 0.00121 0.00166 0.0251 4.57E-06 0.00139 0.00536 0.0172 0.0882 0.00216 0.00636 0.00117
Two-way ANOVA (target type X subject group): ASD vs. NUS Control
Fixation Order 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 All Early Late
Main effect of target type
F-statistic 
F(1,22)
0.209 23.4 4.70 4.54 3.74 0.938 1.02 0.00971 0.764 NaN 8.87 19.1 1.18
p-value
0.652 7.85E-05 0.0413 0.0445 0.0662 0.344 0.326 0.923 0.405 NaN 0.00694 0.000246 0.289
Effect Size 
0.00622 0.178 0.0271 0.0398 0.0471 0.008 0.0226 0.000261 0.0424 NaN 0.0604 0.0877 0.0117
Main effect of subject group
F-statistic 
F(1,22)
2.72 6.31 3.14 1.69 5.38 0.0101 1.1 4.56 24.7 NaN 8.25 5.02 5.67
p-value
0.113 0.0198 0.0903 0.207 0.0301 0.921 0.308 0.0485 0.000774 NaN 0.00886 0.0355 0.0268
Effect Size 
0.0344 0.146 0.106 0.0541 0.131 0.000375 0.0349 0.126 0.332 NaN 0.215 0.151 0.165
Interaction
F-statistic 
F(1,22)
0.857 0.125 0.049 0.969 0.702 4.34 1.28 0.0845 0.0764 NaN 0.359 7.54E-05 0.396
p-value 0.365 0.727 0.827 0.336 0.411 0.0497 0.273 0.775 0.788 NaN 0.555 0.993 0.536
Effect Size 
0.0255 0.000952 0.000283 0.00849 0.00884 0.037 0.0283 0.00227 0.00424 NaN 0.00245 3.47E-07 0.00391
Two-way ANOVA (target type X subject group): Amygdala vs. ASD Control
Fixation Order 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 All Early Late
Main effect of target type
F-statistic 
F(1,9)
0.498 9.55 0.164 0.00920 0.00348 0.00523 0.269 0.312 0.387 10.6 0.228 2.51 0.0575
p-value 0.498 0.0129 0.695 0.926 0.954 0.944 0.620 0.600 0.597 0.190 0.645 0.148 0.816
Effect Size 
0.0198 0.308 0.00256 0.000132 2.87E-05 0.000222 0.0121 0.0299 0.118 0.126 0.011 0.0232 0.00374
Main effect of subject group
F-statistic 
F(1,9)
0.00024
4 0.502 0.615 1.41 3.97 0.417 0.00699 0.0527 0.343 0.316 1.31 2.60 0.27
p-value 0.988 0.496 0.453 0.265 0.0776 0.535 0.936 0.827 0.617 0.674 0.282 0.141 0.616
Effect Size 
1.68E-05 0.0212 0.0538 0.118 0.283 0.0271 0.000670 0.00508 0.0237 0.178 0.0694 0.200 0.0118
Interaction
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We further compared people with ASD to general controls and found that social objects 
attracted more attention (two-way mixed ANOVA (target type X subject group); main 
effect of target type; average of fixations 2 to 10: social: 35.11 ± 3.52 (mean ± SEM), 
non-social: 22.74 ± 2.64; F(1,14) = 24.7, p = 2.05×10-4, η2 = 0.21) and people with ASD 
had reduced target-relevant effects (ASD: 22.20 ± 3.30, general control: 35.64 ± 3.05; 
F(1,14) = 8.97, p = 9.64×10-3, η2 = 0.25). Fixation-by-fixation analysis revealed that the 
impairment in people with ASD mainly came from initial fixations of their search 
(fixation 2 to 5: 16.78 ± 3.54; see Table 5.5). However, there was a weak interaction 
(average of fixations 2 to 10: F(1,14) = 4.86, p = 0.045, η2 = 0.041), suggesting that 
compared to general controls, people with ASD were more impaired in orienting to 
socially relevant targets. 
When analyzing target-relevant effects separately for social targets (Figure 5.7A) and 
non-social targets (Figure 5.7B),	   fixation-by-fixation analysis revealed that the target-
relevant effect was reduced in people with ASD for social targets in the first few fixations 
(one-way ANOVA across subject groups, p < 0.05 for fixations 2 to 4; FDR corrected) 
F-statistic 
F(1,9)
0.0623 0.0214 0.962 0.243 0.145 0.115 0.041 0.0477 0.359 10.2 0.154 0.208 0.115
p-value 0.808 0.887 0.352 0.634 0.712 0.743 0.845 0.836 0.61 0.193 0.704 0.659 0.742
Effect Size 
0.00248 0.00069 0.015 0.00348 0.00119 0.00487 0.00184 0.00457 0.110 0.121 0.00744 0.00192 0.0075
One-Way ANOVA: Social Targets
Fixation Order 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 All Early Late
F-statistic 
F(3,31) 0.8863 2.0504 1.4601 1.5952 1.7811 0.3717 2.0223 1.2824 5.5773 0.2578 3.1216 2.184 2.4871
p-value 0.459 0.1272 0.2445 0.2105 0.1713 0.774 0.1345 0.303 0.0069 0.8543 0.0400 0.1098 0.0789
Effect Size 0.079 0.1656 0.1238 0.1337 0.147 0.0347 0.1835 0.1382 0.4817 0.0606 0.232 0.1745 0.194
One-Way ANOVA: Non-social Targets
Fixation Order 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 All Early Late
F-statistic 
F(3,31) 0.0296 1.6797 1.2487 0.6742 3.7904 0.4411 0.0451 0.8797 3.8646 0.8791 2.2979 2.4435 1.166
p-value 0.993 0.1917 0.309 0.5744 0.0200 0.7253 0.987 0.4661 0.0332 0.4449 0.097 0.0827 0.339
Effect Size 0.0029 0.1398 0.1078 0.0613 0.2684 0.0422 0.0056 0.1029 0.453 0.1495 0.1819 0.1912 0.1044
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but not for non-social targets (p > 0.05 for all fixations, FDR corrected), further 
demonstrating a more severe impairment of people with ASD in social attention.	  
Strikingly, there was no difference between people with ASD and controls for later 
fixations, showing that people with ASD could catch up gradually. Similar results were 
derived when comparing people with ASD to NUS controls, where we found a significant 
interaction between subject group and target type (social or non-social), with the 
impairment in the ASD group most pronounced again for the social case (Table 5.5). 
We next compared amygdala lesion patients with general controls. Social targets still 
attracted more attention than non-social targets (two-way mixed ANOVA (target type X 
subject group); main effect of target type; average of fixations 2 to 10: social: 42.80 ± 
1.89, non-social: 24.76 ± 3.37; F(1,9) = 41.1, p = 1.23×10-4, η2 = 0.52), but there was no 
difference between amygdala patients and controls for the average of all fixations (main 
effect of subject group: amygdala: 28.81 ± 1.02, general control: 35.64 ± 3.05; F(1,9) = 
1.74, p = 0.22, η2 = 0.059), early fixations (amygdala: 26.38 ± 1.35, general control: 
31.47 ± 2.62; F(1,9) = 1.28, p = 0.29, η2 = 0.041), late fixations (amygdala: 30.76 ± 2.14, 
general control: 40.11 ± 5.39; F(1,9) = 1.04, p = 0.33, η2 = 0.059), nor at any individual 
fixation (p > 0.05 for all fixations, FDR corrected). There was no interaction for all 
averages or at any fixations (see Table 5.5). Separate analysis within social targets 
(Figure 5.7A) and non-social targets (Figure 5.7B) found no reduced attention towards 
target-relevant objects, for neither social targets nor non-social targets (t-test with general 
controls: p > 0.05 for all fixations, FDR corrected). Further, we observed no difference 
between general controls and NUS controls (p > 0.05 for all fixations, FDR corrected).	  
The above results were robust to several factors. First, when controlling for the overall 
fewer numbers of fixations made by people with ASD (Figure 5.6 and Figure 5.8A,B) 
with normalized fixation percentages, we obtained the same pattern of findings (Figure 
5.8C,D). Likewise, our results were robust to the particular size of the ROI that defined 
each object (we tried several different sizes, all producing qualitatively the same results). 
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Finally, our analysis was based on target-present trials only; again, the target-relevant 
effects above all held when we analyzed target-absent catch trials only. 
!
!  
Figure 5.8. Target relevant effect in Experiment 1 was preserved after normalization 
of fixation percentage.  
People with ASD had reduced percentage of fixations on objects, for both (A) social 
targets and (B) non-social targets. However, people with ASD still had reduced gazes 
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towards social objects when searching for social targets (C), but they were not different 
from controls when searching for non-social targets (D).  
!
In conclusion, we found people with ASD did not orient towards target-relevant objects 
as rapidly as controls, an abnormality that was present for all stimuli but most 
pronounced for social stimuli, and furthermore, that this impairment was not evident in 
patients with amygdala lesions. 
!
5.5.4 The attentional deficit in ASD could not be explained by low-level visual properties 
of the stimuli 
In Experiment 1, we observed reduced rapid orientation towards target-relevant objects in 
people with ASD, especially for social targets. To check whether this might be due to 
low-level saliency differences, we conducted Experiment 2 in which low-level properties 
of social and non-social objects were equalized within each search array (Figure 5.2A-
C). 
Target-relevant effects were replicated in Experiment 2. All subjects showed rapid and 
sustained target-relevant effects, for both social targets (Figure 5.9 upper row) and non-
social targets (Figure 5.9 lower row). Even with equal low-level saliency, social targets 
still featured greater target-relevant effects (two-way mixed ANOVA (target type X 
subject group); main effect of target type; average of fixations 2 to 10: social: 37.19 ± 
2.62, non-social: 26.18 ± 1.64; F(1,29) = 31.3, p = 4.91×10-6, η2 = 0.17; see Table 5.5 for 
statistics) and for both early fixations (social: 34.45 ± 2.47, non-social: 22.10 ± 1.56; 
F(1,29) = 39.2, p = 7.88×10-7, η2 = 0.22) and late fixations (social: 39.43 ± 2.94, non-
social: 29.49 ± 2.22; F(1,29) = 15.0, p = 5.74×10-4, η2 = 0.10), showing persistent 
stronger attention towards social objects than non-social objects. Consistent with 
Experiment 1, the stronger social attention persisted through the 8th fixation. Still, people 
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with ASD had reduced overall target-relevant effects (main effect of subject group; 
average of fixations 2 to 10 collapsing social and non-social: ASD: 25.07 ± 3.55, NUS 
control: 38.68 ± 2.36, ASD control: 32.82 ± 1.51; F(2,29) = 6.00, p = 6.62×10-3, η2 = 
0.20) and for both early fixations (ASD: 21.76 ± 3.14, NUS control: 34.71 ± 2.07, ASD 
control: 30.03 ± 2.09; F(2,29) = 6.63, p = 4.26×10-3, η2 = 0.19) and late fixations (ASD: 
27.71 ± 4.01, NUS control: 42.00 ± 3.26, ASD control: 35.05 ± 2.06; F(2,29) = 4.52, p = 
0.020, η2 = 0.16). Comparing people with ASD to ASD controls alone revealed a 
marginally significant reduction of overall target-relevant effect during early fixations 
(ASD: 21.76 ± 3.14, ASD control: 30.03 ± 2.09; F(1,19) = 3.61, p = 0.073, η2 = 0.10; see 
Table 5.5). Comparing people with ASD to NUS controls showed similar results and 
revealed a significant reduction of overall target-relevant effects for all fixations, early 
fixations and late fixations (Table 5.5). Separate analysis within social targets (Figure 
5.7C) and non-social targets (Figure 5.7D) showed that the deficit mainly came from 
social targets (see Table 5.5), replicating Experiment 1.  
!
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!  
Figure 5.9. In Experiment 2, all subjects looked at target congruent objects in a fast 
and sustained manner.  
(A–B) People with ASD. (C–D) ASD controls. (E–F) NUS controls. Red: social objects. 
Blue: non-social objects. Upper row (A,C,E): when searching for social targets. Lower 
row (B,D,F): when searching for non-social targets. Asterisk indicates significant 
difference between target congruent objects and target incongruent objects (two-tailed 
paired t-test: p < 0.05, FDR corrected). Shaded area denotes ± SEM. 
!
Notably, no difference was found between Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 at all fixations 
(excluding the very first fixation) for people with ASD (unpaired two-tailed t-test: p > 
0.05, FDR corrected) or NUS controls (paired two-tailed t-test: p > 0.05, FDR corrected), 
for both social targets and non-social targets. 
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In conclusion, Experiment 2 replicated the findings of Experiment 1 and thus 
corroborated our claim of reduced rapid orientation to target-relevant objects, especially 
when these were social, in people with ASD. Importantly, Experiment 2 demonstrated 
that the findings in Experiment 1 were not due to the low-level stimulus properties. 
!
5.5.5 The attentional deficit in ASD is more severe with high task demands 
Experiment 1 and 2 showed that people with ASD, but not with amygdala lesions, have 
reduced attention to target-relevant objects. Do these effects depend on cognitive load? 
To test this hypothesis, we further designed simpler arrays with fewer objects to make the 
search easier. We still equalized low-level saliency, distance to center and size for these 
simpler search arrays. 
As in Experiment 1 and 2, all subjects oriented to social objects rapidly and kept on 
searching within social objects if the target was social (Figure 5.10 upper row) and 
oriented to non-social objects if the target was non-social (Figure 5.10 lower row), 
showing rapid and sustained target-relevant effects for both social targets and non-social 
targets. In contrast to Experiment 1 and 2, with fewer objects in the search array, the 
difference between social target-relevant effects and non-social target-relevant effects 
became very small (social–non-social, Experiment 1: 13.15 ± 1.82, Experiment 2: 11.01 
± 1.94, Experiment 3: 6.30 ± 2.42; two-way mixed ANOVA (target type X subject group); 
main effect of target type; average of fixations 2 to 10: F(1,31) = 6.50, p = 0.016, η2 = 
0.043), and no difference was found at the single fixation level (see Table 5.5 for 
statistics). The deficit of target-relevant orientation in people with ASD also became very 
small (main effect of subject group; average of fixations 2 to 10: ASD: 35.55 ± 3.32, 
amygdala: 39.38 ± 6.88, NUS control: 50.75 ± 4.21, ASD control: 46.53 ± 2.94; F(3,31) 
= 3.54, p = 0.026, η2 = 0.19; only the 2nd fixation showed a difference) and there was no 
interaction.  
!
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!  
Figure 5.10. In Experiment 3, all subjects looked at target congruent objects in a 
fast and sustained manner.  
(A–B) Amygdala patients. (C–D) People with ASD. (E–F) ASD controls. (G–H) NUS 
controls. Red: social objects. Blue: non-social objects. Upper row (A,C,E,G): when 
searching for social targets. Lower row (B,D,F,H): when searching for non-social targets. 
Asterisk indicates significant difference between target congruent objects and target 
incongruent objects (two-tailed paired t-test: p < 0.05, FDR corrected). Shaded area 
denotes ± SEM. 
!
Comparing people with ASD and ASD controls also revealed a small but significant 
difference in target-relevant effects (average of fixations 2 to 10: ASD: 35.55 ± 3.32, 
ASD control: 46.53 ± 2.94; F(1,19) = 5.15, p = 0.035, η2 = 0.14), and there was no 
fixation-by-fixation difference (Table 5.5). Further, consistent with Experiment 1 and 2, 
we found no difference in target-relevant effects between amygdala patients and ASD 
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controls, or between amygdala patients and NUS controls, for the average of all fixations, 
nor at each fixation (p > 0.05 for all fixations, FDR corrected; Table 5.5). Amygdala 
lesion patients had similar target-relevant effects as people with ASD at all fixations 
(Table 5.5).  
Separate analysis within social targets (Figure 5.7E) showed that the target-relevant 
effect was not reduced in people with ASD for social targets – we observed no difference 
across all subject groups (ASD: 38.82 ± 3.96, amygdala: 38.94 ± 6.58, NUS control: 
55.65 ± 4.57, ASD control: 48.43 ± 4.71;	  one-way ANOVA, p > 0.05 for all fixations, 
FDR corrected), and when comparing people with ASD and ASD controls, we observed 
no difference in target-relevant effects (p > 0.05 for all fixations, FDR corrected). Still, 
amygdala lesion patients did not show a different target-relevant effect compared to ASD 
controls, NUS controls, or people with ASD (Table 5.5). Similarly, separate analysis 
within non-social targets (Figure 5.7F) showed no difference across all subject groups 
(ASD: 32.28 ± 3.82, amygdala: 39.81 ± 7.68, NUS control: 45.86 ± 4.52, ASD control: 
44.62 ± 4.39; p > 0.05 for all fixations, FDR corrected). There was no difference for 
people with ASD vs. ASD controls, amygdala patients vs. people with ASD, amygdala 
patients vs. ASD controls, nor ASD controls vs. NUS controls (for all comparisons: p > 
0.05 for all fixations, FDR corrected; see Table 5.5).	  
In conclusion, we were able to find impaired attention to target-relevant stimuli in ASD 
only for the larger search array, but not for the smaller search array of Experiment 3. 
Likely explanation for the lack of an effect in Experiment 3 is reduced cognitive load. 
!
5.5.6 Missing detection of targets was not prominent in amygdala lesion patients  
In some trials, targets failed to be detected even if the subject looked at the target object 
in the array. We further explored this mechanism by computing the percentage of trials 
having ‘misses’, which were defined as fixations that landed on the target even though 
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the target was not detected. We excluded the last 3 fixations landing on the target for 
misses since they corresponded to target detection. 
Figure 5.11 summarizes the percentage of trials with misses across subject groups. In 
Experiment 1 (Figure 5.11A), no difference was found between social and non-social 
targets (two-way repeated ANOVA (target type X subject group); main effect of target 
type: F(1,26) = 0.28, p = 0.60, effect size η2 = 8.90×10-4) nor interaction (F(3,26) = 0.50, 
p = 0.68, effect size η2 = 0.0049). However, NUS controls had significantly fewer misses 
(main effect of subject group: F(3,26) = 5.45, p = 0.0048, η2 = 0.35; t-test against general 
controls: t(17) = 3.44, p = 0.0032, effect size in Hedges's g (standardized mean 
difference): g = 1.53 for social targets, and t(17) = 2.21, p = 0.041, g = 0.98 for non-
social targets), which was likely due to the faster RT (Figure 5.4B; see Discussion). But 
compared to general controls, neither people with ASD (t(14) = 0.59, p = 0.56, g = 0.28 
for social targets, and t(14) = 0.53, p = 0.60, g = 0.25 for non-social targets) nor 
amygdala lesion patients (t(9) = 1.15, p = 0.27, g = 0.71 for social targets, and t(9) = 0.51, 
p = 0.62, g = 0.32 for non-social targets) had more misses, suggesting that the amygdala 
is not essential for preferential coding of biologically relevant stimuli into conscious 
perception in this visual search. 
!
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Figure 5.11. Percentage of trials with misses.  
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(A) Experiment 1. (B) Experiment 2.  (C) Experiment 3. Red: social objects. Blue: non-
social objects. Error bars denote one SEM of the mean. 
!
We repeated the analysis by excluding the last 2 fixations landing on the target for misses 
and we derived qualitatively the same results. 
Similarly, in Experiment 2 (Figure 5.11B), no difference was found between social and 
non-social targets (main effect of target type: F(1,29) = 0.10, p = 0.75, η2 = 1.34×10-4) 
nor interaction (F(2,29) = 0.60, p = 0.56, η2 = 0.0015), but NUS controls had significantly 
fewer misses than people with ASD and ASD controls (main effect of subject group: 
F(2,29) = 4.57, p = 0.019, η2 = 0.23). People with ASD had comparable misses to those 
seen in ASD controls (unpaired t-test: t(19) = 2.03, p = 0.057, g = 0.87 for social targets 
and t(19) = 1.37, p = 0.19, g = 0.59 for non-social targets). Notably, with an independent 
sample of people with ASD, Experiment 2 had comparable percentages of trials with 
misses as Experiment 1 (unpaired t-test: t(19) = -1.23, p = 0.23, g = -0.53). 
With an easier task in Experiment 3 (Figure 5.11C), we found the percentage of trials 
with misses decreased compared to Experiment 2 (both experiments had equal saliency 
between social and non-social objects; two-way ANOVA (experiment X subject group 
(ASD, ASD controls and NUS controls)); main effect of experiment: F(1,58) = 4.99, p = 
0.029, η2 = 0.060; paired t-test for people with ASD: t(12) = 2.76, p = 0.017, g = 0.78; 
paired t-test for ASD controls: t(7) = 1.99, p = 0.087, g = 0.90; paired t-test for NUS 
controls: t(10) = 3.28, p = 0.0082, g = 1.15), consistent with the idea that the percentage 
of misses is a function of the task difficulty (Rutishauser and Koch, 2007). We found no 
difference between social and non-social targets (two-way repeated ANOVA (target type 
X subject group); main effect of target type: F(1,31) = 0.77, p = 0.39, η2 = 0.0020), 
suggesting that social and non-social targets had equal strength to be encoded into 
consciousness. However, ASD controls and NUS controls had significantly fewer misses 
(main effect of subject group: F(3,31) = 4.57, p = 0.0092, η2 = 0.27), which was likely 
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due to the faster RT (Figure 5.4F; see Discussion). People with ASD had more misses 
than did ASD controls (t-test, t(19) = 2.05, p = 0.054, g = 0.89 for social and t(19) = 2.17, 
p = 0.043, g = 0.94 for non-social), but had similar numbers of misses as did amygdala 
lesion patients (t(14) = 1.62, p = 0.13, g = 0.98 for social and t(14) = 0.073, p = 0.94, g = 
0.044 for non-social). ASD controls had similar number of misses as did NUS controls 
(t(17) = 0.39, p = 0.70, g = 0.17 for social and t(17) = 0.94, p = 0.36, g = 0.42 for non-
social).  
We lastly performed a subject-by-subject correlation analysis to confirm that the 
percentage of misses is a function of task difficulty. Task difficulty is typically measured 
by the time required to find the target (Treisman, 1988, 1998, Wolfe, 1998). In 
Experiment 1, there was strong subject-by-subject correlation between RT and the 
percentage of misses (Pearson correlation; all subjects: r = 0.72, p = 8.31×10-6; amygdala 
lesion patients: r = 0.97, p = 0.15; people with ASD: r = 0.67, p = 0.068; general controls: 
r = 0.57, p = 0.14; NUS controls: r = 0.22, p = 0.51). Strong correlations were observed 
in Experiment 2 (all subjects: r = 0.84, p = 2.29×10-9; people with ASD: r = 0.89, p = 
4.53×10-5; ASD controls: r = 0.69, p = 0.060; NUS controls: r = 0.87, p = 5.52×10-4) and 
Experiment 3 (all subjects: r = 0.76, p = 9.60×10-8; amygdala lesion patients: r = 0.90, p = 
0.29; people with ASD: r = 0.89, p = 5.58×10-5; ASD controls: r = 0.89, p = 0.0034; NUS 
controls: r = 0.23, p = 0.50) as well. These results showed that the percentage of misses is 
a function of task difficulty. 
!
5.6 Discussion 
In this study we found that people with ASD had reduced attention to target-relevant 
objects in visual search. Bilateral lesions of the amygdala did not result in a similar 
deficit. The impairment seemed most pronounced for social targets, although there was a 
deficit for non-social targets as well. The effect was not attributable to low-level 
properties of the stimuli. With arrays containing a reduced number of objects, we found a 
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weaker deficit. Overall, we revealed a search-dependent attentional deficit in people with 
ASD that was dependent on task demands. 
Our findings suggest some clear future directions, as well as points of contact with prior 
findings and theories of ASD. With respect to future directions, there are in our view 
three core extensions of our study that would be important to undertake, aside from sheer 
replication. The first is replication together with generalization: that is, replicate our 
finding in a sample of people with ASD who are younger, and/or lower functioning, and/
or have more substantial comorbidity. This direction would be perhaps the most 
important from a clinical perspective. The second extension would be to broaden the 
difficulty of the search task. It is worth noting that (a) we only observed clear deficits in 
the ASD group for our larger search array (24 items; Experiments 1 and 2), but not for the 
smaller array (12 items; Experiment 3); and (b) all groups were close to ceiling in overall 
performance accuracy. Would one find a much larger deficit if more severe time 
constraints were imposed, or if arrays larger than 24 items were used? This might 
substantially increase the sensitivity of the task to detect abnormalities in ASD. The third 
extension of our study would be to probe in more detail the neural substrates of the effect, 
thus shedding light on the neurological basis of impaired social attention in ASD. The 
fact that we found no impairment in patients with amygdala lesions suggests that the 
amygdala is not essential here, but this of course does not rule out the possibility that the 
amygdala nonetheless plays a role in brains without amygdala lesions, including people 
with ASD. Translating our task into an fMRI study would thus be an informative future 
direction. 
With respect to points of contact with the related literature in autism research, we take up 
the following issues in more detail below: relation to studies of visual search in ASD, and 
the connection with the amygdala. We also discuss missing detection of targets and task 
difficulty. 
!
!198
5.6.1 Visual search in autism 
In a typical visual search task, an observer looks for a target item among an array of 
distractor items and responds by indicating whether a target is present or absent. In 
“classic guidance”, attention is guided towards likely targets by a limited set of stimulus 
attributes such as color and size (Wolfe and Horowitz, 2004, Wolfe, 2012). Several 
studies have suggested superior visual search skills in individuals with ASD (Plaisted et 
al., 1998, O'Riordan and Plaisted, 2001, O'Riordan et al., 2001, O'Riordan, 2004, Kemner 
et al., 2008), particularly in relatively difficult tasks. Among various efforts to explain the 
differences, O'Riordan and Plaisted (O'Riordan and Plaisted, 2001) proposed two 
processing differences that could potentially explain the performance advantage: (1) 
enhanced memory for distractor locations already inspected, and (2) enhanced ability to 
discriminate between target and distractor stimulus features. Later, Joseph et al. (Joseph 
et al., 2009) argued that the superiority is due to the anomalously enhanced perception of 
stimulus features. 
While most studies of visual search in autism focused on low-level features and 
inanimate stimuli (e.g., letters and shapes) (Plaisted et al., 1998, O'Riordan and Plaisted, 
2001, O'Riordan et al., 2001, O'Riordan, 2004, Manjaly et al., 2007, Kemner et al., 2008), 
far fewer studies have examined complex images and social stimuli. Some studies 
employed visual search to investigate recognition abilities of facial expressions in 
children with ASD and found that faces with certain emotions are detected faster than 
others (Farran et al., 2011, Rosset et al., 2011). However, when compared with age-
matched controls, no significant differences were found anymore. 
Semantic-level features like faces can be considerably more potent than low-level cues to 
attract gaze to complex stimuli (Cerf et al., 2009, Judd et al., 2009, Zhao and Koch, 2011, 
2012, Xu et al., 2014). In this study, we not only included social stimuli, but instead of 
isolated facial emotions, used natural social (faces and people with various emotions and 
poses) and non-social (e.g., furniture, toys and food) objects. In Experiment 2, we 
equalized the low-level saliency, object size and location of items, thus helping to isolate 
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effect to the semantic level. Our results suggest that reduced target-congruent attention in 
people with ASD is mostly restricted to the social domain and the semantic level. 
Taken together, our findings and the prior literature then suggest that there may be two 
types of effects that distinguish visual search in people with ASD. One effect is that 
search is more efficient when it is based on low-level features and does not involve social 
content. A second effect is that search is less efficient when it is based on semantic-level 
features, and perhaps in particular when it involves social content. Respectively, these 
two putative effects bear some similarity to the two core aspects of the ASD diagnosis: 
augmented interests and focus on certain non-social patterns of stimuli and/or behavior; 
and diminished interest and focus on social communicative aspects. 
!
5.6.2 Missing detection of targets and task difficulty 
Subjects could look at the target during search without detecting it, failures of attention 
despite fixation that occurred surprisingly frequently in our task, especially with 
increased task load (Experiments 1 and 2). Task difficulty is typically measured by the 
time required to find the target and the RT correlates with the size of the search array 
(Treisman, 1988, 1998, Wolfe, 1998). Thus, a search task is more difficult than another, 
or more difficult to one subject than another, if more time is required to find the target. 
Consistent with previous findings (Rutishauser and Koch, 2007), we found in our 
experiments that the percentage of misses is a function of the task difficulty—when RT is 
shorter, the percentage of missed detections is lower, as shown by a strong correlation 
within each subject group, as well as pronounced differences between subject groups 
such that NUS controls who had fastest RT also showed the smallest percentage of 
misses. Furthermore, in the simpler arrays (Experiment 3), not only were the targets 
easier to detect (shown by a significantly shorter RT), but also the percentage of missed 
detections was lower. The missed detections might be explained by a capacity limitation 
(Rutishauser and Koch, 2007). With greater task difficulty, the target object might not 
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effectively be reported as it failed to emerge into “access consciousness”, a failure to 
transfer from iconic to working memory. 
!
5.6.3 The amygdala and saliency 
A distinctive aspect of our studies was the direct comparison between subjects with ASD, 
and rare patients with bilateral amygdala lesions. The human amygdala has been quite 
broadly implicated in processing emotionally salient and socially relevant stimuli (Kling 
and Brothers, 1992, Adolphs, 2010). Studies of a patient with bilateral amygdala lesions 
demonstrated a selective impairment in recognizing fearful faces (Adolphs et al., 1994), 
congruent with early neuroimaging studies (Morris et al., 1996).  
Recently, however, the amygdala has been proposed to respond to a broader spectrum of 
social attributes such as facial emotions in general (Fitzgerald et al., 2006) and regulating 
a person’s personal space (Kennedy et al., 2009). Electrophysiological recordings in 
monkeys (Rolls, 1984, Leonard et al., 1985) and humans (Kreiman et al., 2000, 
Rutishauser et al., 2011) have found single neurons that respond not only to faces, but 
also to face identities, facial expressions and gaze directions (Gothard et al., 2007, 
Hoffman et al., 2007). Further, the amygdala processes more abstract attributes such as 
stimulus unpredictability (Herry et al., 2007). Amygdala lesions result in an absence or 
reduction of fixations on novel objects observed in monkeys (Bagshaw et al., 1972). It 
has also been shown that the amygdala mediates emotion-enhanced vividness (Todd et 
al., 2012) and responds more to animate entities compared to inanimate ones (Mormann 
et al., 2011, Yang et al., 2012b). Overall, the amygdala might act as a detector of 
perceptual saliency and biological relevance (Sander et al., 2005, Adolphs, 2008)—a 
reasonable substrate also for the altered preferences evident in people with ASD. 
Our search arrays contained people and faces with various identities, expressions and 
gaze directions, but our data did not find any impairments in the three amygdala patients 
in deploying attention to target-relevant objects, either for social or non-social targets. 
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While our findings show that the amygdala cannot be essential in our task, we 
acknowledge that we are limited by statistical power given our small subject sample. It is 
also worth noting that compensatory circuits might account for the intact social attention 
in amygdala lesion patients (Becker et al., 2012) and a recent finding (Wang et al., 2014a) 
has also shown that amygdala lesion patients have intact preferred attention towards 
animals, even though these findings would not be expected on the basis of neuronal 
responses observed in the amygdala to animals (Mormann et al., 2011). Our finding is 
consistent also with preserved attentional capture by emotional stimuli and intact 
emotion-guided visual search in patients with acute amygdala lesions due to 
neurosurgical resection (Piech et al., 2010, Piech et al., 2011). Taken together, there are 
now numerous examples of a discrepancy between engagement of the amygdala (e.g., in 
functional neuroimaging studies) in tasks for which there is no obvious corresponding 
behavioral impairment when the amygdala is lesioned. This of course poses some 
challenges also for how to view the possible role of the amygdala in ASD, a final topic to 
which we turn next. 
!
5.6.4 Amygdala theory of autism 
The abnormal facial scanning patterns generally reported in people with ASD (Adolphs et 
al., 2001, Klin et al., 2002, Pelphrey et al., 2002, Neumann et al., 2006, Spezio et al., 
2007a, Spezio et al., 2007b, Kliemann et al., 2010) may plausibly be related to amygdala 
dysfunction (Baron-Cohen et al., 2000). This hypothesis is supported by rather similar 
patterns of deficits seen in patients with amygdala damage, who fail to fixate on the eyes 
in faces (Adolphs et al., 2005), single neuron recordings in the human amygdala showing 
weaker response to eyes in people with ASD (Rutishauser et al., 2013), as well as 
neuroimaging studies showing that amygdala activation is specifically enhanced for 
fearful faces when saccading from the mouth to the eye regions (Gamer and Büchel, 
2009). This amygdala-mediated orientation towards eyes seen in BOLD-fMRI is 
dysfunctional in ASD (Kliemann et al., 2012). Activation in the amygdala has also been 
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reported to be correlated with the time spent fixating the eyes in ASD (Dalton et al., 
2005). The idea of amygdala abnormalities in autism is supported by a substantial 
literature showing structural abnormalities (Bauman and Kemper, 1985, Schumann et al., 
2004, Schumann and Amaral, 2006, Amaral et al., 2008, Ecker et al., 2012) and atypical 
activation (Gotts et al., 2012, Philip et al., 2012) in the amygdala in ASD. 
While actual amygdala lesions did not result in search-related attentional deficits in our 
tasks, it is important to keep in mind that people with ASD of course do not have 
amygdala lesions. It is thus still conceivable that more subtle malfunction (including 
hyperactivation) of the amygdala contributes to ASD, even though a bona fide lesion of 
the amygdala has no effect that bears similarity to ASD (see also (Paul et al., 2010)). 
Finally, autism spectrum disorders are well known to be highly heterogeneous at the 
biological and behavioral levels, and it is likely that there will be no single genetic or 
cognitive cause for the diverse symptoms defining autism (Happe et al., 2006). No 
unanimously endorsed hypothesis for a primary deficit has emerged that can plausibly 
account for the full triad of social, communicative and rigid/repetitive difficulties (Happe, 
2003). Nonetheless, our present findings argue for at least one further feature at the 
cognitive level that can be used to describe ASD: an inability to use semantic-level task 
demands, especially with high cognitive load and especially for social stimuli, in order to 
efficiently guide attention selection during visual search. As we noted at the beginning of 
our Discussion, it will be important to extend these studies to additional measures in the 
future, notably including neuroimaging studies of people with ASD during visual search. 
!
5.7 Conclusion 
While a sizable literature in ASD has investigated search for simple, non-social objects 
(shapes and letters, etc.) and only manipulated low-level attributes of the stimuli, far 
fewer studies have examined visual search with social stimuli. In this study, we used a 
visual search protocol with well-validated social stimuli. We observed reliable attentional 
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deficits in people with ASD, especially social attention. Our findings were further 
corroborated by the following evidence and manipulations: (1) We replicated the 
attentional deficit in ASD in an independent sample of ASD subjects. (2) We conducted a 
control experiment that equated the stimuli in the search array for low-level visual 
properties and ruled out the potential influence from low-level features. (3) Importantly, 
we performed the identical task on amygdala lesion patients, thus enabling a direct 
comparison. Taken together, our study has tested a key hypothesized function of the 
amygdala in autism, and offered both a clear test of this hypothesis, and a convincing 
result—a reliable attentional deficit in ASD, which does not depend on low-level 
properties, nor the amygdala, but on task demands. Our present findings have further 
advanced the understanding of how the brain processes socially salient stimuli and argue 
for at least one further well-characterized deficit of social attention in people with ASD. 
!
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Chapter VI: Future Directions  
!
My thesis has investigated a few socially salient cues, including faces and people, using 
different psychological designs and neuroscience techniques. There are still remaining 
questions for future studies. Some of these questions have been put under investigation, 
and I will outline the questions and some preliminary findings in this section. 
!
6.1 Computational modeling of saliency 
In Chapter III, we used a change detection task to compare three animate cues (animals, 
people and head direction) to two inanimate cues (plants and objects), and in Chapter V, 
we used social (faces and people with different postures, emotions, ages, and genders) 
and a variety of non-social objects (e.g., electronics, food, utensils) for visual search. In 
order to further understand what it is that is special about social cues compared to non-
social cues, it is important to test a larger vocabulary of social cues including eye gaze, 
emotional faces, finger gestures, and body postures. It is also useful to extend the 
investigation to lexical cues. With a larger vocabulary of social cues tested, we can then 
investigate whether there is also a saliency map for these social cues. Note that in both 
Chapter III and Chapter V, we computed and controlled for low-level saliency, in order to 
facilitate comparisons on the semantic level. 
To computationally model saliency and create a comprehensive saliency map including 
social and semantic cues, I was also involved in modeling low-, object- and semantic-
level saliency in natural scenes (Xu et al., 2014). To further understand the social aspect 
of the saliency map, we are extending the current framework to viewers with autism 
spectrum disorder (ASD): is there a difference in saliency representation in ASD? The 
computational model will be fit on the basis of behavior, and then queried in relation to 
the neuronal responses obtained from single-neuron recordings in humans. We will 
acquire two behavioral measures: (i) explicit ratings of interest and saliency from the 
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subjects when they see stimuli, and (ii) implicit saliency derived from where people look: 
their fixations onto stimuli when presented in arrays will index how salient the stimuli are 
(more fixated = more salient). We hypothesize that the behavior of people with ASD can 
best be fit by a model that has different weights for semantic categories (e.g., lower 
weights for faces or humans but higher weights for autism special-interest objects; the 
higher the weights, the more salient to the subject) as well as generally higher weights for 
low-level saliency (corresponding to increased fixations to visual features such as edges 
and flickering stimuli). We will also correlate the attribute values (a vector for each 
image) from this computational model of saliency trial-by-trial with the neuronal 
responses from the amygdala—the best correlated attributes would indicate that the 
amygdala represents them as the most salient. We will analyze this not only categorically 
(diagnosis of ASD), but also along dimensions in the non-autistic population (e.g., with 
questionnaires like the Autism Quotient (AQ) that show a distribution across the 
population). Preliminary analysis has shown a general similarity between people with 
ASD and healthy individuals, but revealed small differences in saliency weights of social 
attributes. 
!
6.2 Investigating face perception 
In Chapter III and Chapter V, we have shown that faces are particularly salient stimuli. In 
Chapter IV, we showed that single-neurons in the human amygdala encode subjectively 
perceived fearful and happy emotions. This opens many ensuing questions: does the 
amygdala track other emotions and to what extent does the amygdala track emotions? Is 
the subjectivity encoded in the amygdala restricted to emotions and faces? Does the 
amygdala track visual saliency or distinctiveness independently of, or disproportionally 
to, other stimulus attributes? Does the amygdala track visual saliency for all stimuli or 
specifically or disproportionally for social stimuli? Are bottom-up saliency and top-down 
saliency both coded in the amygdala? What parameters describing visual stimuli best 
correlate with amygdala activation? Even harder questions include what the neuronal 
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population coding of faces is in the amygdala and where the subjective judgment of faces 
commences. Since we have only tested one set of faces (“bubbled” faces), do amygdala 
neurons track subjective judgment on other face stimuli, especially ambiguous face 
stimuli in which different subjective judgments are possible on an identical face? In this 
case, how can perceptual decisions be formed based on eye movements? On the other 
hand, are there individual differences in subjective face judgment, in particular when 
comparing to neurological populations (e.g., people with autism and patients with 
amygdala lesions)? Are there in-group, out-group, or cultural effects? Neuroimaging 
studies have shown that some brain regions track stimulus strength and represent faces in 
a continuous manner, such as the posterior superior temporal sulcus for morphed 
emotions (Harris et al., 2012) and the fusiform gyrus for morphed genders (Freeman et 
al., 2010), and some other brain regions form categorical judgments, such as the 
amygdala (Harris et al., 2012) and the orbitofrontal cortex (Freeman et al., 2010). What 
are the response characteristics of the amygdala neurons to faces gradually changing 
along one dimension? Is it all the same for faces along many different dimensions? To 
answer these questions, we have conducted the following studies using eye-tracking and 
single-neuron recordings with concurrent eye-tracking. We are also testing the same 
paradigms on people with autism and amygdala lesion patients. These paradigms are 
extendable for future fMRI studies as well. 
!
6.2.1 Investigating how neurons in the amygdala respond to morphed faces 
In Chapter IV, we used “bubbled faces” as stimuli. In each trial, only a certain parts of 
faces were revealed, and different parts of faces were revealed in different trials. These 
stimuli were not particularly natural, and indeed they just look artificial. Also, it is 
difficult to control the relationship between stimulus input and behavioral output given 
variable facial parts shown in each trial. Therefore, in this new study, we are using 
morphed faces, which have ambiguous facial emotions, and most importantly, different 
subjective judgments can be made on an identical face. We have created 5 levels of fear-
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happy morphs (ranging from 30% fear–70% happy to 70% fear–30% happy) and 2 
anchor faces of fear and happy without ambiguity. We present patients with these 
morphed faces and ask them to judge whether the emotion is ‘fear’ or ‘happy’. Using 
these faces, we can confirm whether amygdala neurons encode subjective judgment. 
The gradient of morphs further allows us to test whether amygdala neurons track stimulus 
physical strength in a continuous manner or encode subjective categorization in a binary 
manner. Further research questions involve testing behavioral and electrophysiological 
abnormalities in people with ASD for emotion perception and judgment, with a focus on 
the amygdala. We hypothesize that people with ASD will judge the morphed faces 
differently (more biased towards one emotion and relatively insensitive to blends) and 
that the neuronal response to faces will differ in accordance with the behavior. We will 
specifically examine evoked responses in amygdala, in prefrontal cortex, and in temporal 
cortex, as well as functional connectivity between these regions. This will help to 
determine at what stage of processing the behavioral impairment arises. 
We have recorded more than 250 neurons from 16 sessions from 10 patients. Our 
preliminary analysis has shown that about a third of amygdala neurons track the gradual 
change of emotion in the stimulus. Interestingly, testing the same task on amygdala lesion 
patients and people with autism has revealed increased percentage of fearful judgment on 
the same face, indicating a functional role of the amygdala in face judgment and possible 
deficits of face judgment in people with autism which might be due to amygdala 
dysfunction. 
!
6.2.2 Investigating faces along many dimensions 
In everyday life, people constantly form judgments of others based on purely facial 
features. The objective of this project is to determine which dimension of faces the 
amygdala best tracks and investigate whether there is a difference in people with ASD. 
Established software FaceGen was used to create sets of faces that vary from one 
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dimension to another: “happy vs. fearful”, “anger vs. disgust”, “anger vs. fearful”, “male 
vs. female” and more complex social dimensions, like dominance and trustworthiness. 
This expands the dimensions under investigation and we will still record single neurons 
using these sets of faces. We present subjects with these parameterized faces and ask 
them to judge the face as well as rate the confidence they have in their judgment. 
Preliminary behavioral data that we have collected from healthy individuals have shown 
that subjects are able to pick up subtle changes in facial structures regarding emotion and 
gender in their judgments. We are collecting data from people with ASD and we 
hypothesize that people with ASD will judge some facial dimensions differently 
compared to controls (which would be revealed as shifted psychometric curves) and that 
neuronal responses in the amygdala will track these behavioral differences. Specifically, 
we will measure spike rate from single neurons within the amygdala, and in addition 
examine evoked responses from prefrontal cortex and temporal cortex, as well as 
connectivity between these regions. Furthermore, we will record eye movements when 
subjects view and judge these faces to answer the questions listed in the section below. 
!
6.2.3 Eye-tracking 
One of the very novel aspects in our single-neuron recording setup is to simultaneously 
record eye movements. We can thus investigate how eye movements are related to face 
perception and judgments, and the underlying neural basis of such eye movements. We 
have shown in our previous work that amygdala neurons are tuned to facial features 
(Rutishauser et al., 2013). However, without concurrent eye-tracking, we were only able 
to infer the relationship between neuronal response and eye movement by recalling 
recorded neurosurgical patients to the laboratory for eye-tracking experiments, but not 
able to tell exactly how neurons respond to the fixated facial features. 
In this study, we will investigate how the eye-movement patterns and the underlying 
neural responses determine their decisions. The questions we can analyze are (1) how do 
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fixation density maps / fixation density in specific regions of interest (ROIs) evolve with 
parametrically synthesized faces along different dimensions? (2) For a given face 
(identical visual input), do subjects judge the emotion differently if they look at faces 
differently—is the behavioral choice influenced by the gaze pattern? (3) How is the 
neural response related to the fixation? Specifically, do neurons fire in preparation of a 
fixation towards a facial part, or only once the facial part has in fact been fixated? (4) 
What is the relationship between how facial features drive neuronal response, and how 
they drive fixations by the viewer? We can compare people with ASD and without ASD 
for each question, and we can correlate the eye movement patterns (e.g., fixation density 
in eye ROI) with autism scores (measured by autism questionnaires like Autism Quotient 
(AQ) and Social Responsiveness Scale (SRS)). To investigate these questions, we have 
recorded from five neurosurgical patients with concurrent eye-tracking. Furthermore, in 
the laboratory (not at the hospital), we are administering the task behaviorally in a larger 
sample (N = 10–20) of people with autism and matched controls (neither surgical 
patients) in order to check that the surgical patients are representative in terms of their 
behavior. 
!
6.3 Investigating saliency in visual search 
In Chapter V, we have shown that healthy individuals can adopt an efficient search 
strategy with top-down task instructions. But what are the underlying neural mechanisms 
of this behavior? It is known that the amygdala plays an important role in detecting 
saliency and biological relevance. How do amygdala neurons respond to salient and 
target-relevant objects (compared to task-irrelevant objects) in the visual search? 
Furthermore, is there a difference in response between social and non-social objects? Is 
there a difference in neuronal response between people with ASD and controls? How do 
neurons respond to eye movements? Specifically, do amygdala neurons fire in 
preparation of a fixation towards a salient target, or only once the target has in fact been 
fixated (that is, are amygdala responses cause or consequence of visual attention). If 
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neurosurgical patients co-morbid with autism are available, we expect that the proportion 
of face-responsive neurons in the amygdala will be lower in ASD, whereas the proportion 
of neurons responsive to autism special-interest objects will be higher. This would 
indicate that the amygdala represents salient stimuli, and that what is salient differs in 
ASD. We would also expect reduced response to socially relevant objects, in accordance 
with the behavioral findings shown in Chapter V. 
To answer these questions, we have been conducting further experiments with single-
neuron recordings in neurosurgical patients with concurrent eye-tracking. It is well 
known that the human medial temporal lobe plays a key role in analyzing and 
recognizing visual objects, purported to convey saliency and object selection signals 
through its dense network with other cortical regions. Using the same task as in Chapter 
V, we have recorded from over 150 single neurons in the amygdalae and hippocampi of 
four neurosurgical patients (five sessions) with implanted depth electrodes. Behaviorally, 
we found patients rapidly oriented to, and persistently searched among, target-congruent 
objects, consistent with the findings of healthy individuals shown in Chapter V. Trial-by-
trial analysis showed that 11.7% (8.3% for amygdala and 16.7% for hippocampus) of 
neurons responded only when a target was found. Fixation analysis revealed neurons that 
responded only when a fixation fell on a target but not a distractor. By comparing the 
average number of spikes in a time window of the entire fixation duration between 
fixations on targets and distractors, we selected 24.2% of these target neurons (9.7% for 
amygdala and 45.8% for hippocampus; two-tailed t-test at p < 0.05; among which 82.3% 
increased firing rate to targets and 17.2% decreased). Since the same objects can be either 
targets or distractors on different trials, this reveals the top-down driven nature of the 
response, which suggests that task-relevant target saliency was encoded by a subset of 
neurons. We further conducted two control experiments in the same patients: one ruled 
out motor confounds by applying a fixed duration of search in the same task without 
button press, and the second ruled out working memory or object matching confounds by 
employing a pop-out search task in which the target was defined as one face among 
vehicles or one vehicle among faces (thus no pre-defined target). We also found 21.7% 
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(27.8% for amygdala and 12.5% for hippocampus) of neurons that responded more to 
social objects than to non-social objects. Interestingly, there was a small population (4%) 
of target-responsive neurons that differentiated social vs. non-social objects both during 
single target presentation and subsequent target detection in the search array. Taken 
together, we found compelling evidence that neurons in the human medial temporal lobe 
encode object categories and saliency signals that contribute to attention. 
!
6.4 More ecologically valid stimuli 
A last note is that all the stimuli used in my thesis are in 2D. To be more ecologically 
valid, stimuli in 3D or face-to-face real person interactions will be necessary. 
Furthermore, we have been using eye-tracking with high temporal and spatial precision, 
but it is more desirable to have people wear small eye-trackers in glasses while they walk 
around the real world.  These are challenging future extensions that I am not immediately 
planning to pursue, but they are important to think about nonetheless. 
!
6.5 Conclusion 
Findings from my research will have applications to how we interact with other people 
and the environment, in both the real world and in virtual environments such as through 
the internet. How can one grab and guide another’s attention most efficiently? How can 
one influence another’s attention and memory through structured presentation of items? 
How can we help and train people with autism given the identified attentional deficits? 
Can we build biologically plausible computational models of social saliency and build 
social robots? My thesis contributes to understanding these questions.  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